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Policy Summary
This book presents and analyzes the historical background of the unemploy
ment insurance (UI) funding problems of the 1970s and 1980s, followed by
a model-based assessment of potential funding problems for future years. Con
cluding that a serious recession in the near future would cause several states
to need UI loans from the U.S. Treasury, the author presents a discussion of
a possible new federal role for enhancing UI solvency. "Even if the federal
government were not to modify its present laissez-faire policy stance,'' he says,
"it might take actions that would affect the risk of insolvency in the states."
In the case of a recession, likely candidates for borrowing would be states
whose reserve ratio multiples were less than .5 (Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas, for example). The regional pat
tern of the recession would also influence which states would become largescale borrowers.
Under present federal policy regarding UI financing, the states are held
responsible for funding their own programs, using any combination of fund
ing strategies (pre-funding, automatic pay-as-you-go financing, or discretionary
pay-as-you-go financing). Alternatively, the author suggests, federal policy
could encourage the states to (1) achieve a trust fund solvency standard; (2)
enact more flexible financing legislation; or (3) participate in a cost sharing/cost
reimbursement arrangement whereby reserves from prosperous states are made
available to those with funding problems. A cost reinsurance plan would mean
the states would pay into a common fund and those with unusually bad ex
periences would receive payments for part or all of the excess costs due to
unforeseeable events. Under a cost equalization plan, states with excessive
cost burdens arising from economic factors beyond state control would receive
payments from the U.S. Treasury or from a cost equalization fund.
Under cost reinsurance or cost equalization, exclusive state responsibility
for UI financing would be ended. Although any such plan would need to ad
dress many specific implementation questions and issues, the main principle
is that there would be shared responsibility for funding excess costs incurred
by the states experiencing the worst economic conditions.
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Background
of the
Financing Problem
State unemployment insurance (UI) pays benefits that provide par
tial wage loss replacement for the unemployed. It has been an impor
tant social insurance program in the U.S. for more than 50 years. Pro
gram benefits to unemployed workers provide a degree of income securi
ty for many families and enhance the built-in stability of the
macroeconomy. Payroll taxes levied on covered employers and paid
into trust funds maintained at the U.S. Treasury are the sole source
of funding for most state UI programs. In all states the payroll taxes
are (partially) experience rated, i.e., benefit claims filed mainly by
employees on temporary or permanent layoff influence the tax rates
levied on individual employers. The three main objectives of state UI
are to provide partial wage loss replacement for individual workers,
to enhance the automatic or built-in stability of the economy, and to pro
mote worker attachment with individual employers through experience
rating of employer taxes (Haber and Murray 1966, chapter 1).
During the 1980s there were two major developments in state
unemployment insurance; an unprecedented reliance on loans from the
U.S. Treasury to make benefit payments, and a sizable reduction in
the availability of program benefits to the unemployed. Both
developments are related to a problem of inadequate benefit financing,
which first emerged in the 1970s. Trust fund balances in many states
have not been large enough to meet the heavy demand for benefits from
eligible unemployed workers. Individual states in this situation have
responded in different ways: by borrowing from the U.S. Treasury,
raising UI taxes, and/or restricting the availability of UI benefits. Among
the states that have incurred UI debts there has been a sharp increase
in the pace of debt repayment in the 1980s.
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Loans, Debt and Debt Repayment
For more than 30 years following the creation of the state UI pro
grams in the mid-1930s, the system of financing benefit payments with
trust fund reserves functioned quite well. Large trust fund accumula
tions occurred in all states before and during World War II. Following
the recessions of 1949, 1954, 1958 and 1960-61, nominal trust fund
balances were largely restored to pre-recession levels. In almost all states
fund balances proved adequate when benefit payments rose during a
later recession.
Prior to the 1970s there were three instances where trust fund balances
became sufficiently depleted to necessitate state borrowing. Alaska,
Michigan and Pennsylvania secured loans from the U.S. Treasury in
the 1950s and early 1960s under loan provisions included in federal
UI legislation. l In two instances (Michigan and Pennsylvania) the state's
trust fund balance never actually was exhausted, so that the loans were
not used to make benefit payments. Alaska, which first borrowed in
1955, did use its loans to make benefit payments and had a negative
net fund balance from 1957 to 1963. The loans to all three states were
eventually repaid after fund balances had been restored to more ade
quate levels. 2
Although trust fund balances were generally adequate to pay UI
benefits in this period, there was a gradual erosion of fund adequacy
caused by increased employment and inflation of the 1950s and 1960s.
Between the end of 1948 and the end of 1969, for example, the nominal
level of trust fund reserves for all state UI programs increased from
$7.6 billion to $12.6 billion. Due to inflation and growth in covered
employment, however, total payrolls of taxable covered employers in
creased from $96.1 billion in 1948 to $365.7 billion in 1969. Thus net
reserves as a share of total covered payrolls declined from 7.9 percent
in 1948 to 3.4 percent in 1969. 3
Table 1.1 summarizes information on state trust fund balances, loans,
debt and debt repayment over the period from 1969 to 1989. The table
shows aggregates of annual data for 53 UI programs; the 50 states plus
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Also in
cluded in the table are a business cycle indicator (the unemployment
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rate) and the annual flows of UI benefit payments and tax receipts. In
each of the four recessionary periods covered by table 1.1 (1970-71,
1974-75, 1980 and 1982) total benefit payments responded strongly as
unemployment increased. In annual data the peak-to-trough percentage
increases in benefit payments for the four recessions were as follows;
1969 to 1971-149 percent, 1973 to 1975-219 percent, 1979 to 1980-63
percent and 1981 to 1982-55 percent.
The experience rating of employer UI taxes operates with a lag. Con
sequently, when benefit outlays rise in recessions there is little immediate
response of tax receipts, and trust fund balances declined during each
of the recessionary periods covered by table 1.1. The observed time
path of the aggregate trust fund balance reflects the functioning of
unemployment insurance as an automatic stabilizer, i.e., benefit
payments exceed tax receipts during recessions.
The economic downturn of 1970-71 was rather mild compared to some
earlier recessions, and fund balances were generally adequate. Although
benefit outflows from state trust funds more than doubled between 1969
and 1971, the two-year decline in aggregate reserves was only $2.9
billion (to $9.7 billion at the end of 1971) and over the next two years
$1.2 billion was restored. The aggregate trust fund balances of $10.9
billion at the end of 1973, however, represented only 2.1 percent of
covered payrolls, down from 3.4 percent at the end of 1969. Also, to
make benefit payments in 1972 and 1973, Connecticut and Washington
secured loans from the U.S. Treasury which totaled $94 million. Both
states experienced very high unemployment between 1970 and 1973
and their reserves were not adequate to meet the increased demand for
benefit payments. 4
The downturn of 1973-75 was very severe, with the total unemploy
ment rate reaching a peak of 8.5 percent in 1975. This recession also
was characterized by a high rate of wage and price inflation. The
simultaneous occurrence of high unemployment and high inflation (term
ed stagflation) caused benefit outlays to increase by more than three
times between 1973 and 1975 (from $4.1 billion to $13.0 billion). As
benefit payments rose, net reserves fell sharply and reached $3.1 billion
by the end of 1975. Borrowing by insolvent UI programs became
widespread in 1975 and continued for the succeeding three years.
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Table 1.1 shows that 16 different UI programs needed loans in 1975,
and over the next three years the numbers that borrowed were 23, 20
and 11, respectively. The volume of loans was actually highest in 1976,
the year after the business cycle trough but a year of unusually high
long-term unemployment. 5 UI programs with small and negative net
reserve balances borrowed $1.9 billion in 1976, as well as $1.5 billion
in 1975 and $1.3 billion in 1977. Over the entire six-year period from
1974 through 1979, loans totaling $5.54 billion were disbursed to 25
different UI programs (22 states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands). The loans represented 10.0 percent of
total UI benefit payments made during these six years.
During 1978 and 1979, net trust fund reserves increased $7.7 billion.
Because reserves had been so severely depleted in the preceding reces
sion, however, net reserves at the end of 1979 totaled only $8.6 billion
or .90 percent of total covered payrolls. Thus at the end of 1979 the
aggregate net reserve percentage was roughly 43 percent of what it had
been at the end of 1973 and only 26 percent of what it had been at the
end of the previous decade. Given the widespread incidence of reserve
inadequacy manifest during and after the 1973-75 downturn, it is clear
that UI programs entered the 1980s in a worse overall financial posi
tion than they entered the 1970s. In fact, as shown in table 1.1, 13 pro
grams entered the 1980s with outstanding debts associated with loans
they had received in the 1970s.
Back-to-back recessions in 1980 and 1981-82 caused the demand for
benefit payments to rise again in the early 1980s. Renewed borrowing
commenced in 1980 and peaked in 1982 and 1983, the years of highest
unemployment over the entire post World War n period. Loans during
1982 and 1983 totaled $11.8 billion, and the number of programs needing
loans peaked at 28 in 1983. Loans also continued after 1983 with $9.1
billion of disbursements from the U.S. Treasury between 1984 and 1987.
Only $.2 billion was borrowed after 1987.
Over the eight years from 1980 to 1987, when borrowing was a com
mon occurrence, loans totaling $24.0 billion were made to 32 insol
vent UI programs. By year, the number of states needing loans ranged
from a low of 8 in 1980 and 1987 to a high of 28 in 1983. The loans
represented 19.2 percent of total benefits paid by the states to unemployed
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workers in these eight years. Loans were roughly twice as important
to the states during 1980-87 as they had been during 1974-79 (19.2
percent of benefits versus 10.0 percent respectively in the two periods).
Because so many UI programs entered the 1980s with low net
balances, the large benefit outlays of 1982 and 1983 caused aggregate
net reserves to turn negative and reach a deficit of $5.8 billion at the
end of 1983. The net indebtedness of the 23 debtor programs at the
end of 1983 exceeded the positive balances of the other 30 programs
by almost $6 billion. This situation had never occurred in the entire
previous history of state UI programs in the United States.
Since 1983 the states have made sustained and large-scale additions
to net reserves. For the six years 1984 through 1989, net reserves in
creased by $8.0, $7.9, $5.3, $7.8, $8.7, and $5.0 billion respectively.
Tax receipts plus interest income have exceeded benefit outlays by
substantial margins in these years. By the end of 1989 the net fund
balance across all 53 programs stood at $36.9 billion.
Because the recent build-up of net reserves started from such a low
level, however, the total of net fund balances at the end of 1989 was
still modest relative to the total scale of the UI programs. The $36.9
billion of net reserves represented just 1.9 percent of total covered
payrolls in 1989. This was higher than the reserve percentage at the
end of 1979 (.9 percent) but less than the reserve percentage at the end
of 1973 (2.1 percent) which proved inadequate to fully cover benefit
payments made during the 1973-75 recession. Thus despite the largescale trust fund accumulations of the 1984-89 period, the level of net
trust fund balances at the end of 1989 did not seem to be sufficient to
obviate the need for further loans if another serious recession were to
follow.
Table 1.1 also shows that debtor programs made large-scale loan
repayments in each year from 1983 through 1987. Repayments in these
years were so large, ranging from $3.6 billion to $6.8 billion, that state
indebtedness was largely eliminated. By the end of 1987, only three
states had outstanding debts (Michigan, Pennsylvania and Texas) and
the volume of remaining debt, $2.1 billion, was the lowest since the
end of 1975. Two years later these numbers had been further reduced
to one state and $.6 billion of debt. State UI programs during the
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mid-to-late 1980s increased their net reserves substantially while at the
same time repaying most of their outstanding debt.
The rapid rate of loan repayments observed in the mid-1980s stands
in sharp contrast to repayment activities of the 1970s. Of the $5.6 billion
in loans received by UI programs between 1972 and 1979, only $1.8
billion was repaid during the 1970s and most of this ($1.3 billion) oc
curred in 1979. Debt repayment of the 1980s has involved "old" debt,
i.e., debt incurred prior to 1980, as well as more recent debt.
To summarize: (1) Because of inadequate trust fund reserves, many
state UI programs had to borrow to make benefit payments during and
after the recessions of 1974-75, 1980 and 1981-82. (2) The volume
of borrowing has been higher in the 1980s both in absolute dollar amounts
and relative to the volume of benefit payments. Loans equaled 10.0 per
cent of benefits from 1974 to 1979 but 19.2 percent of benefits from
1980 to 1987. (3) Loan repayments have been much more rapid in the
1980s than they were in the 1970s. (4) Despite large-scale net reserve
accumulations that occurred between 1984 and 1989, the net reserve
percentage (net reserves as a percent of total covered payrolls) at the
end of 1989 was less than it had been at the end of 1973 and many
states were faced with the threat of insolvency if there were to be another
recession.

Unemployment and Unemployment
Insurance Benefits in the 1980s

Coincident with the serious financing problems experienced by UI
programs in the 1980s, there have also been noticeable cutbacks in the
availability of program benefits. The cutbacks have affected benefits
paid under regular UI programs and benefits for long term unemploy
ment. These cutbacks have occurred despite changes in unemployment
which, on balance, would be expected to increase (or, at least, not
decrease) the proportion of unemployed workers receiving UI benefits
in the 1980s. The changes in unemployment will be briefly reviewed
before examining the reductions in benefit availability.
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Table 1.2 presents summary information on unemployment for the
40 years 1948 to 1987 with data grouped into four intervals; 1948-59,
1960-69,1970-79 and 1980-87. Note that average unemployment rates
have been higher in the 1970s and 1980s than in earlier years and were
especially high in the 1980s. The 7.7 percent average unemployment
rate of 1980-87 is the highest rate experienced for an eight year period
since World War H. The lowest annual rate for 1980-87 (6.2 percent
in 1987) just matches the average unemployment rate for the 1970s.
Labor force growth since World War II has been less rapid for adult
men than for other segments of the working population 16 and older.
Since adult men experience below average unemployment rates, the
growing labor force shares of young workers and adult women have
been a factor tending to raise the overall unemployment rate. Note in
table 1.2, for example, that while the average unemployment rate for
men 25 and older was 3.6 percent in both 1948-59 and 1970-79, the
overall rates were 4.6 percent and 6.2 percent respectively for these
two periods. From a comparison of the rates for men 25 and older and
''all others," it is clear that relative unemployment rates for adult men
declined noticeably over the 1948-1979 period.
In the 1980s, however, the relative unemployment rate as well as the
absolute rate for adult men increased sharply. In fact, the gains in relative
unemployment realized by adult men between 1948 and 1979 have been
completely reversed in the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1987, their
unemployment rate averaged .616 of the rate for all other demographic
groups, the highest relative rate for adult men of all four periods covered
by table 1.2. Comparing the 1980s with the 1970s, the average
unemployment rate for other labor force groups increased by .8 percent
age points (from 8.5 percent to 9.3 percent), while the rate increased
by 2.2 percentage points (from 3.6 percent to 5.8 percent) for adult men.
The 1980s have also had a very high incidence of long term unemploy
ment. Table 1.2 shows that the proportion of workers unemployed 27
weeks or longer averaged .160 in the 1980s, whereas in the previous
decades the proportion averaged .110 or less. The proportion
unemployed 27 weeks or longer has been nearly twice as high in the
1980s as it was in the period from 1948 to 1959.

Table 1.2
Measures of Average Unemployment, 1948 to 1987
Unemployment rate (percent)
Relative
unemployment for
men 25+

Proportion
unemployed
27 weeks
or longer

Ratio of
insured to total
unemployment

.578

.088

.492

All
persons

Men 25 +

All
others

1948-59

4.6

3.6

6.1

1960-69

4.8

3.1

6.7

.457

.105

.417

1970-79

6.2

3.6

8.5

.419

.110

.402

1980-87

7.7

5.8

9.3

.616

.160

.337

W

SOURCE: All data from the U.S. Department of Labor.
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The three unusual aspects of unemployment in the 1980s (very high
overall unemployment, high relative unemployment among adult men
and the high incidence of long term unemployment) are closely inter
related. Economic developments such as plant closings, industrial
restructuring, increased import competition and rapidly declining
unionization appear to be more prevalent in the 1980s than in earlier
decades and causing large numbers of workers to experience serious
problems of adjustment in the labor market. Adult men with extensive
employment histories and long tenure at high-paying jobs appear to be
particularly susceptible to job displacement and then to experience prob
lems in securing reemployment.
To illustrate the interrelatedness of the three unemployment
phenomena, a time series regression analysis was conducted to explain
the proportion of workers unemployed 27 weeks or longer (PU27). The
primary explanatory variable was the overall unemployment rate (TUR).
When unemployment rises, the amount of long-term unemployment also
rises. The prevalence of long-term unemployment tends to lag behind
overall unemployment so that the regression specification used the lagged
unemployment rate (TURL) as well as the current rate. Because adult
men are often subject to long spells of unemployment and have experienc
ed variation in their relative unemployment rates, the specification also
incorporated an unemployment mix variable, unemployment of men 25
and older as a proportion of total unemployment (UM25TU). Finally,
the regression included a correction for first order serial correlation
(RHO).
For the period 1949 to 1979, the fitted equation based on annual data
was as follows (with t ratios appearing beneath the coefficients):
(1)PU27=-.135 + 1.74TUR+1.67TURL-K169UM25TV-K766RHO
(4.6) (7.8)
(8.7)
(2.0)
(5.5)
R2 = .914
Std. Error=.0115
1949-1979
Equation (1) explained over 90 percent of the variance in the longterm unemployment proportion. When the unemployment rate rises,
long-term unemployment responds strongly with large effects attributable
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to both the current and the lagged unemployment rate. Unemployment
mix, the proportion accounted for by men 25 and older, also enters equa
tion (1) significantly, but its effect is quantitatively much smaller than
the effects of the overall unemployment rate.
Equation (1) made accurate projections of the long-term unemploy
ment proportion for the 1980s. Over the eight-year interval from 1980
to 1987 the average projection from the equation was .175, which was
only .015 higher than the actual average of. 160. 6 The standard devia
tion of the eight projection errors was .0184 compared to the equation's
standard error of .0115 for the 1949-1979 estimation period. Most of
the explanation for the high long-term unemployment proportion of the
1980s came from the effects of the current and lagged unemployment
rate. If the adult male unemployment rate had retained its previous
relative relationship vis a vis other unemployment rates into the 1980s,
equation (1) then predicted the average long-term unemployment pro
portion for the 1980s to be .168 rather than .175. About 88 percent
of the increase in long-term unemployment of the 1980s was attributable
to the current and lagged effects of higher overall unemployment rates. 7
On balance, the combined effects of the three unusual aspects of 1980s
unemployment (high overall unemployment, high relative unemploy
ment among adult men, and the high proportion of long-term unemploy
ment) should probably have caused the proportion of the unemployed
claiming UI benefits to rise. In fact, the standard indicator of claims
activity for the regular UI programs, the ratio of insured unemploy
ment (IU) to total unemployment (TU), declined noticeably in the 1980s. 8
Table 1.2 shows that the IU/TU ratio decreased from .402 in the 1970s
to .337 in the 1980s. Thus in the recent period of very high average
unemployment the fraction of workers claiming regular state UI benefits
declined to its lowest level since World War II.
The decline in the IU/TU ratio of the 1980s has been widely noted.
To document the unexpected component of the decline, a multiple regres
sion analysis was conducted: For the period from 1948 to 1979, the
IU/TU ratio was explained with three arguments: the total unemploy
ment rate (TUR), the total unemployment rate lagged one year (TURL),
and the demographic mix of unemployment (the proportion of total
unemployment accounted for by men 25 and older (UM25TU)). When
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unemployment rises, the proportion who are job losers increases and
this raises the IU/TU ratio. The lagged unemployment rate proxies for
the effect of exhaustions, and TURL is expected to have a negative ef
fect on the IU/TU ratio. Adult men are the demographic group most
likely to collect benefit,9 so that UM25TU is expected to have a positive
effect.
The regression result for the 1949-1979 period (with a correction for
first order serial correlation (RHO) and t ratios beneath the coefficients)
is shown as equation (2):
(2) IU/TU=.307+1.53TUR - 2.44TURL+.498UM25TU+.440RHO
(6.9) (3.5)
(5.8)
(5.9)
(2.4)
R2 =.842
Std. Error=.0241
1949-1979
All coefficients have expected signs and all are statistically significant.
Over 80 percent of the variation in the IU/TU ratio is explained by the
regression.
In equation (2), the net effect of sustained high unemployment is to
lower the IU/TU ratio, i.e., the negative coefficient on TURL is larger
than the positive coefficient of TUR. Since long-term unemployment
and benefit exhaustions have been high in the 1980s, they have tended
to reduce the IU/TU ratio in this decade. However, the increase in the
adult male share of total unemployment has tended to raise the ratio.
When equation (2) was used to project the IU/TU ratio for the
1980-1987 period, the average projected value was .417 or .079 higher
than the actual average of .337. Between the ten years of the 1970s
and the eight years of the 1980s, the regression projected the average
IU/TU ratio to increase by .025 (from .392 to .417), whereas the ac
tual ratio decreased by .065 (from .402 to .337). There clearly has been
a major cutback in the availability of regular UI benefits in the 1980s.
Equation (2) suggests that the actual availability of regular benefits (as
proxied by the IU/TU ratio) has been about 81 percent of what would
have been expected based on program performance over the 1949-1979
period, i.e., the actual IU/TU ratio of .337 is 80.9 percent of the pro
jected ratio of .417.
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As of mid-1990, a consensus has not been reached as to the cause
(or, more likely, the causes) for the recent decline in the IU/TU ratio.
Besides the three factors explicitly included as arguments in equation
(2) the level of overall unemployment, the lagged level of unemploy
ment (a proxy for the effects of exhaustions), and the demographic mix
of unemployment several other factors have also been suggested. Four
suggested factors are: (1) changes in the industrial distribution of
unemployment; (2) change in the regional distribution of unemploy
ment; (3) taxation of UI benefits; and (4) financing problems experienced
by several large UI program in the 1980s, e.g., Illinois, Michigan, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania.
There have been long-term trends in the shares of employment and
unemployment by industry since World War II, towards trade, finance
and services and away from mining, manufacturing and transportation.
Because fewer unemployed workers claim benefits in the growing in
dustries relative to the declining industries, the trends can cause the
IU/TU ratio to decline, and perhaps at an accelerated rate in the 1980s. 10
A similar argument applies with respect to the geographic distribution
of unemployment. Generally, IU/TU ratios are lower in southern and
western states, which are growing more rapidly than northeastern and
midwestern states. n Program benefits have been taxable under federal
and state personal income taxes since 1979, and this may have reduced
the financial incentives for some workers to apply, particularly second
earners in high-income households. The timing of the changes in the
tax treatment of UI benefits (partially taxable from 1979 through 1986
and fully taxable since 1987) roughly matches the period of decline in
the IU/TU ratio.
Particularly relevant for the concerns of the present investigation is
the possible contribution of UI financing problems to the decline in
benefit availability. It is clear in state data that IU/TU ratios have declined
sharply in several large industrial states that have experienced financ
ing problems in the 1980s. To the extent that financing problems cause
individual states to restrict benefit availability (through both formal
legislation and changes in administrative procedures) avoiding future
financing problems could contribute positively to UI benefit availabili
ty in future periods.
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The decline in the IU/TU ratio has been a concern of UI ad
ministrators, policy makers and worker representatives. To help pro
vide a systematic explanation for this phenomenon, the UI Service of
the U.S. Department of Labor has sponsored two research projects,
the larger and more recent of which was completed in mid-1988 (Burtless
and Saks 1984; Corson and Nicholson 1988). Of the research completed
to date, including these two studies, three findings are noteworthy. (1)
All agree there has been a major decline in the IU/TU ratio in the 1980s.
The behavior of the ratio in the 1980s represents a sharp break from
its behavior in earlier decades. (2) A long list of potential contributing
factors has been identified. Besides factors discussed earlier (benefit
exhaustions, demographic mix, industrial mix, regional mix, taxation
of benefits, UI financing problems), changes in the EB program, changed
treatment of the pension benefit offset and changes in the measurement
of total unemployment in the CPS have also been suggested. (3) No
consensus has emerged as to the weighting to place on different factors
in contributing to the decline in the IU/TU ratio. This third point is
amply illustrated by the cautionary tone of the conclusions offered in
the report by Corson and Nicholson (1988, p. 117.)
Indicative of current understanding of the causes for the decline is
the summary provided by Corson and Nicholson (1988, pp. 117-138).
The following list of causal factors is taken from table VI. 1 of their
report. For each factor they supplied a high estimate and a low estimate
of its percentage contribution to the reduction in the IU/TU ratio be
tween 1971-79 and 1980-86. In their high estimates, whose sum fully
accounted for the decline, eight different factors accounted for at least
10 percent of the total: (1) industry mix of unemployment; (2) geographic
mix of unemployment; (3) taxation of benefits; (4) changes in the CPS
measures of total unemployment; and four state-level policy actions
which restricted eligibility: (5) monetary qualifying requirements; (6)
voluntary separation denials; (7) misconduct denials; and (8) disquali
fying income denials. Although Corson and Nicholson did not try to
determine how many state policy actions of the 1980s were motivated
by UI financing problems, the types of changes which they identified
as important are all discussed in chapter 2 of my earlier analysis of debtor
state policy actions in the 1980-1984 period (Vroman 1986).
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Regardless of the full explanation for the lower IU/TU ratio and the
contribution attributable to funding problems in the states, the decline
signals a reduction in UI benefit availability in the 1980s. The decline
means that state UI is functioning less adequately both in maintaining
the income of individual unemployed workers and as an automatic
stabilizer of aggregate economic activity.
Besides the reductions in IU/TU ratios which relate to benefits from
regular state UI programs, the 1980s have also witnessed reductions
in benefits targeted on the long-term unemployed. Benefits from the
federal-state Extended Benefits (EB) program were restricted follow
ing federal legislation of 1981 which changed the way that EB programs
in the states could be activated. 12 Furthermore, the temporary emergency
program of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) was smaller and
was enacted later in the cyclical downturn of the 1980s than the cor
responding program of Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) that ex
isted during 1975-1977. Due to differences in the availability of both
EB and emergency benefits, annualized real per capita benefits for the
long-term unemployed averaged $5545 in 1975-77, but only $2014 in
1982-84. Benefits for long-term unemployment declined much more
in the 1980s than benefits from the regular state UI programs. 13
Indicative of a probable link between UI financing problems and
benefit availability are state data on changes in IU/TU ratios in the 1980s.
Between 1980 and 1987 the UI programs in the four large industrial
states of Illinois, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania were continuously
in debt to the U.S. Treasury. In contrast, four other large states, Califor
nia, Florida, Massachusetts and New York, have been debt-free in the
1980s (except for Massachusetts which completed its debt repayments
in 1980). Table 1.3 focuses on unemployment and insured unemploy
ment in the two groups of states during the late 1970s and the 1980s.
For comparative purposes, national data are also included in the table.
Unemployment rates in the four large debtor states have been high
in the 1980s and substantially higher than they were in the late 1970s.
The simple average of the TURs for the four during 1980-87 was 9.7
percent, 3.3 percentage points higher than in 1978-79. In contrast, the
four debt-free states with large UI fund balances experienced little in
crease in average unemployment rates in the 1980s; an average increase

Table 1.3
Unemployment Rates and IU/TU Ratios in the 1980s
Ratio of insured
unemployment to
total unemployment

Total
unemployment rate
(percent)
1978-79

1980-87

Change

1978-79

1986-87

ffa
Change

o
**»
S-

Four states with continuous and
large UI debts
Illinois
Michigan
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Simple average

5.8
7.4
5.6
6.9
6.4

9.1
11.6
9.5
8.6
9.7

3.3
4.2
3.9
1.7
3.3

0.464
0.464
0.358
0.501
0.447

0.299
0.308
0.280
0.420
0.327

-0.165
-0.156
-0.078
-0.081
-0.120

Four states with large UI trust
fund balances
California
Florida
Massachusetts
New York
Simple average

6.6
6.3
5.8
7.4
6.5

7.7
6.6
5.3
7.2
6.7

1.1
0.3
-0.5
-0.2
0.2

0.408
0.226
0.462
0.436
0.383

0.434
0.175
0.540
0.388
0.384

0.026
-0.051
0.078
-0.048
0.001

U.S. total

6.0

7.7

1.7

0.379

0.313

-0.066

T1

SOURCE: All data from the U.S. Department of Labor.

Background of the Financing Problem

17

of .2 percentage points compared to the national average increase of
1.7 percentage points.
Table 1.3 also shows that IU/TU ratios declined sharply in the four
debtor states. The simple average of the declines between 1978-79 and
1986-87 was .120, or nearly double the national decline of .066. In
contrast, the IU/TU ratios were not much different in 1986-87 com
pared to 1978-79 in the four other states, increasing in California and
Massachusetts but declining in Florida and New York.
It should not be surprising that IU/TU ratios declined substantially
in the four debtor states. Each of the four enacted major UI solvency
legislation in 1982 or 1983 to gain financial advantages in debt
repayments under terms of the 1983 Social Security Amendments. 14
Benefit reductions were an important part of the 1982-83 solvency
legislation in each of the four states. Additionally, three of the four (all
but Ohio) had previously enacted legislation to reduce benefits in either
1980 or 1981. These statutory changes undoubtedly contribute to the
reductions in the IU/TU ratios observed in table 1.3. To date, no one
has conducted research to precisely estimate how much state legisla
tion has contributed to the reduced IU/TU ratios in these states. Corson and Nicholson's (1988) conclusion is that state legislation may ac
count for about one-third of the general decline in the 1980-86 period
but their estimates may well have underestimated the size of the effect
in debtor states like the four included in table 1.3. Further, they do
not draw attention to the federal financial incentives that prompted the
state legislation following the 1983 Social Security Amendments.

Changing Patterns of Debt Repayment
After a state UI program borrows from the U.S. Treasury, it will
pay off the debt by making voluntary repayments or through credit reduc
tions mandated under statutory provisions of the Federal Unemploy
ment Tax Act (PUTA). States that make voluntary payments control
the size and the timing of their payments. In contrast, credit reductions
under FUTA take place according to a fixed schedule which commences
after a loan has been outstanding on January 1 of two consecutive years,
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with an initial credit reduction rate (penalty tax rate) of .3 percent of
taxable payroll. 15 The penalty tax rate rises as unpaid loans have been
outstanding for longer periods of time. The year-to-year increments in
penalty tax rates have varied in different past periods and have depend
ed upon the financial circumstances of individual states.
The penalty taxes that ensure the eventual repayment by debtor states
are technically tax credit reductions applied against the Federal
Unemployment Tax (PUT), whose statutory tax rate was 6.2 percent
in 1990. State UI programs must conform to certain federal standards,
e.g., in 1990 the tax base must be at least $7,000 per worker, the max
imum statutory employer tax rate must be at least 5.4 percent of covered
payroll and the state must have an approved method for experience rating
individual employers, 16 to receive a PUT tax credit of 5.4 percent which
reduces the federal tax rate from 6.2 percent to .8 percent. A debtor
state subject to mandatory loan repayment provisions receives smaller
PUT tax credits, i.e., 5.1 percent rather than 5.4 percent in the first
year of mandatory debt repayment. The credit reductions that ensure
debt repayment are applied at a single flat rate to all employers in the
debtor state.
The distinction between voluntary and mandatory debt repayment is
somewhat artificial since a state can avoid mandatory repayments in
a given year if the size of its voluntary repayment equals or exceeds
the mandatory repayment required for that year, while at the same time
satisfying other statutory financial requirements. In the 1980s there were
four financial requirements: (1) repay all current year loans by November
1st; (2) repay any PUT penalty tax (credit reduction) that was due for
the current year; (3) not borrow from the U.S. Treasury during the next
12 months; and, (4) have a trust fund balance sufficient to pay at least
three months of benefits (for the November-January period). If a state
satisfied these requirements and wanted to make the current year's repay
ment with experience-rated taxes, it could use the proceeds from a pro
portional supplemental tax surcharge rather than do nothing and be sub
ject to a PUT penalty tax (credit reduction).
The mandatory debt repayment provisions under FUTA were not con
sistently applied to debtor states in the 1970s. Federal legislation enacted
in 1976 and in 1978 deferred the full implementation of the repayment
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provisions until 1980. In 1980, when the provisions did become fully
operative, nine states were subject to penalty taxes. Penalty tax receipts
are payable in the year following the year when they accrue.
Loans to insolvent UI programs were interest free in all periods
through March 31, 1982. Under provisions of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, however, loans made after March 1982 have
been interest bearing. Interest is charged on loans that are not fully repaid
in the same fiscal year they are received. The rate of interest charged
for these advances is the same as the interest rate earned by states with
positive trust fund balances, but subject to a maximum of 10 percent
per year. The imposition of interest charges began just as the economy
was experiencing a major recession. Consequently, most loans made
in the 1980s have been interest bearing loans.
Because of the large volume of loans required by the states in the
early 1980s it became clear that debt repayment would place serious
financial burdens on many states with large UI debts. To ease some
of these financial burdens federal UI legislation enacted in 1981, 1982
and 1983 included provisions which lessened PUT penalty taxes (credit
reduction rates), and modified the terms of repayment and the interest
charges on loans. 17
It is now clear that charging interest on loans has prompted impor
tant changes in loan repayment behavior. Since 1983, debtor states have
been very prompt in repaying debt, particularly interest-bearing debt.
Table 1.4 summarizes annual data on loans, debt, and debt repay
ment in the 1970s and 1980s, with interest-free advances distinguished
from interest-bearing advances. Of the $29.84 billion in loans secured
in these years, $10.47 billion was interest-free and $19.36 billion was
interest-bearing. The outstanding debt remaining at the end of 1989 total
ed only $.60 billion, and none of it was interest-bearing debt. Thus,
by the end of the period covered by table 1.4, all the interest-bearing
loans had been repaid compared to 94.3 percent of the interest-free loans.
Despite the fact that all interest-free advances were made prior to April
1982 and all interest-bearing advances were made after April 1982, the
latter were fully repaid at the end of 1989.
Table 1.4 also reveals significant contrasts in the methods used to
repay the two types of loans. Statutory debt repayment requirements

Table 1.4
Summary of State UI Debt and Debt Repayment Activities, 1969-1989
(in $ billions)

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
All years
1969-89

Total
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.09
0.11
1.59
3.40
4.58
5.09
3.83
4.99
6.27
10.63
13.37
9.49
6.11
4.81
2.05
0.78
0.60

State debt, December 31
Interest
Interest
bearing
free
NA
0.00
NA
0.00
NA
0.00
NA
0.07
NA
0.09
NA
0.11
NA
1.59
NA
3.40
NA
4.58
NA
5.09
NA
3.83
NA
4.99
NA
6.27
3.07
7.57
6.40
6.93
3.75
5.74
1.58
4.54
1.41
3.40
0.51
1.54
0.00
0.78
0.00
0.60

Total
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.03
0.02
1.49
1.85
1.29
0.84
0.05
1.47
1.61
5.18
6.63
3.01
2.55
2.29
1.23
0.23
0.00

Loans to states
Interest
free
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.03
0.02
1.49
1.85
1.29
0.84
0.05
1.47
1.61
1.76
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

Interest
bearing
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
3.42
6.63
3.01
2.55
2.29
1.23
0.23
0.00

29.84

10.47

19.36
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Table 1.4 (continued)

Total
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
All years
1969-89

Loan repayments
Interest bearing
Interest free
Voluntary
Credit
Voluntary
Credit
repayments
reductions
repayments
reductions

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.04
0.11
0.33
1.31
0.31
0.33
0.83
3.93
6.84
5.93
3.59
3.99
1.50
0.18

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.32
0.47
0.63
0.88
0.99
0.80
0.93
0.56
0.18

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.10
0.33
1.30
0.25
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.31
0.21
0.34
0.93
0.20
0.00

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0.11
0.11
0.07
0.00
0.00

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0.36
3.30
5.65
4.63
2.34
2.06
0.74
0.00

29.25

5.85

4.02

0.29

19.08

Loan repayment rate

Total

Interest
free

Interest
bearing

NA
NA
NA
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.013
0.023
0.061
0.255
0.058
0.050
0.072
0.228
0.418
0.493
0.428
0.662
0.658
0.230

NA
NA
NA
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.013
0.023
0.061
0.255
0.058
0.050
0.058
0.084
0.172
0.209
0.251
0.547
0.494
0.230

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

0.106
0.340
0.601
0.751
0.632
0.810
1.000
NA

SOURCE: All data from the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor.
NA=not applicable. There were no interest bearing loans before 1982, no interest free loans after 1982, and no UI debt during 1969-1971. Repayments
rates are measured as the ratio of credit reductions plus voluntary repayments in the current year to the sum of debt outstanding at the start of the year
plus loans received during the year.
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and financial incentives have combined to produce the repayment pat
terns observed in the table. Debt repayment provisions require that when
a state makes a voluntary repayment, it must be applied to the most
recent advance, whereas PUT penalty taxes (credit reductions) are ap
plied to the earliest of any outstanding advances. Thus when states made
voluntary repayments in the 1980s, the repayment typically applied to
an interest-bearing loan. Financial incentives (avoidance of interest
payments) also influenced the states to repay these loans most rapidly.
Note in table 1.4 that the total dollar amount of credit reductions
associated with interest-free loans exceeded the dollar amount of volun
tary repayments of such loans ($5.85 billion versus $4.02 billion). Credit
reductions were the larger of the two means of repayment in all years
since 1981, with the exception of 1987 when the two are nearly equal
in size at a level of $.93 billion.
In contrast, nearly all repayments of interest-bearing advances were
voluntary repayments ($19.08 billion versus only $.29 billion in credit
reductions). To minimize interest charges and to avoid such charges
altogether, the states paid off these loans very rapidly. In fact, only
in 1982 and 1983 did the volume of interest-bearing loans exceed the
volume of voluntary repayments of such loans.
The final columns of table 1.4 summarize the pace of loan repay
ment activities. Annual loan repayment rates are defined as the ratio
of repayments (credit reductions plus voluntary repayments) to the sum
of debt outstanding at the start of the year plus new loans received dur
ing the year. The loan repayment rates were much higher in the mid
1980s than in earlier years. Repayment rates for all loans averaged .045
from 1972 to 1979, .060 from 1980 to 1982, and .445 from 1983 to
1989. The sharp increase in repayment rates coincides with the change
in the interest treatment of UI loans. The first year when interest
payments were due for unpaid interest bearing loans was 1983. 18
Table 1.4 also shows the repayment rates for interest-free loans and
for interest-bearing loans. For interest-free loans, the simple average
repayment rate over the entire 1972-1989 period was .140. The repay
ment rate for these loans exceeded .50 in one year (1987), and it ex
ceeded .25 in three other years (1979, 1986 and 1988). In contrast,
the simple average of the repayment rates for interest-bearing loans was
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606 from 1982 to 1988, and the repayment rate exceeded .60 in the
last five years 1984 to 1988.
The lower rate of loan repayments observed for the 1970s was due
in part to the fact that loans were interest-free. In an economic environ
ment that had substantial price and wage inflation, each year that
repayments were deferred meant that repayment would be less burden
some to the debtor state. Two other factors that reduced loan repay
ment rates were also operative in the 1970s. First, as noted previously,
the full operation of the automatic repayment schedule for PUT penal
ty taxes (credit reductions) was twice deferred in the 1970s. Second,
discussions of cost reinsurance and debt forgiveness gave debtor states
perverse incentives to slow their rate of debt repayment. A state would
probably need to have outstanding debt to realize any financial advan
tages from cost reinsurance or outright debt forgiveness.
As noted, during most of the 1980s debtor states faced statutory re
quirements as well as financial incentives to repay loans quickly. In
terest costs would be reduced or completely avoided if interest-bearing
debt was repaid rapidly, and PUT penalty taxes were levied consistently
on states with debt more than two years old. Table 1.4 shows that even
interest-free loans were repaid more rapidly after 1982 than they were
in earlier years.
As UI programs developed experience with interest-bearing debt since
1982, a clearcut pattern of debt repayment activities has emerged. States
that incur debt repay interest-bearing loans very rapidly. If they also
happen to have outstanding interest-free loans from earlier periods, these
are repaid slowly. The slowest permissible repayment rate for old debt
is to pay mandated PUT penalty taxes. By repaying interest-free debt
slowly, a state can accumulate a larger trust fund balance and lower
the risk of needing additional interest-bearing loans in the event of a
recession. Voluntary repayments of interest-free debt have usually taken
place only after all interest-bearing debt was repaid and after the fund
balance was restored to a level deemed adequate for most contingencies.
Because table 1.4 combines repayment data from all debtor states the
repayment patterns are not as obvious as when data from individual
states are examined. Table 1.5 and 1.6 show loans and repayments by
state for individual years in the 1980s; table 1.5 covers interest-bearing
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loans and table 1.6 covers interest-free loans. Considering the carryover
of debt from the 1970s as well as loans received in the 1980s, these
tables identify 30 UI programs with experience in repaying interestbearing debt and 21 with experience in repaying interest-free debt in
the 1980s. 19
In table 1.5 there are 100 state-year observations for interest-bearing
loans, i.e., times when states received loans. The table shows that for
most of these years the states also made loan repayments within the
same year. There are only 13 state-year observations where a loan was
received but no repayment was made, and six occurred in 1982. Many
programs borrowed in these years, but to minimize interest costs they
repaid the loans very quickly.
Interest-bearing loans were usually completely repaid within a few
years of their initial receipt. Table 1.5 illustrates this with indicators
of years when states experienced PUT penalty taxes (credit reductions).
To activate a penalty tax assessment, an unpaid interest-bearing loan
(like other loans) must have been unpaid in the two consecutive January
Ists following its receipt. The penalty tax is then assessed in the next
year. Since the first interest-bearing loans were secured in 1982, the
first penalty taxes were collected in 1985. There are only nine stateyear observations where penalty taxes are indicated (five in 1985, three
in 1986, and one in 1987). As noted previously, all states except Texas
had completely repaid their interest-bearing loans by the end of 1987.
Texas completed its repayments in 1988.
The usual method for making voluntary repayments is for the pro
gram to debit an amount from its trust fund balance maintained at the
U.S. Treasury. This reduces the program's gross reserves but leaves
its net reserves unchanged. In 1987, however, two states (Louisiana
and West Virginia) issued special unemployment insurance bonds and
used the proceeds to pay off their interest-bearing debt. These programs
made their own loan arrangements rather than relying on the U.S.
Treasury to cover their trust fund debt. The states expect to pay off
the loans after their trust fund balances have been increased to more
adequate levels. This innovative method of bond financing also illustrates
the strong aversion felt by debtor UI programs to long-term indebtedness
to the U.S. Treasury when the debt is interest bearing. 20
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Table 1.5
Interest-Bearing Loans and Repayments, 1982 to 1988

Alabama
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
District of
Columbia
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
New Jersey
North Dakota
Ohio
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Virgin Islands
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

1986

1987

1982

1983

1984

1985

L
L

L.V-F
L,V
L,V
L

V-F
L.V
V

L.V-F
V-F

L,V
L,V

C,V-F
L,V

L.V-F

L,V
L,V
L,B

L.C.V-F
L.V-F
L,C,V

L,C,V

L.C.V-F

L,V
L,V

L.V-F
L,V

L,C,V

L.V-F

L,V

L.V-F

L,V
L.V
L,V

L,V
L,V
L,V

L,V
L,V
L,V

L.V-F
L.V-F
L.V-F

L,V

L,C,V

L,V

L,V

L,C,V
L.V-F
L,V
L,V

C.V-F

L
L,V
L,V
L,V
L
L,V
L,V

L,V
L,V

L
L,V
L.V-F
L,V
L,V
L,V
L.V-F
L,V
L,V
L.V-F
L
L,V-F
L,V
L.V
L,V
L.V-F

L

L,V-F
L,V
L.V-F
L.V
L.V-F
L

L,V
L.V

L
L,V

L

1988

L.V-F

L.V-F
L
L,V
L
L,V
L.V-F

L,V
L,V-F

L.V-F

SOURCE: Based on loan and repayment data from the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor.
Key: L=Loan, V=Voluntary Loan Repayment, C=FUT Credit Reduction, V-F=Final Loan
Repayment

Table 1.6
Interest-Free Loans and Repayments, 1980 to 1989

Arkansas
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Illinois
Kentucky
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
New Jersey
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
Vermont
Virgin Islands
West Virginia
Wisconsin

CO

In debt
in 1979

1980

1981

X
X
X
X

L
L
C
V
L

L
L,C
L,C

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

V-F
L
L

c,v
L,C
L
C

1982
C
L,C
C
L,C
L
C

1983

1984

C
C

C,V-F
C
C,V-F
C
C
C,V-F

c,v
C
C

1987

1985

1986

C

C.V-F

C-F
C

C

C.V-F

1988

1989

C

C,V-F

L
L

L
L
L

C
C

C
C
V-F

C
C

C
C-F

C,V

C

C
L
L,C
C
C
C

C
L
L,C
C
C
C
C
L
L

C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C

C
C
C
C
C,V-F
C
C
C

C.V-F
C
C
C

C
C
C,V-F

C,V-F
C,V

C.V-F

V-F
L
L,C
L
V
L

c,v
L

C
C-F
C

C,V-F
C
V-F

C.V-F

SOURCE: Based on loan and repayment data from the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor.
Key: X=Debtor State at the end of 1979, L=Loan, C=FUT Credit Reduction, C-F=FUT Credit Reduction and Final Payment, V=Voluntary Loan
Repayment, V-F=Final Loan Repayment
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Debtor state behavior regarding interest-free debt from the 1970s and
early 1980s stands in vivid contrast to the interest-bearing debt. Table
1.6 documents the repayment of interest-free debt through 1989. As
noted earlier, just two states (Michigan and Pennsylvania) still had
interest-free debt at the end of 1987, while Michigan was the lone re
maining debtor state at the end of 1989.
Penalty taxes to repay old unpaid loans are applied to the oldest outstan
ding loans. Note in table 1.6 that at the end of 1979, 13 states had old
debt, incurred mainly between 1975 and 1978. Two completed their
debt repayments in 1980 (Massachusetts and Montana), but the other
eleven did not and were subject to PUT penalty taxes (levied in 1981).
Similarly, four states that were debt free at the end of 1979 but that
borrowed in 1980 (Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and West Virginia) were
subject to penalty taxes in 1983. Altogether there are 85 state-year obser
vations in table 1.6 where penalty taxes were levied. There are just four
state-year observations where the only type of repayment was a volun
tary payment. For most of the observations involving penalty taxes (68
of 85), the credit reduction represented the minimum that the state could
repay while satisfying federal UI conformity requirements. Penalty taxes
totaled $5.85 billion between 1980 and 1989.
The number of states that made voluntary repayments of interest-free
debt was small in each year covered by table 1.6. There are only 23
state-year observations'in the table where voluntary debt repayments
occurred. The annual dollar amounts of the voluntary repayments in
the 1980s are dominated by one or a few states making final payments
to completely repay their interest-free debts. Note in table 1.6 that there
were no final repayments in 1981 or 1982. For the other years covered
by the table, it is instructive to summarize the dollar volume of final
repayments and to compare it to the total dollar volume of voluntary
repayments. The states and payments by year were as follows: (1980)
Massachusetts and Montana - $239 million out of $247 million; (1983)
Maine - $4 million out of $6 million; (1984) Arkansas, Delaware, Ken
tucky, Missouri and Rhode Island - $310 million out of $310 million,
(1985) New Jersey - $209 million out of $209 million; (1986) Con
necticut, Puerto Rico, Vermont, and Wisconsin - $174 million out of
$340 million; (1987) Illinois, Ohio, and West Virginia - $785 million
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out of $933 million; and (1988) Pennsylvania - $198 million out of $587
million. For practical purposes, voluntary repayments of interest-free
debt in the 1980s have occurred only as the final act in repaying this
type of UI debt. Over the eight years from 1980 to 1987, voluntary
repayments made in the last year of indebtedness accounted for $1.72
billion or 84 percent of the $2.05 billion of voluntary repayments of
interest-free debt.
The preceding discussion of debt repayment patterns in the 1970s and
1980s can be summarized in a few sentences. Debt repayment occur
red at a very slow rate in the 1970s but then speeded up dramatically
in the 1980s after new loans started to carry interest charges. Even during
the 1980s, there continued to be a major contrast in debtor state treat
ment for interest-free and interest-bearing debt. In most years, in most
debtor states, interest-bearing debt was repaid rapidly while interestfree debt was repaid as slowly as possible. Large voluntary repayments
of interest-free debt typically occurred only at the end of the debt repay
ment process.

State UI Funding Strategies
The financing problems encountered by many state UI programs in
the 1970s and 1980s can be attributed to a number of factors. Most
prominent are (1) the high overall levels of unemployment experienc
ed since 1970; (2) the unusual regional patterns of unemployment in
the past two decades; (3) the unexpected costs of federal-state Extend
ed Benefits (EB); (4) asymmetric responses of taxes and benefits to high
inflation (taxes are less responsive than benefits in many states); and
(5) unfortunate timing of benefit liberalizations in selected states. These
causes are discussed in detail in chapters 1 and 2 of Vroman (1986).
Although many of the earlier adverse economic developments may be
less prevalent in future years, there is no assurance that the future
economic environment will be free of recessions and/or inflation.
If states are to avoid a repetition of their recent borrowing and debt
experiences, they will need to satisfy one or more of the following three
conditions: accumulate a "large" trust fund, have a UI tax system that
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responds quickly and strongly to reductions in trust fund balances
(perhaps supplemented by a response of benefit payments as well), or
be willing to enact solvency legislation when trust fund balances decline
to what are deemed unacceptably low levels. The three conditions are
not mutually exclusive. To the extent that the first two are present
having a large trust fund and a responsive tax (and benefit) system
the third can be avoided enacting additional tax increases (and/or benefit
reductions) in a future recession.
It is now clear that one alternative funding strategy followed by several
UI programs in the 1970s and early 1980s (willingness to incur substan
tial debt for a sustained period) is no longer attractive. The charging
of interest on new loans caused debtor states to make prompt repayments
of loans secured after March 1982. Since interest-free debt is now largely
paid off and future loans will carry interest charges, it is probable that
any future loans to states would also be repaid promptly. Thus in a future
recession states would be expected to avoid debt and to repay quickly
any recently-incurred debt.
In the 1982-1984 period when trust fund balances were generally low
and new loans carried interest charges, several states enacted major
solvency legislation. Vroman (1986, chapter 2) provides details of this
legislation in 10 large debtor states. A question to be addressed in chapter
4 is the extent to which similar state UI legislative activity could be
avoided in a future recession if trust fund balances were larger and/or
if the UI tax (and benefit) system were more responsive. Before under
taking that analysis, however, chapter 2 reviews the existing literature
on trust fund adequacy and chapter 3 introduces the simulation model
to be used in the analysis of fund adequacy and tax responsiveness.
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NOTES
1. The terms of debt repayment requirements for U.S. Treasury loans are discussed later in this
chapter.
2.The periods when the three states had loans outstanding were as follows; Alaska from 1955
to 1967, Michigan from 1958 to 1967 and Pennsylvania from 1959 to 1966.
3. For more discussion of the decline in the relative size of trust fund reserves prior to 1970 see
chapter 1 and table 1.1 in Vroman (1986).
4. Estimates of annual total unemployment rates (TURs) based on the Current Population Survey
(CPS) are available for 27 states from 1970 to 1975 and for all states starting in 1976. For
Washington and Connecticut, the TURs from 1970 to 1973 were as follows: Washington - 9.2
percent, 10.1 percent, 9.5 percent and 7.9 percent; Connecticut 5.7 percent, 8.4 percent, 8.6
percent and 6.3 percent. Washington's TUR was the highest of the 27 state TURs in each of the
four years, while Connecticut's TUR ranked sixth, third, second and fifth highest respectively
in these years.
5. The number of persons unemployed 27 weeks and longer in 1976 averaged 1.35 million or
1.40 percent of the civilian labor force. The highest previous percentages were 1.20 percent in
1975, 1.14 percent in 1961 and .99 percent in 1958.
6. The projections were made using actual values from the 1980s for the three principal explanatory
variables from equation (1) (TUR, TURL and UM25TU) and the error term for 1979 from the
fitted equation which was allowed to decay exponentially.
7. A regression of the adult male unemployment rate on the total unemployment rate, the unemploy
ment rate for "all others," a time trend, and a serial correlation correction was fitted from 1949
to 1979 and then used to project the adult male rate from 1980 to 1987. The projected unemploy
ment rate averaged 5.09 percent or .69 percentage points less than the actual average of 5.78
percent. When the counterfactual unemployment mix variable was then used in equation (1) to
project the long-term unemployment proportion, the average for the 1980s was .168 compared
to .115 for the 1970s.
8. Insured unemployment includes some UI claimants who are not presently receiving benefitspeople serving waiting periods and (in some states) disqualification periods. In 1986 the number
of beneficiaries represented 88.2 percent of insured unemployment.
9. For example, in the two years 1976 and 1977 thelU/TU ratio averaged .382. Among four
major demographic groups, however, the IU/TU ratio for these years was as follows; all persons
16-19 .082, all persons 20-24 .288, women 25 and older .448, and men 25 and older .650.
10. For example, among unemployed wage and salary workers in the private sector, the average
IU/TU ratio in 1976 and 1977 was .532. The corresponding averages for seven broad industries
were as follows: mining .880, construction .753, manufacturing .633, transportation .638,
wholesale and retail trade .372, finance .471 and services (except for private household
services) .444.
11. For example, the national average of the IU/TU ratio in 1976 and 1977 was .382. The cor
responding averages for the nine Census Divisions were as follows: New England .433, Mid
Atlantic .441, East North Central .417, West North Central .420, Mountain .319, Pacific
.407, South Atlantic .297, East South Central .376 and West South Central .262.
12. See Vroman (1990) for one discussion of these changes. The national EB insured unemploy
ment rate trigger was eliminated, state threshold tnggers were raised, and the computation of
the state triggers was modified by removing EB recipients from the calculations. All three changes
had the effect of reducing the availability of EB benefits.
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13. The calculation summed EB plus emergency benefits in each year of both three-year periods,
deflated by the personal consumption deflator from the National Income Accounts and divided
by the number unemployed 27 weeks or longer in the same year. Cutbacks in long-term benefits
are important to the working poor. Vroman (1990) compares the poverty-reducing effectiveness
of UI benefits in 1976 and 1983 and finds that UI benefits caused smaller reductions in poverty
among the long-term unemployed in 1983.
14. This 1983 federal legislation is described in chapter 1 of Vroman (1986) and the solvency
legislation enacted in the four states is detailed in chapter 2 of the same volume, along with the
legislation in six other large debtor states.
15. The basic framework which determines the repayment of UI debt has been present in the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act since 1954. Repayment provisions were modified three times
by federal legislation enacted between 1981 and 1983. For details of this legislative history see
chapter 1 in Vroman (1986).
16. There are 35 conformity requirements that state UI Programs must satisfy, 21 specified by
Section 3304 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and 14 specified by Title HI of the Social
Security Act. A full listing of these requirementsis given in Appendix VHI of U.S. General Ac
counting Office (1988).
17. The three pieces of federal legislation were the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and the Social Security Amendments of
1983. The provisions in these bills affecting UI loans and debt repayment are described in chapter
1 of Vroman (1986).
18. Technically, the first interest payments were due on October 1, 1982 for 1982 interest-bearing
loans not repaid by September 30, 1982. The payment of interest for 1982, however, could be
deferred until 1983.
19. There are 15 UI programs with experience in the 1980s in repaying both types of debt: Con
necticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont, the Virgin Islands, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
20. Part of the motivation for issuing state debt was financial, i.e., the interest rates payable on
state bonds was expected to be lower than the interest rates charged on U.S. Treasury loans.

Financing Issues and Literature
Specifying the level of trust fund reserves appropriate for individual
UI programs is not a simple task. This chapter discusses several aspects
of the UI financing problem and reviews earlier literature on the topic. l
The perspective of the chapter is that individual UI programs have the
primary responsibility for achieving solvency. As such, there is no
discussion of the federal role in ensuring solvency, and consideration
of cost sharing and cost reinsurance ideas is reserved for chapter 5.
The main areas to be analyzed here are basic funding strategies, the
concept of an acceptable risk of insolvency, the 1.5 reserve ratio multiple
rule, and a review of earlier literature on trust fund adequacy.

The Financing Problem
The financing problem which state UI programs face is a stock-flow
situation where the stock of trust fund reserves acts as a buffer be
tween two flows: an inflow made up of tax receipts and interest income
and an outflow of benefit payments. Since the rates of inflow and outflow
do not necessarily coincide, especially in the short run, the trust fund
reserve is needed to ensure that benefits will continue to be paid in those
periods when the benefit outflow exceeds the tax-plus-interest inflow.
The financing problem can be described by analogy with a bathtub
where the level of the stock of water in the bathtub at a point in time
is like the trust fund balance. It rises or falls whenever the rate of in
flow does not equal the rate of outflow. The bathtub analogy, however,
is deficient in two important ways. First, the rate of outflow from the
UI trust fund is highly variable. Cyclical and seasonal factors cause
the rate of outflow to be unstable from one month to the next. The cur
rent outflow from the fund may be considerably smaller than the max33
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imum (or capacity) outflow to be experienced in a period of severe reces
sion. Second, there is a strong (but lagged) connection between the rate
of outflow from the trust fund and the rate of inflow. Through experience
rating there is a feedback effect from increased (reduced) benefit
payments to increased (decreased) tax payments. Because of experience
rating, an initial change in the fund level caused by a changed flow of
benefit payments is followed by an offsetting tax change that (partially
or fully) restores the fund balance to its previous level. Under a system
of full or perfect experience rating, any change in the outflow will be
fully matched by a subsequent change in the inflow.
In the United States, experience rating is practiced in all UI programs
except in Puerto Rico. Basically there are two types of experience rating
systems. Stock-based systems which are present in 33 programs deter
mine employer tax rates mainly on the basis of individual company ac
count balances and the aggregate state trust fund reserve. In these systems
(termed reserve ratio systems), employer account balances and the ag
gregate trust fund reserve as measured on a set date in the current year
(often June 30th) determine next year's employer payroll tax rates. The
aggregate fund balance determines which among several tax rate
schedules is to be used in the next year and the employer's balance deter
mines which tax rate from that schedule is to be applied. Flow-based
systems use actual benefit outflows over a recent time period (or a close
proxy such as the base period wages of claimants or, in Alaska, recent
declines in covered payrolls) to determine which tax rate from a tax
schedule is to be paid by each employer. Typically the benefit outflow
(or its proxy) is averaged for three years in determining individual tax
rates in these systems. The three flow-based systems are termed the
benefit ratio, benefit-wage ratio, and payroll decline systems, and they
are found in a total in 19 states. 2
To help ensure fund solvency, many states also provide for emergency
(or solvency) taxes to be levied on employers in addition to the taxes
determined through the normal experience rating procedures. Solven
cy taxes may be assessed as flat rate taxes or as proportional add ons
to the experience rated taxes. Typically, the level of the state's trust
fund balance as of a certain date determines the size of next year's sol-
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vency taxes in both stock-based and flow-based experience rating
systems.
Regardless of what system is used to determine employer taxes, all
experience rating systems have common objectives: to have the capacity
and responsiveness to prevent insolvency during a recession and to
replenish the trust fund after the state emerges from a recession. 3 A
state can meet these objectives even if there is not a perfect match of
benefit payouts and tax obligations for all individual covered employers.
The important point is that an increase in the outflow of benefits is even
tually matched by an increased inflow of tax receipts.

Funding Strategies
Cyclical fluctuations in the economy ensure that there will continue
to be year-to-year variability in unemployment and UI claims. Faced
with an uncertain demand for benefit payments, individual states may
employ different strategies to cover future obligations. There are no
federal conformity requirements regarding necessary levels of state trust
fund reserves. A suggested standard for trust fund adequacy, the so
called 1.5 reserve ratio multiple rule (to be discussed below), has ex
isted for three decades, but few states have maintained reserves as large
as needed to meet that standard. In practice, many states have been able
to function with much smaller reserves than implied by the 1.5 reserve
ratio multiple rule.
Absent a clearcut actuarial guideline for defining trust fund adequacy,
individual states can maintain a trust fund reserve as large or as small
as they deem fiscally prudent. States must strike a balance between risks
of large-scale borrowing with the associated interest charges if reserves
are too small and the opportunity cost (of alternative uses of UI taxes)
associated with reserve balances that are too large.
Three distinct UI funding strategies can be identified. Introduced at
the end of chapter 1, the strategies will be described here in greater
detail. The first strategy can be termed pre-funding. States accumulate
a large enough reserve to carry them through a recession without the
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need for emergency tax increases and/or for benefit reductions. The
trust fund balance declines sharply in recessions and then is restored
by subsequent experience rated tax increases. The second strategy can
be termed automatic pay-as-you-go. Under this strategy, the state builds
mechanisms into its tax statutes and benefit provisions that automatically
increase tax receipts and reduce benefit outlays as the trust fund balance
is drawn down in a recession. The third strategy can be termed discre
tionary pay-as-you-go. Here the state enacts changes in its UI laws that
raise taxes and lower benefits when a recession causes the trust fund
balance to decline to an unacceptably low level.
Under all three strategies, there is still a risk of insolvency in the
event of an unexpectedly severe and prolonged recession. A large and
rapid outflow of benefits can exhaust the trust fund reserve before
automatic or discretionary adjustments can restore it. Under a strategy
of pre-funding, the insolvency risk is reduced by having a larger fund
balance that permits the flow of benefits to exceed the (tax and interest)
inflow for a longer period of time. Both pay-as-you-go strategies rely
on mechanisms to adjust the rates of inflow and outflow to equalize
following an initial increase in the benefit outflow caused by a downturn.
Both cause the trust fund reserve to be more stable over the business
cycle (and, perhaps, smaller on average) relative to the trust fund reserve
under a pre-funding strategy.
Since there is a risk of insolvency under all three strategies, one can
ask what is an acceptable risk? A discussion of this question is reserv
ed for the next section of the present chapter. To anticipate one aspect
of that discussion, a state may experience some risk of short-term in
solvency while following a fiscally prudent funding strategy.
Pre-funding and the two pay-as-you-go strategies are not mutually
exclusive. A state may rely on elements of all three in determining its
present tax and benefit statutes and its desired trust fund reserve. For
example, a state might place primary reliance on a pre-funding strategy
but plan to make discretionary statutory adjustments in response to an
unprecedented (or catastrophic) level of benefit outlays. Given the in
evitable lags in implementing pay-as-you-go strategies, all states ex
perience substantial trust fund fluctuations during short time periods
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like months, quarters and six-month intervals. For time periods of two
years and longer, a pre-funding strategy will allow for a substantial
response of tax receipts to a large change in benefit payments. Thus,
to some extent the distinction between pre-funding and pay-as-you-go
depends on the length of time over which the flows of benefits and taxes
are observed. For a long time period such as five years, UI financing
could be described as largely pay-as-you-go.
Pre-funding program benefits is the characterization most common
ly given to state UI financing and the strategy anticipated by the authors
of the Social Security Act of 1935. Originally, most states with ex
perience rating did not permit reductions in employer tax rates until
the state trust fund had been built to a level that exceeded the previous
years benefit outlays. 4 The key question surrounding the pre-funding
strategy is: What constitutes an adequate trust fund reserve? it obviously
depends (positively) on the size of the potential benefit outflow and
(negatively) on the size and speed of the response of tax receipts to in
creased benefit payments. Since these factors can vary considerably,
two states of the same size could have very different requirements for
achieving an adequate trust fund reserve.
One aspect of pre-funding that is useful to emphasize is the potential
importance of interest payments in financing UI benefits. During the
1980s Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, and Mississippi have maintained large
trust funds relative to the size of their annual benefit outlays. In these
states, interest payments credited to the trust funds have constituted a
sizable proportion of total trust fund receipts. By state, the share of
interest income in total trust fund receipts (interest plus taxes) over the
1980-1986 period were as follows: Florida .274; Hawaii .174;
Kansas .144; and Mississippi .206. The corresponding interest in
come share across all 53 programs for the same period was only .067. 5
The automatic pay-as-you-go strategy can involve automatic offset
ting responses of both taxes and benefits to an initial change in benefit
outlays. The usual trigger for the automatic tax and benefit responses
is for the state's trust fund reserve to cross (fall below) one or more
thresholds specified in the state's UI statute. Potential tax responses
include changes in the taxable wage base per employee as well as pro-
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portional or flat rate add-ons to experience rated tax rates. Potential
benefit responses include changes in the statutory replacement rate (the
percentage that links weekly benefits to previous earnings) and a freeze
or a reduction in the weekly benefit maximum.
The most common of the automatic tax and benefit features are solven
cy tax rate provisions which were present in 28 UI programs in 1988. 6
Three programs had automatic tax base response features in 1988 and
eight provided for automatic responses in weekly benefits. Altogether,
34 of 53 UI programs had at least one of the three types of automatic
response provisions in 1988.
Illinois amended its UI statute in 1987 and among the changes there
were three designed to increase the automatic responsiveness of tax
receipts and benefit payments. The law called for a flat rate tax sur
charge of .2 percent (of the previous year's taxable wages) to be paid
by July 31st of the year whenever the trust fund balance as of May 15th
fell below $90 million. It also widened the range of experience rated
tax rates. Finally, the law provided for annual increases in the weekly
benefit maximum from 1988 through 1992, but also specified reces
sionary conditions (based on three program indicators) that would freeze
or reduce the benefit maximum. 7
The results of simulations conducted by UI Actuarial Service in Illinois
suggest that the new law does not eliminate the risk of insolvency. A
simulation of a recession that started in 1989 and subjected the state
to a repetition of claims experiences from 1982 and 1983 (a period of
severe recession) projected total borrowing of about $1 billion which
was then fully repaid within eighteen months. For comparative pur
poses, it should be noted that Illinois borrowed $3.1 billion between
1980 and 1984. Thus, in the face of a very serious recession the automatic
pay-as-you-go features of the 1987 law appear to have greatly reduced
the scale of needed borrowing, but they have not completely eliminated
the possible need to borrow. 8
Proponents of automatic pay-as-you-go financing believe it has two
advantages as a funding strategy. First, when compared to pre-funding,
it avoids the need to build as large a trust fund reserve and probably
results in a smaller average fund balance over the business cycle. 9 Sec-
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ond, because the provisions to change taxes and benefits are activated
automatically, the problems associated with legislative delays are
avoided.
A drawback of automatic pay-as-you-go financing is the risk of us
ing it in good times but not sticking with it in recessions. The experiences
of Texas and Louisiana in 1982 and 1983 illustrate this problem. Both
states revised their solvency tax statutes in the midst of a recession in
order to lessen the tax increases to be incurred by their employers. 10
The actions meant that taxes did not respond as strongly as implied by
the previous laws, but it was felt that the 1982-83 actions were necessary
to lessen the hardships on employers that the larger tax increases would
have caused.
This issue is likely to arise in any recession when business profits
are already low and to be a bigger problem the more serious the reces
sion. Of course it is precisely during a major recession that large tax
increases (and benefit reductions) are needed under an automatic payas-you-go strategy since there are large benefit outflows from a trust
fund that has been deliberately kept at a low level prior to the recession.
Discretionary pay-as-you-go financing is a funding strategy that relies
on new legislative enactments to avoid or reduce insolvency problems
in a recession. States can change many aspects of benefits and taxes
in order to restore the trust fund reserve. Besides changes in the tax
base, the tax rate and weekly benefits already noted there are several
other tax and benefit changes that can be considered. Other tax changes
include widening the range of experience rated tax rates, levying special
assessments on negative balance employers and restricting "writeoff
provisions for negative balance employers. 11 Other benefit changes in
clude reducing maximum potential benefit duration, increasing the
waiting period, increasing monetary qualification requirements and in
creasing the disqualification penalties for nonmonetary issues such as
voluntary quits, discharge for misconduct, disqualifying income and
availability for work. States that have enacted important solvency legisla
tion in the 1980s have typically modified several tax and benefit provi
sions in their UI laws. 12
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As a funding strategy, discretionary pay-as-you-go will be more suc
cessful if legislation can be agreed to and enacted quickly. Often the
legislative package enacted will contain both benefit reductions and tax
increases. When legislation entails long lags and trust fund reserves are
low, the risk of insolvency rises. To the extent that the state does not
pre-fund or enact strong automatic pay-as-you-go provisions, it will have
to place greater reliance on a discretionary pay-as-you-go strategy.
One way to compare the relative merits of the three funding strategies
is to evaluate them from the perspective of the overall objectives of
unemployment insurance. State UI is often described as having three
primary objectives: (1) to provide partial wage loss replacement (or
income maintenance) to unemployed workers and their families; (2) to
provide automatic or built-in stability to the macro economy; and (3)
to encourage employers to stabilize employment through the experience
rating of UI taxes. 13 Relative to pre-funding, the pay- as-you-go strategies
would seem to be inferior in two ways. First, each provides less counter
cyclical stimulus than pre-funding, regardless of the mix of pay-as-you-go
tax increases versus benefit reductions used to restore the trust fund
balance. Second, to the extent that pay-as-you-go strategies rely on
benefit reductions to restore the trust fund, they are inferior to prefunding in achieving the income maintenance objective of UI. Prefunding has advantages in achieving both the income maintenance and
automatic stabilization objectives of unemployment insurance.

Acceptable Risk
Because the future liability to pay UI benefits has elements that are
difficult to forecast, a state does not know with certainty how large its
trust fund reserve should be. The depth and duration of recessions are
primary factors that cause variability in the trust fund outflow. Funds
must be adequate to cover the outflow until the revenue side responds.
One approach for specifying fund adequacy is to argue that fund
balances must be large enough to ensure that no borrowing will occur
regardless of the size of any future recession. In effect, the fund balance
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would be large enough to ensure a zero risk of insolvency, i.e., the
fund balance never going to a zero level. Predicting the depth of a future
recession and the size of the associated benefit outflow poses serious
problems for UI programs. To guard against borrowing under any con
ceivable future contingency, a state would need to have a very large
trust fund reserve, a very responsive tax generation system, and/or an
excellent forecasting capability in order to enact tax and benefit changes
at the appropriate time.
Under present UI law, the tax revenues deposited in state trust funds
can have only one possible use: to pay cash benefits to UI claimants.
Monies that potentially could be collected as UI taxes have several alter
native (public and private) uses. These alternative uses are foreclosed
once UI taxes have been levied and deposited in the trust fund. Since
UI programs can borrow from the U.S. Treasury to pay benefits when
trust funds are depleted, it would be irrational to build trust funds to
levels that completely obviated the need for U.S. Treasury loans.
Most states have, in fact, resorted to U.S. Treasury loans in recent
years. Between 1972 and 1987, 37 states plus the District of Colum
bia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands obtained loans. If the loans
are small and indebtedness lasts for only short periods, the utilization
of loans is a rational policy and a preferred alternative to the accumulation
of needlessly large UI trust fund reserves.
Much of the borrowing that occurred between 1972 and 1987 was
small and short term (as the terms are to be defined below). As noted
in chapter 1, borrowing activities in these 16 years fell into two major
episodes: the first associated with the recession of the mid-1970s, and
the second associated with the back-to-back recessions of 1980 and
1981-82. Twenty-five jurisdictions borrowed in the 1970s and roughly
half completed their loan repayments by the end of 1980. In the 1980-87
period, 14 of the 32 jurisdictions that borrowed completed their debt
repayments within the following two years. It is also clear that loan
repayments have been much more rapid since April 1982 when new
loans started to carry interest charges.
Define as "small" an amount of borrowing that is less than 1 per
cent of covered wages and that encompasses all borrowing that occurs
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during a recession. Although an arbitrary size designation, this scale
of borrowing is usually small enough to permit full loan repayment dur
ing a subsequent economic recovery without the need to enact major
legislation that raises taxes and/or reduces benefits. Nine of the 25
jurisdictions that borrowed between 1972 and 1979 required "small"
loans. 14 During the 1980 to 1987 period, "small" loans were disburs
ed to 18 of the 32 jurisdictions. 15 Typically, these loans were needed
for a short period at the end of the recession, and they were repaid
promptly in the ensuing recovery, partly from the effects of modest
changes in UI tax and benefit statutes. Utilizing loans of this scale can
be justified as a prudent policy.
One can define an acceptable risk of insolvency as having two
elements: a measurable probability of insolvency, and small-scale bor
rowing while insolvent. The risk should be measured over an entire
business cycle or even longer if economic downturns are as closely spac
ed as they were in 1980 and 1981-82. Although it is arbitrary, one
specific definition of acceptable risk would be as follows: a UI pro
gram has a 25 percent chance of needing a "small" loan where a small
loan is less than 1 percent of covered wages. As noted, 9 jurisdictions
and 18 jurisdictions, respectively, received loans of this scale during
the 1972-79 and 1980-87 periods. When experiences of the two periods
are combined, they yield an overall average 25 percent chance of needing
loans of this scale per recessionary episode. 16
Under this specific definition of acceptable risk, one can estimate the
volume of U.S. Treasury loans that would be needed over a business
cycle. Using the 1972-79 and 1980-87 periods as examples one can
select a base year from each period to measure covered wages, e.g.,
1975 and 1984. If every UI program had the same 25 percent chance
of insolvency and if small loans to such programs averaged .5 percent
of current wages (the midpoint between 0 and 1 percent), the total volume
of small loans in the two periods would have been $.7 billion and $1.7
billion, respectively. 17 Comparing these amounts to the actual loan totals
for the two periods ($5.5 billion and $24.0 billion), it is clear that with
this specific definition of acceptable risk many states have been expos
ed to much larger risks.
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While many states have needed only "small" loans to help finance
benefit payments in recent recessions, it is obvious that the major share
of U.S. Treasury loans has gone to states that have experienced largescale and long-term indebtedness. This point is vividly illustrated with
data covering the entire 1972-1987 period. Over these 16 years there
were 12 programs that had had UI debts in 10 or more consecutive
years. 18 Their loans totaled $17.4 billion or 59 percent of all loans
disbursed between 1972 and 1987. An additional 11 states had had UI
debts in five to nine consecutive years. 19 Loans to states with UI debts
in five or more consecutive years totaled $27.8 billion or 94 percent
of all loans for this period. The bulk of U.S. Treasury loans has gone
to programs with chronic problems of UI financing.
Although borrowing was widespread during both 1972-79 and
1980-87, 13 UI programs were able to avoid borrowing over this en
tire period. One analysis identified three important factors associated
with debt avoidance. 20 (1) The states entered recessions with larger than
average trust fund balances. (2) When trust funds were drawn down
these states enacted legislation promptly to raise taxes and (in some in
stances) reduce benefit outlays. 21 (3) States avoiding the need to bor
row typically experienced favorable economic events such as low unem
ployment and a high rate of economic growth. In the past, active policies
and favorable economic events have both contributed to debt avoidance.
Since new loans from the U.S. Treasury carry interest charges, the
states now feel more political and economic pressure to avoid largescale indebtedness than they did prior to April 1982. On the other hand,
the states must incur some risks of borrowing to avoid accumulating
needlessly large trust fund balances. Thus, a state's problem can be
stated as follows: it cannot completely avoid the risk of borrowing, but
it wants to avoid large-scale borrowing. One specific strategy for in
curring an acceptable risk of insolvency that was discussed here would
be for a UI program to incur a 25 percent probability of needing a small
loan, i.e., a loan equaling 1 percent or less of wages. If this situation
had prevailed during the 1980-87 period, total loans would have fallen
into the $1-3 billion range rather than the $24.0 billion that was re
quired. 22 Achieving this level of acceptable risk would have resulted
in a greatly reduced volume of loans to insolvent UI programs.
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The 1.5 Reserve Ratio Multiple
As a guideline for assessing the adequacy of trust fund reserves, UI
policymakers and practitioners frequently measure their fund balance
in terms of a "reserve ratio multiple" or simply a reserve multiple.
This measure provides a rule of thumb useful for gauging the size of
reserves relative to the potential demand for benefits that could occur
in a recession. The reserve ratio multiple was first developed at the
U.S. Department of Labor, but it became more widely known after be
ing examined and publicized by a benefit financing committee of ICES A,
the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies (1959). The
multiple is a quotient that is computed from two ratios. The denominator
is UI benefit payments as a percentage of total covered payrolls in the
highest cost 12-month period (not necessarily a calendar year), while
the numerator is total net reserves at the end of the current year ex
pressed as a percentage of total covered payrolls for the year. The
numerator is commonly called the reserve ratio. If, for example, a
hypothetical state's highest cost year had benefit outlays equal to 2 per
cent of total payrolls, and if current payrolls were $30 billion, it could
expect to pay out as much as $600 million in benefits should the cur
rent year have a recession as serious as that of the high-cost year.
The ICESA committee recommended that a reserve ratio multiple of
from 1.5 to 3.0 was needed for trust fund adequacy. Although neither
ICESA nor the U.S. Department of Labor has formally adopted a specific
numeric standard to be used by UI programs in judging fund adequacy,
a 1.5 reserve multiple is often used as a guideline in assessments of
minimum reserve adequacy. The state in the previous hypothetical ex
ample would need a trust fund reserve of $900 million to meet this ac
tuarial guideline.
In developing the 1.5 reserve multiple guideline, the ICESA com
mittee utilized benefit cost data from the recessions of 1949, 1954, and
1958. There were three important elements in the committee's analysis
(ICESA 1959, p. 22). (1) The cost rate measured benefits as a percent
age of total payrolls, not as an absolute dollar amount or as a percent
age of taxable payrolls. The committee reasoned that measuring benefits
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relative to total payrolls provides a more reliable cost indicator than
the other two because it accounts for cost changes that arise from chang
ing employment levels and changing levels of money wages. (2) In the
three recessions studied, the heaviest drains on trust funds occurred over
periods of about 12 months (periods that did not always coincide with
given calendar or fiscal years), and total recession-related outlays were
about one and one-half times the costs incurred in the highest cost,
12-month period. (3) Under this analysis, if a state achieves a 1.5 multiple
before the onset of a recession, it would have sufficient reserves to last
through the recession without exhausting the trust fund and without
needing to increase taxes until the subsequent economic recovery has
commenced. This level of reserves would allow the UI program to pro
vide the greatest amount of countercyclical stimulus, i.e., benefits rise
in the recession but taxes do not respond until the recovery has set in.
From the perspective of the 1980s, three critical comments about the
ICESA committee's reasoning can be offered. (1) The past may not
provide useful guidance in planning for future high-cost, 12-month
periods. Future high-cost years will deviate from previous high-cost
years if the level of state unemployment is different, if UI eligibility
and/or potential benefit duration are different, or if the level of weekly
benefits (relative to weekly wages) is different. (2) The multiplier of
1.5 that relates total recession-related costs to costs in the high-cost year
may be incorrect. In both the mid-1970s and the 1980s, recessions have
been longer than they were prior to 1960. (3) The 1.5 multiple ignores
the responses of taxes to the decline in the UI trust fund balance. This
response varies from state to state, and in all states it is larger in reces
sions of longer duration. These considerations imply that the 1.5 multiple
could give misleading signals when applied to specific circumstances.
Another limitation of the 1.5 reserve ratio multiple guideline is sug
gested by the following example. Consider the hypothetical state of the
earlier discussion with covered payrolls of $30 billion and a high-cost
rate equal to 2 percent of payrolls. If the UI fund satisfied the 1.5 multiple
the current balance would be $900 million. Further, assume that the
tax and benefit flows are initially equal at 1 percent of payrolls (and
that interest accruals are small enough to be ignored).
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If the state now experiences a serious recession and the benefit outflow
from the trust fund increases to 2 percent of payrolls, the annual outflow
would increase from $300 million to $600 million. Suppose further that
the benefit outflow remains at this high-cost rate for three years and
that tax rates do not respond as the fund balance declines. Even though
the benefit costs in this recession are three times (not 1.5 times) the
single year's high costs, the fund balance does not reach zero until the
end of the third year of recession. Any lessening of the benefit payout
rate or any response of taxes in the second or third year would cause
the fund balance to be positive at the end of year three.
Obviously, many other time paths of taxes and benefits could be
hypothesized, and some would cause insolvency to occur before the
end of year three. The point of the example is to show the importance
of the initial inflow and outflow in determining the risk of insolvency.
The fund balance must be large enough to cover the increment in the
benefit outflow that occurs in the recession, not the total level of costs.
Under the 1.5 multiple guideline, the $900 million initial trust fund
balance is large enough to cover three years of incremental costs (at
$300 million per year) where each year has the full increment (1 per
cent of payrolls) over base period costs.
The 1.5 multiple is a conservative fiscal guideline. If a state satisfies
the guideline it can experience a prolonged period of high costs and
still avoid insolvency even when its tax structure responds only slowly
to increased benefit outflows. Many UI practitioners regard the 1.5
reserve multiple as a desirable target to strive for, but feel that insolvency
can be avoided with fund balances of much smaller size. Since the
mid-1970s, very few states have achieved fund balances that satisfy the
1.5 reserve multiple guideline.
Table 2.1 provides summary data on reserve ratio multiples from 1969
to 1989. Because the UI program in the Virgin Islands started in the
mid-1970s, it has been excluded from the table. Trust fund reserves
are measured as net reserves (total reserves less outstanding loans) at
the end of the indicated years. Three years (1969, 1973, and 1979) are
prerecession years. Major decreases in reserve multiples occurred during
1969-73 and again during 1973-79. Over the decade from 1969 to 1979,

Table 2.1
State UI Program Reserve Ratio Multiples, 1969 to 1989

3.0 +

Median
reserve
ratio
multiple

8
1
0
0

1.82
1.35
.64
.91

Number of states - (reserve ratio / 12 month high-cost ratio)
End of
year
1969
1973
1979
1989

Negative

0-.49

.S-.99

0
1
9
0

0
4
13
10

1
14
16

22

1.01.49

1.51.99

2.02.99

16
12
12
17

15
12
2

12

3

8
0
0

Multiple
for U.S.
1 .68
1 .04
.41
.82

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor (1983) and the Financial Handbook update for 1989. Computations of reserve ratio multiples for 1969 and 1989
done at the Urban Institute. All data refer to the 50 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.
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the number of programs (out of 52) with reserve ratio multiples of 1.5
or larger decreased from 35 to just 3. Conversely, the number with
multiples less than 1.0 increased from 1 (Michigan) to 38. The sum
mary measures in table 2.1 (the median multiple and the multiple for
the U.S.) indicate that trust fund reserves at the end of 1979 were only
one-third to one-quarter of what they had been 10 years previously when
assessed using this particular actuarial standard.
As noted in chapter 1, substantial trust fund increases were realized
by UI programs between 1983 and 1989. As a result, the aggregate
fund balance at the end of 1989 was $28.3 billion higher than it had
been at the end of 1979 ($36.9 billion versus $8.6 billion). From table
2.1, however, note that the aggregate U.S. reserve ratio multiple only
increased from .41 to .82 over the 1980-89 period. Because covered
wages increased by 107 percent between 1979 and 1987, net reserves
had to increase by 107 percent just to maintain the aggregate reserve
multiple at its 1979 level.
Based on experiences from the 1970s and 1980s it is clear that the
reserve ratio multiple is a useful construct for identifying UI programs
that may experience insolvency. Table 2.2 presents data on the distribu
tion reserve multiples at the end of 1973 and 1979. For both the 1974-79
and the 1980-87 periods, the table also shows the total number of states
that borrowed and the number that were "major" borrowers, i.e.,
needing loans that exceeded 1 percent of covered payrolls (as of 1975
and 1984, respectively). As with table 2.1, this table also summarizes
the experiences of 52 programs (but not the Virgin Islands, which bor
rowed in both periods and was a major borrower during 1974-79).
The probability of insolvency was strongly associated with the level
of the reserve ratio multiple in both the 1970s and the 1980s. All five
programs with multiples below .5 in 1973 needed loans between 1974
and 1979, and all five were major borrowers. Of the 14 with multiples
between .5 and .99, 12 needed loans and 8 were major borrowers.
Among those with multiples of 1.5 or larger, only 2 of 21 needed any
loans and just 1 (the District of Columbia) was a major borrower.

Table 2.2
Distribution of Reserve Ratio Multiples and UI Program Borrowing in the 1970s and 1980s
Borrowing
status
1974-1979
No. of programs
Borrowers
Major borrowers
Proportion borrowers
Proportion major borrowers
Borrowing
status
1980-1987
No. of programs
Borrowers
Major borrowers
Proportion borrowers
Proportion major borrowers

Reserve ratio multiples at end of 1973
Negative

0-.49

.S-.99

1.0-1.49

1.5-1.99

2.0+

Total

1
1
1
1.00
1.00

4
4
4
1.00
1.00

14
12
8
.86
.57

12
5
1
.42
.08

12
2
1
.08
.08

9
0
0
.00
.00

52
24
15
.46
.29

Reserve ratio multiples at end of 1979
Negative

0-.49

.S-.99

1.0-1.49

1.5-1.99

2.0+

Total

9
8
2
.89
.22

13
11
6
.85
.46

16
10
5
.62
.31

12
2
1
.17
.08

2
0
0
.00
.00

0
NA
NA
NA
NA

52
31
14
.60
.27

SOURCE: Data on loans from the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor (1988b). Loans in the 1970s and 1980s refer to 1974-1979 and 1980-1987
respectively and are measured as a percent of covered wages in 1975 and 1984 respectively. Large loans are defined as loans exceeding 1 percent of
covered wages. All data refer to 50 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.
NA=Not applicable as no program had a reserve ratio multiple in this range.
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The probability of insolvency and the probability of major borrow
ing in the 1980-87 period were also closely tied to the reserve ratio
multiples at the end of 1979. Both probabilities decline sharply as one
moves from left to right in the indicated rows of table 2.2. For exam
ple, the probability of borrowing was .89 for states that entered the 1980s
with negative net reserves, but it was only . 17 for states whose reserve
multiples fell into the 1.0-1.49 range.
Three other aspects of table 2.2 should also be noted. First, observe
that for a given range of reserve multiples the probability of borrowing
was much lower in 1980-87 than in 1974-79. In the 1.0-1.49 range,
for example, the probability of insolvency was .42 in 1974-79, but only
.17 in 1980-87. For a given reserve multiple, states were much less
likely to experience insolvency in the 1980s than in the 1970s. Much
of the difference is due to the increased costs of indebtedness in the
1980s and increased certainty of incurring those costs in the 1980s.
Because states face the prospect of paying interest on UI loans (unless
they make rapid loan repayments), they have been more willing to enact
solvency legislation in the 1980s when fund balances have been reduc
ed towards zero.
Second, although the probability of insolvency was lower during
1980-87 than during 1974-79 within each range of reserve multiples
in table 2.2, the overall probability was higher (.60 versus .46). This
is another indication of the loss of reserve adequacy that occurred be
tween 1973 and 1979. When the 1980-87 borrower proportions were
applied to the 1973 distribution of reserve ratio multiples, the constructed
borrower proportion was .29. The difference between the constructed
proportion of .29 and the actual proportion of .60 helps to illustrate
the decline in reserve adequacy in the mid- to late-1970s.
Third, although UI programs entered the 1980s with much lower
reserve ratio multiples than at the end of 1973, the proportions that were
major borrowers were essentially the same in the two periods (.29 in
1974-79 versus .27 in 1980-87). States were more willing to act to
avoid major borrowing, but because 1979 reserves were so low, the
dollar amount of large-scale borrowing was much higher in the 1980s. 23
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Overall, the data in table 2.2 show that reserve ratio multiples are
useful (but not infallible) for judging the probability of insolvency in
individual states. The 1.5 reserve multiple guideline continues to be
used at the U.S. Department of Labor in its assessments of reserve ade
quacy. An illustration of this is provided by an Unemployment Insurance
Program Letter on reserve adequacy sent to the states in 1981. After
noting there is no single definition of reserve adequacy, this document
stresses that the 1.5 multiple provides "an indication of a base minimum
of reserve adequacy" (U.S. Department of Labor 1981, p. 2). It is in
teresting to note in table 2.2 that 19 of 50 UI programs that fell below
this "base minimum'' in 1979 did not experience insolvency in the subse
quent recessions of 1980 and 1981-82. Of the 19 that did not borrow
between 1980 and 1987, however, 10 entered the 1980s with reserve
multiples of at least 1.0.
Two final points about UI program reserves at the end of the 1980s
should be offered. First, total net reserves at the end of 1989 fell far
short of the level suggested by the 1.5 reserve ratio multiple rule. To
bring total net reserves up to the level that would yield a reserve multi
ple of 1.0 in each state would have required an increase of $6.7 billion
above the actual 1989 level of $36.9 billion (to $43.6 billion). Achieve
ment of a 1.5 reserve ratio multiple in all 53 programs would have re
quired net reserves to increase by $28.5 billion (to $65.4 billion). Since
only 2 of 14 programs with 1979 reserve multiples of 1.0 or larger receiv
ed U.S. Treasury loans between 1980 and 1987, it seems clear that
achievement of the 1.0 reserve multiple threshold is a much higher priori
ty (as well as being more feasible) than achievement of the 1.5 multi
ple for programs with lower levels of net reserves.
Second, several UI programs faced the risk of insolvency at the end
of 1989. To give a rough idea of the magnitude of the risks, two
hypothetical borrowing probabilities have been calculated. Suppose a
recession had started in 1988 and it had the same time profile as the
downturn and subsequent economic recovery of the 1980-87 period.
Then one could use the 1989 distribution of reserve ratio multiples along
with the 1980-87 borrowing proportions (in table 2.2) to calculate ag
gregate borrowing proportions across the 52 UI programs. The calculated
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proportions, .46 for the proportion needing to borrow and .23 for the
proportion needing major loans, suggested that 24 states would need
loans and 12 would need major loans. Although this calculation ignores
many specific details for individual UI programs, it strongly suggests
that additional trust fund building above the levels that existed at the
end of 1989 is needed if the programs are to achieve the level of accept
able risk discussed earlier in this chapter, i.e., a .25 chance of needing
a loan smaller than 1 percent of covered wages.

Earlier Literature on Fund Adequacy
Although it has been obvious since the mid-1970s that UI programs
are having funding problems, this has not stimulated a substantial
literature on trust fund adequacy. From earlier research, mainly sup
ported by the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor and by the
National Commission on Unemployment Compensation, four analyses
of fund adequacy have been selected for review. Because they follow
ed contrasting methodologies, however, the four cannot easily be com
pared. The approach taken here is to summarize each study and then
to offer some concluding comments.
An analysis of UI trust funds was conducted by Bowes, Brechling,
and Utgoff (1980). They recognized three important components in a
state's utility function for determining the optimal level of the trust fund
reserve. (1) Because of the opportunity cost of monies held as trust fund
reserves, utility falls as the average fund balance increases. (2) An in
crease in the probability of insolvency lowers utility. This probability
falls as the average fund balance is higher and as the variance in the
fund balance is lower. (3) States, even those that rely most heavily on
experience rating, can choose to exercise a high degree of tax smoothing,
i.e., maintaining year-to-year stability in their tax rates. As the degree
of tax smoothing increases, the UI program exerts a greater counter
cyclical impact and utility is increased.
Key elements in this analysis are the parameters of the state's UI tax
schedule (the minimum tax rate, the slope of the tax schedule, the range
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of experience rated tax rates, and the penalty tax rate for employers
with negative fund balances). Their research included theoretical and
empirical analyses of how the parameters of the tax schedule can be
altered to reduce inefficiencies in the UI system, i.e., to increase the
utility of at least one of the arguments in the utility function without
lowering utility in either of the other arguments. Their empirical analysis
was conducted using three distinct types of models to characterize the
behavior of actual and hypothetical UI programs. Unfortunately, they
did not find many examples of tax parameter changes that unambiguously
increased utility in all three models.
Although the framework and methodology of this research is found
ed in the neoclassical constrained maximization paradigm used by most
economists, there are three points to note. First, the mean and the
variance of the trust fund balance each enter two different arguments
in the utility function and with opposite signs. Thus, if a state changes
its tax schedule in a way that reduces year-to-year changes in employer
tax rates, the variance of the fund balance will rise and increase the
probability of insolvency (lowering utility), but at the same time this
change will also increase the UI program's degree of tax smoothing
(raising utility). Because of these offsetting effects, it is not possible
in most situations to know how a change in the mean or the variance
of the fund balance affects utility. Second, their research focused primari
ly on parameters of the tax schedule. Less attention was given to
behavioral relationships determining insured unemployment, average
weekly benefits, and the taxable wage base. State laws can affect these
variables as well as the parameters of the tax schedule. All are impor
tant for understanding the behavior of the average trust fund level and
trust fund variability. Third, the empirical work was conducted using
a data period that ended in 1977. Some aspects of state behavior have
been changing since the mid-1970s, particularly an increased willingness
to enact solvency legislation when the trust fund balance moves towards
zero, and these changes need to be recognized if future trust fund
behavior is to be accurately modeled.
Freiman (1980) developed a model based on aggregate UI program
data and used it to examine both trust fund financing problems of the
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mid-1970s and possible future financing problems in the 1980s and
1990s. He fitted multiple regressions to annual time series data for the
years 1948 to 1974 to obtain parameters for the model's equations, in
cluding the tax rate equation. The tax rate depended on the lagged tax
rate, the lagged trust fund reserve ratio, and a UI loan ratio (total loans
as a percent of taxable payrolls). When the model was then used to
simulate the years 1975-1977, he found that the tax equation made
substantial overpredictions so that the simulated volume of UI loans
was much less than actual loan disbursements of the three years. Freiman
concluded that a major reason for the large loan volume of 1975-1977
was the small response of UI taxes (both tax rate and tax base increases)
to declining reserve balances of these years.
Freiman's analysis also emphasized how high inflation causes financ
ing problems for UI programs. In many states maximum weekly benefits
rise with inflation while the taxable wage base does not respond. This
causes tax revenues to grow more slowly than benefit payments in periods
of high inflation. 24
He further used the model to conduct simulations of UI trust fund
balances in the 1980s and 1990s. In each of his long-run simulations,
the UI system eventually encountered problems of fund inadequacy,
due largely to the fact that benefits grow automatically with inflation
and productivity growth while the tax base lags behind. Occurrences
of high unemployment and/or high inflation, however, caused the fund
ing problems to arise sooner. Given the high unemployment and high
inflation that the U.S. economy experienced in the early 1980s, the fund
ing problem predicted by his simulations became real experiences for
many states.
This analysis is useful both for showing how the funding problems
of the mid-1970s arose and how UI was exposed to a repetition of these
problems in the 1980s. Because it was an aggregative analysis, however,
it could not provide guidance to individual states as to the level of reserves
needed to avoid insolvency, and Freiman did not attempt to provide
aggregate solvency guidelines. His analysis was most useful for show
ing the harmful consequences of having a dynamic (indexed) benefit
structure coupled with a static (nonindexed) tax base.
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An alternative to the 1.5 reserve ratio multiple for assessing trust fund
adequacy was developed in the mid-1970s at the South Carolina Employ
ment Security Commission (1976). Like the 1.5 multiple, the South
Carolina analysis yields a solvency standard against which a state's cur
rent trust fund balance can be compared. The South Carolina standard
is easily understood and it can be computed from data routinely col
lected in a state's UI program.
There are three essential ideas in the South Carolina analysis of fund
adequacy. (1) A UI program should strive to have stable tax rates. If
the excess of taxes over benefits in prosperous periods matches the deficit
of recession years, the state can cover its costs without needing to have
fluctuating tax rates. Stable tax rates cause the UI program to impart
the maximum countercyclical stimulus to the economy. (2) The required
level of reserves (termed maximum reserves in the South Carolina
analysis) must be sufficient to cover all outlays that will occur over a
business cycle. Required reserves are computed as the product of three
factors: (i) business cycle duration (in years); (ii) the average annual
cost rate (benefits as a percent of total payrolls) over the business cy
cle; and (iii) the state's exposure to UI costs (the highest level of total
payrolls). (3) Fund adequacy is assessed by comparing the ratio of ac
tual reserves to required (or maximum) reserves. If actual reserves equal
or exceed required reserves the state knows it can pass through a reces
sion without having to raise taxes.
Besides these three key elements there are certain other aspects of
the South Carolina analysis to be noted. (1) They advocate a system
of array allocation for assigning tax rates to individual employers. Under
array allocation the cost experiences of individual employers are rank
ed relative to average experience, and employers are assigned to tax
categories where each category contains a fixed percentage of overall
taxable wages. Array allocation ensures that for a given schedule of
tax rates the aggregate ratio of tax receipts to taxable payrolls is stable
from one year to the next. (2) They advocate having a flexible (index
ed) tax base. (3) They stress the need for periodic reevaluation of the
factors that contribute to UI benefit costs. This is done to ensure that
historic cost rates remain appropriate for the current period. (4) They

56

Financing Issues and Literature

recognize a tradeoff between the level of the fund balance and the stability
of tax rates. A state may choose to maintain a lower average balance
if it is willing to change rates during the business cycle, i.e., to increase
rates following an economic downturn.
Questions can be raised regarding the reliability of the South Carolina
procedures for estimating a state's reserve requirements. How long is
the period for measuring the length of the business cycle? Do past cost
experiences provide a reliable guide for assessing future costs? If a state
experiences a longer and/or a deeper recession than in the past, its
reserves may be inadequate even if they satisfy the level specified by
the South Carolina guideline. Of course, the 1.5 reserve multiple would
also give misleading signals as to reserve adequacy if a future reces
sion were longer and/or deeper than past recessions.
To evaluate the South Carolina guideline relative to the 1.5 reserve
multiple it is instructive to calculate the level of reserves deemed ade
quate under the two. In one analysis (South Carolina Employment Securi
ty Commission 1976, chapter HI), they estimate that required reserves
for June 30, 1975 were $254.9 million. This calculation was made as
follows: (1) business cycle duration 4 years; (2) high cost rate for four
consecutive years 1.08 percent (1955 1958); and (3) exposure (1974
total payrolls) $5.9 billion. The actual fund balance at the end of June
1975 was $130.9 million or 51 percent of its required balance. Under
the 1.5 reserve multiple calculation, the highest cost rate prior to 1975
was the rate in 1954 of 1.54 percent. Using the same $5.9 billion of
total payrolls causes the target fund balance to be $136.3 million under
the 1.5 reserve ratio multiple guideline.
Thus the South Carolina guideline yields much larger reserve re
quirements than does the 1.5 reserve ratio multiple. This is hardly sur
prising since the fund balance is to equal four years of benefits at a
four-year average cost rate rather than 1.5 years of benefits at a
12-month, high-cost rate. It should also be obvious that the difference
in the two target levels for fund balances will be proportionally larger
in states that have less severe cyclical cost experiences. Since the states
do not now come close to meeting the 1.5 multiple guideline, the South
Carolina guideline is even less attainable. It seems unlikely that any
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state would implement the South Carolina guideline and actually main
tain a fund balance equal to four years of benefit outlays.
Baskin and Kite (1977) produced a lengthy report on fund adequacy
under a U.S. Labor Department contract. Of the report's four chapters
(I-Historical Summary, II-The 1.5 Reserve Adequacy Rule, III-Alter
native Reserve Adequacy Rules, and IV-Recommendations), the analysis
of their chapter HI is of most interest. Baskin and Hite investigated the
relative effectiveness of four rules that could determine trust fund
balances. Relative effectiveness was judged by the ability of each rule
to prevent insolvency during recessions, i.e., borrowing because the
trust fund was exhausted.
The study used a simulation methodology where annual data from
individual states for the 1951-1976 period were the units of observa
tion. Historic data on state tax collections and benefit payments were
used and downturns were defined as periods (of one or more conser
vative years) when the trust fund balance declined.25 During the 1951-75
period they identified a total of 365 downturns across all programs.
At the start of each downturn, the state's trust fund balance was set
according to one of the following four rules: (1) the 1.5 reserve ratio
multiple rule (where the high-cost base year was the highest-cost year
actually experienced during the 1951-75 period); (2) the highest cost
rate experienced for two consecutive years; (3) a reserve multiple rule
where the multiple is the ratio of total covered wages to taxable wages
in the preceding year (thus a multiple that rises between 1951 and 1975);
and (4) a combination rule. The latter allows the state to choose the
most favorable from among the prior three rules for preventing insolven
cy in each downturn.
All rules were quite effective in preventing insolvency, but clear dif
ferences were found in their relative effectiveness. Respectively, the
number of insolvencies under the four rules were 33, 10, 32 and 8.
The percentage range of these numbers of insolvencies was from a high
of 9.0 percent under the 1.5 reserve multiple rule to a low of 2.2 per
cent under the combination rule. Probably the most striking finding is
that all four rules seem to be effective in preventing the need for bor
rowing by individual states.
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The actual usefulness of the Baskin-Hite study can be questioned due
to four methodological shortcomings. (1) Because the high-cost year
used was the highest one for the entire 1951-75 period, the simula
tions assume a degree of foresight that the states could not be assumed
to have. States could not reasonably be expected to set their reserves
at the start of, say, 1954 on the basis of future high costs to be experienc
ed in 1975. (2) In a similar vein, the combination rule is not really
available to the states since it is determined in an ex post manner by
the simulations and not on the basis of earlier state experiences. (3)
There is no allowance for the possible responsiveness of tax collections
(and benefit payouts) to reductions in trust fund balances. The initial
trust fund balances, annual tax receipts and annual benefit payments
are all treated as exogenous variables in the simulations. Among the
most crucial research questions in determining appropriate fund balances,
however, is the degree to which tax collections and benefit payments
are endogenous, i.e., responsive to reductions in fund balances. (4) When
the four rules are carefully compared, they suggest one obvious con
clusion. This conclusion is illustrated with data appearing in appendix
IDA of the Baskin-Hite report. The appendix shows the cost rates for
the base cost years underlying the 1.5 reserve ratio multiples and the
two year cost ratios for each state as used in the simulations. In 42 of
51 states the latter is larger than the former by a ratio of more than
1.5 which means that the two year cost rule gives larger initial reserves
in 42 of 51 jurisdictions. It is hardly surprising that use of the two year
cost ratio produces fewer insolvencies, i.e., 10 as opposed to 33. A
short summary of the study would be: larger reserves are more effec
tive than smaller reserves in preventing UI trust fund insolvencies.
In summary, several final comments can be offered about the earlier
literature on UI trust fund adequacy. First there are five critical com
ments. (1) The literature has not produced a major alternative to the
1.5 reserve ratio multiple as a useful rule of thumb for assessing fund
adequacy. (2) Although the existence of excessive fund balances is a
theoretical possibility emphasized by Bowes, Brechling and Utgoff
(1980), the record of large-scale and widespread borrowing by the states
in the 1970s and 1980s makes it clear that the real problem has been one
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of inadequate reserves. (3) Maintaining adequate reserves is exclusively
a state responsibility in the 1980s. Therefore an aggregative analysis
such as Freiman's (1980) does not provide guidance at the level where
fiscal responsibility now resides. For example, his analysis does not
show by how much the individual states should have raised their taxes
in the mid-1970s to avoid insolvency. (4) The South Carolina analysis
provides needlessly conservative guidance on the target or required level
of a state's fund balance. (5) The analysis of Baskin and Kite (1977)
cannot readily be used by individual states because it incorporates in
formation on future cost rates not known prior to specific downturns,
and it completely ignores the response of UI taxes (and benefits) to reduc
tions in the fund balance.
Two more positive observations are the following. (1) To help avoid
insolvency problems, states should apply indexing symmetrically to the
tax and benefit sides of their programs. If the maximum weekly benefit
is indexed, then the tax base should also be indexed. This is stated ex
plicitly by Freiman and it is advocated by the South Carolina analysis.
(2) The South Carolina analysis is useful for emphasizing the total amount
of benefit outlays that a state must finance over a complete business
cycle. This recognition of both business cycle duration and average an
nual costs is not incorporated into the 1.5 reserve multiple solvency
guideline.

Summary
This chapter has examined several aspects of the UI financing prob
lem, including a review of the previous literature. From rough calcula
tions based on 1989 year-end reserve ratio multiples and the 1980-87
borrowing experiences of the states (from table 2.2), it appears that
many UI programs remain exposed to a substantial risk of insolvency
even after the large-scale trust fund building of the 1983-89 period.
This calculation underscores the importance of knowing how large in
dividual UI program trust fund reserves should be in order to achieve
a low risk of small-scale borrowing in the next recession.
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With the advent of interest charges on U.S. Treasury loans extended
to debtor jurisdictions since April 1982, UI programs are much more
inclined to avoid long-term debt than they were in the 1970s and the
early 1980s. Since trust fund reserves are not that large, increased
reliance on pay-as-you-go financing strategies may be expected. Some
of this may be automatic pay-as-you-go financing, but undoubtedly there
will still be some need for discretionary tax and benefit adjustments
as fund reserves decline towards zero in the next recession.
The literature on UI financing reviewed here was not as helpful as
would be hoped since much of the empirical analysis was based on ex
periences from the 1970s and earlier when reserves were larger and
U.S. Treasury loans were interest-free. One actuarial guideline, the 1.5
reserve ratio multiple rule, was examined, but achievement of reserve
levels suggested by this guideline would require a 77 percent increase
in total reserves as of the end of 1989 (from $36.9 billion to $65.4
billion). Given the experiences of the 1980s, it appears that many UI
programs can function successfully with reserve balances considerably
smaller than suggested by the 1.5 reserve multiple rule.
Thus, several questions related to UI trust fund adequacy remain.
Among them, the following will be addressed in chapter 4. For reduc
ing the risks of insolvency, how quantitatively important are the
automatic pay-as-you-go tax and benefit features now found in many
UI program statutes? How much would the introduction of tax base in
dexation reduce risks of insolvency in programs that presently index
their maximum weekly benefit but not their taxable wage base? Are
stock-based and flow-based experience rating systems equally prone to
the risk of insolvency? What level of trust fund reserves is needed to
reduce the risk of insolvency to only needing a small UI loan in a reces
sion? Technical questions of this nature are addressed in chapter 4, ap
plying a simulation methodology in seven large states.
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NOTES
1. Sections of this chapter draw heavily upon a report completed in 1986 for the U.S. Department
of Labor and published in 1987. See Barnow and Vroman (1987), chapters II and III.
2. Michigan and Pennsylvania use both reserve ratios and benefit ratios to set employer tax rates.
They have been classified among the 20 benefit ratio systems in the present discussion. Thus the
32-20 split between stock-based and flow-based tax systems would be changed to a 34-18 split
if the two states were reclassified.
3. At the level of individual employers, the practice of experience rating is also intended to en
courage long-term job tenure and to discourage layoffs. This important micro objective of ex
perience rating will not be emphasized in the present analyses.
4. See chapter 19 in Haber and Murray (1966), pp. 380-385, for a discussion of the early ex
periences of the states with solvency standards.
5. Data on interest income by state appear in U.S. Department of Labor (1983) and subsequent
Handbook updates. Nominal interest rates were high in this period, above 8 percent in each year
between 1980 and 1986.
6. Estimates of the number of UI programs with automatic tax and benefit features were made
by the author based on National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation and Workers' Com
pensation (1988), tables 3, 12 and 18.
7. The three indicators are as follows. (1) The average effective tax rate on Illinois employers
must be at least .2 percentage points above the national average. (2) The trust fund balance as
of March 31st must be less than $250 million. (3) Initial claims for benefits must be at least 25
percent above the average for the previous five years. The maximum weekly benefit is frozen
in years when two of these conditions are met and reduced by 10 percent when all three condi
tions are met.
8. Robert Malooly, the former Manager of UI Actuarial Services, Illinois Department of Employ
ment Security, described the results of the Illinois simulations in a conversation with the author.
9. See the 1987 testimony of Ms. Sally A. Ward, Director of the Illinois Department of Employ
ment Security, and the associated statement for the record in U.S. House of Representatives (1987),
pp. 96-106.
10. Details of the 1982-83 tax changes in Louisiana and Texas are given in chapter 2 of Vroman
(1986).
11. In many reserve ratio systems, the excess of negative balances beyond a certain threshold
size is eliminated so that employers are never responsible for repaying these charges against their
accounts.
12. See, for example, tables 2-5 and 2-6 in Vroman (1986).
13. See chapter 2 in Haber and Murray (1966).
14. Loans during 1972-79 were less than 1 percent of 1975 covered payrolls in the following
nine states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New York, Ohio, and
Oregon.
15. Loans during 1980-87 were less than 1 percent of 1984 covered payrolls in 18 programs:
Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, the Virgin Islands,
Washington, and Wyoming.
16. The 53 programs in the two periods give a total exposure of 106 programs compared to a
total of 27 programs that needed small loans. Thus the average probability of a UI program receiving
a small loan in the 1970s and 1980s was .255.
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17. Total covered wages of taxable employers in 1975 and 1984 were respectively $580 billion
and $1369 billion. The estimates of $.7 billion and $1.7 billion in loans were made by taking
.5 percent of one-fourth (the assumed probability of insolvency) of these two covered wages totals.
18. The 12 were Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, the Virgin Islands, and Vermont.
19. The 11 were Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas,
Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia.
20. See chapter 3 in Vroman (1986).
21. Having indexed their taxable wage bases prior to the onset of recession has helped many states
to avoid large-scale borrowing or to completely avoid borrowing.
22. The $1-3 billion range is based on the same kind of calculations as described previously in
footnote 16, but recognizing random elements in the number of states needing small loans, the
average size of their covered payrolls, and the average size of their small loans.
23. The 15 states that were major borrowers in the 1974-79 period borrowed a total of $5.0 billion.
The 14 that were major borrowers in 1980-87 received $23.2 billion in loans. These amounts
represented 2.7 percent and 4.7 percent of their respective 1975 and 1984 payrolls.
24. In 1988 there were 17 UI programs whose maximum weekly benefit was indexed to average
wages but whose taxable wage base was not indexed.
25. Primary and secondary downturns were distinguished. The start of the latter can follow the
end of the former by as little as one year during which the trust fund increased in size. There
were a total of 208 primary downturns and 157 secondary downturns.

3
A New Model
of Unemployment Insurance
Trust Fund Balances
Questions about UI trust fund reserve adequacy can be fruitfully
studied within the framework provided by an economic model. The pres
ent chapter introduces and describes UISIM, a simulation model
developed specifically to examine solvency issues. The next two chapters
then use the model, as developed in several states, to make inferences
about trust fund reserve adequacy.

Simulation Modeling With LOTUS
This section discusses how LOTUS spreadsheets can be used to ex
amine UI funding questions. As a starting point, it reviews other simula
tion modeling efforts that have been fostered by the U.S. Department
of Labor.
The most widely used model for addressing UI funding questions is
the State Benefit Financing Simulation Model (SBFSM) originally
developed for the U.S. Department of Labor by Mercer Associates
(1977). The SBFSM, which continues to be supported by the Labor
Department's Unemployment Insurance Service (UIS), is a very large
scale model using quarterly data to simulate alternative trust fund
scenarios for 10-year periods. To date, the SBFSM has been im
plemented in more than half of the states.
The model has two main sections: the Projection Program (PP) and
the Financial Forecast Program (FFP). The PP section determines the
important labor market variables for the state's economy and the various
economic and statutory factors that affect UI benefit payments. The FFP
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section then combines output from the PP section with equations that
characterize the state's UI tax statutes and the distribution of employers
by tax rate categories to determine tax receipts. Simulations with the
full SBFSM determine benefits, taxes and the state's trust fund balance
for the period of interest.
The SBFSM is the most complete UI modeling capability available
at the present time. Nevertheless, certain features of the SBFSM make
it less usable than is desirable for some applications. The model is very
large and its programming language is sufficiently imposing to discourage
user-initiated changes in individual behavioral relations. Because the
model is so large, it requires a major effort to reset the exogenous
variables whenever a new, i.e., more recent, base period is to be used.
Finally, recent advances in computer software capabilities, e.g., the
LOTUS spreadsheet, provide an alternative approach for simulation
modeling.
Many UI financing questions can be addressed with a much smaller
model than the full SBFSM. One impetus for developing a smaller model
was provided by a recent project on UI trust fund adequacy. In research
supported by the U.S. Department of Labor, a small-scale annual model
was developed to address funding issues. (See chapter IV in Barnow
and Vroman (1987).) That model, termed the Annual Simulation Model
or ASM, had very few equations and was imbedded within a Fortran
program. Subsequent work with LOTUS spreadsheets led to the develop
ment of a UI simulation model based on LOTUS.
The model to be described, UISIM, is an annual model composed
of from seventy to one hundred equations per state. It can be implemented
without the need for Fortran programming, compiling, or the other steps
usually followed in simulation and forecasting exercises. The model
is structured as a rectangular grid of cells, with variables in the rows
and time periods (years) in the columns. Each cell will contain a
behavioral relation, a definitional identity, or the numeric value of a
variable if it is exogenous to the model. Parameter values for the
behavioral relations in UISIM are estimated using time series regres
sions with data from sources such as Unemployment Insurance Finan
cial Data and "Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance
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Laws" published by UIS, Employment and Earnings, and the
"Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment" published
by BLS, or specialized data from the states themselves.
For the present project, simulation models were developed in seven
large states: California, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey,
Ohio, and Texas. Because the states are widely distributed across the
U.S., they encompass a variety of regional economic experiences. They
are also representative of the most common experience rating systems:
four use reserve ratios (California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and
Ohio); two use benefit ratios (Florida and Texas); and the seventh
(Michigan) uses both reserve ratios and benefit ratios. (Experience rating
systems as incorporated into the simulation models are discussed more
fully in the next section of this chapter.)
It should be noted that UISIM produces deterministic solution paths
for all variables. As presently implemented, there are no stochastic (i.e.,
random) elements that may vary from one simulation to the next im
bedded in either the coefficients of the behavioral equations or their
disturbance terms. Thus UISIM is like the SBFSM in that two simula
tion runs based on identical time paths for the exogenous variables and
identical behavioral equations will yield identical solution paths. Ran
dom elements in the coefficients and/or disturbance terms could be added
as inputs, but this type of extension of UISIM has not yet been explored.
Because UISIM has been developed for use on the types of spread
sheet programs available from the LOTUS Development Corporation
(or comparable spreadsheet programs) a brief discussion of this soft
ware may be useful for some readers. LOTUS spreadsheets have a wide
variety of uses on microcomputers. (See LeBlond and Cobb 1985.)
LOTUS is designed to compute solutions to systems of equations where
there is a clear sequential ordering for the effects of individual variables
on other variables. In the jargon of economic model builders, LOTUS
solves recursive (as opposed to simultaneous) equation systems.
The stocks and flows in state UI programs are appropriately model
ed within a recursive framework. At the start of this year, the trust fund
balance and employer tax rates are known. Consequently, the change
in the fund balance during the current year depends primarily on variables
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that influence the outflow of benefit payments. Variables from this year
(and perhaps previous years) determine next year's taxes. Thus there
is a clear sequential ordering of causal relations within UI programs,
i.e., a recursive ordering.
Probably the most powerful feature of LOTUS for simulation analysis
is its automatic spreadsheet recomputation capability. A model is depicted
as a rectangular array in the spreadsheet; each column represents a year
and each row represents a particular variable in UISIM. When one ex
ogenous variable is altered (for one year or a series of years), the ef
fects of the change on all other variables in all years of the simulation
period are computed automatically and displayed on a revised spread
sheet. There is no need to call a recomputation command because
automatic recomputation is built into LOTUS. For example, the user
can increase the state's overall unemployment rate (or TUR) by 1 per
centage point in a single year. The effects on all variables in that year
are computed, and (because of lags in individual equations and the trust
fund identity) the effects in all subsequent years are computed as well.
It is difficult to imagine how easily sensitivity analysis can be perform
ed when automatic recomputation is built into the model.
Three other LOTUS features also facilitate simulation modeling. First,
recall that an individual cell in a worksheet can be a number, an identi
ty, or a behavioral equation. After an equation has been entered into
one cell, the equation can be copied into all other cells, i.e., years, for
that row. Thus a behavioral relation can be applied in all years with
just its entry into one cell and use of the copy command. This feature
makes it easy to explore the effects of changing a single behavioral rela
tionship in the model. If, for example, the effect of indexing the tax
base is of interest, an equation linking the tax base to the lagged average
weekly wage can replace an existing tax base series which is exogenously
determined (as it is in most states).
Second, one can use a variety of logical functions in the individual
cells. Examples of "if statements are: extended benefits (EB) are turned
"on" only if the insured unemployment rate (IUR) exceeds a statutory
threshold; interest accrues to the trust fund only if the average trust
fund balance is positive and an indexed weekly benefit maximum can
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be frozen at its present level if the net trust fund balance is negative.
The "round" statement can be used to replicate actual statutory language,
e.g., in New Jersey the taxable wage base is rounded to the nearest
$100 multiple of 28 times the average weekly wage; or a tax rate can
be rounded to the nearest .01 percent; or the maximum weekly benefit
can be rounded to the nearest whole dollar. Rounding up or rounding
down can also be accomplished with the appropriate addition or sub
traction of a constant within the "round" statement. The "maximum"
and "minimum" functions can be used to ensure that the maximum
tax rate and minimum tax rate cannot exceed their statutory limits.
LOTUS also permits the model builder to specify nested logic
statements within individual cells. For example, if the raw calculation
of the noncharged benefits tax rate exceeds zero (as in Michigan), the
tax rate is the minimum of the calculated rate or 1 percent. Here, the
"if conditional (the raw tax rate exceeding zero) is followed by a
"then" calculation which itself involves a logical comparison (select
ing the smaller of two possible tax rates). An extension of nested logic
statements to "macros" is also possible.
Third, LOTUS has a split screen feature which allows the user to
focus on one area of the spreadsheet, e.g., the trust fund balance, while
retaining the ability to scroll to and view other parts of the spreadsheet,
e.g., a particular exogenous variable such as the state's total unemploy
ment rate (TUR). The split screen capability is particularly convenient
in a sensitivity analysis where the user wants to explore the effects of
one exogenous variable on just one or a few other variables without
looking at model output for all variables. All of these LOTUS features
have been adopted in the development of the simulation models used
in this project.
A General Description of UISIM
The spreadsheet models for each of the states share a number of com
mon features. The following paragraphs first provide a general descrip
tion of their structure and then a more detailed description for one state:
Massachusetts. Each model has five main blocks of equations, and, as
noted previously, each model is recursive.
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Figure 3.1 helps provide an overview of the common features of the
models. The figure identifies the five main blocks of equations. Also
shown are the most important predetermined and exogenous variables
within each block. These variables affect UI benefits, UI taxes, trust
fund interest and the end-of-year fund balance. Variables from the UI
system, however, do not feed-back on (influence) the predetermined
and exogenous variables. The final column of figure 3.1 shows the most
important simulation instruments. The response of the UI system to these
simulation instruments is the main topic of the analysis in chapter 4.
The primary state labor market variables that affect UI taxes and
benefits are determined in Block 1. These variables, which are treated
as exogenous in the model, include the total unemployment rate, the
inflation rate, the interest rate on UI trust fund balances, and the labor
force growth rate. Labor force growth can reflect both national and state
developments, but in the models used here no attempt was made to ex
amine the determinants of state population growth or of state labor force
participation rates. Labor force participation rates, for example, often
decline in recessions, but the size of the decline is small and would not
cause the models to make large errors. Inflation enters the model through
the rate of change of average weekly wages. The total unemployment
rate (TUR) is the most important exogenous variable because it ultimately
drives the volume of claims for UI benefits. State-level projections of
the important exogenous labor market variables may be obtained from
state LMI (labor market information) offices or from forecasting ser
vices such as Data Resources Inc. and Wharton Econometric Forecasting
Associates. Alternatively, the economic assumptions used by the state's
budget office for intermediate-term budget projections can be imposed
on the exogenous variables. In the simulation analysis of chapters 4
and 5, heavy reliance was placed on the past histories of state labor
market variables from the 1970s and 1980s.
Important employment variables are also determined in Block 1. Total
civilian employment is determined as a residual after the TUR and labor
force growth rate have been set. Although both taxable and reimburs
able employment covered by the UI program are influenced by state
statutes, changes in both respond primarily to changes in total employ-
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Figure 3.1
Outline of Unemployment Insurance
Simulation Model (UISIM)
A Recursive Model for the Evaluation
of State UI Trust Fund Financing8
Block

Predetermined and
exogenous variables

Simulation
instruments

1. Labor Market

Labor Force Growth Rate Total Unemployment Rate
Total Unemployment Rate
Wage Growth Rate

2. Annual State UI
Benefit Payments

Lagged Unemployment

Total Unemployment Rate
Benefit Availabilityb
Wage Growth Rate
Maximum Weekly Benefit

3. Annual State UI
Tax Receipts

Covered Wages
State UI Tax Statutes

Regular UI Taxes
UI Solvency Taxes
Taxable Wage Base

4. Trust Fund
Interest Income

Real Interest Rate

Real Interest Rate

5. State UI Trust
Fund Balance

Start-of-year
Fund Balance

Start-of-year
Fund Balance

a. In this five block recursive simulation model the values of variables are determined by block
in order. After values of the variables in the first block are determined, they feed into block two
and so on.
b. Eligibility criteria for UI benefits were significantly tightened in all seven simulation states
in the early 1980s.

70

New Model of Trust Fund Balances

ment and changes in national UI coverage provisions, e.g., the coverage
extensions of 1972 and 1978. Therefore, the covered employment
variables are also determined in Block 1 of UISIM.
Block 2 determines annual benefit payments, both in regular UI and
the federal-state Extended Benefits (EB) program. The key variable in
this block is insured unemployment (IU). Since 1980, the ratio of IU
to total unemployment (TU) has fallen in most states. The explanation
for this decline is not very well understood, but factors such as changes
in statutory eligibility provisions, program administration, changes in
the geographic distribution of unemployment, exhaustions by claimants,
and application behavior have probably all contributed to the decline.
(See the discussion in chapter 2 and the analysis by Corson and Nicholson
1988 and Burtless and Sax 1984, as well as Burtless 1983, Burtless and
Vroman 1984 and Vroman 1990). The determination of insured
unemployment is generally done in a similar way in the individual states.
The three main explanatory variables are current unemployment (TU),
a control for exhaustions (TU lagged one year) and a dummy variable
for changes in program eligibility and participation in the 1980s.
Payments of regular UI benefits also depend on the weekly benefit
amount and the ratio of weeks compensated to weeks claimed (52 times
IU). The latter ratio is influenced by benefit statutes, e.g., the waiting
period, maximum duration provisions and/or the length of benefit dis
qualification periods, and possibly by cyclical factors. The weekly benefit
amount (WBA) depends on the average weekly wage, the maximum
weekly benefit, and the statutory replacement rate. In most states, the
maximum weekly benefit has changed much more than the statutory
replacement rate, so that the estimated effect of the replacement rate
on weekly benefits is not known.
States are also responsible for half of the costs of the EB program.
Since EB is activated by the insured unemployment rate or IUR, i.e.,
the ratio of IU to total covered employment, and since the EB triggers
are now different (higher) than in the 1971-1981 period, it is not ob
vious how EB should be modeled. One approach is to model the "on"
trigger as a zero-one variable which equals one only when the IUR equals
or exceeds a predetermined threshold. Weeks of EB could also depend
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on the IUR, perhaps with a lag. The weekly benefit amount (WBA)
for EB would be expected to be similar to the WBA in the regular pro
gram. Half of EB payments along with all of regular UI benefits would
then account for the outflow of benefits from the trust fund. Since the
EB triggers are now higher than in the 1970s, and since the IU/TU ratio
is now lower, the EB program is much harder to activate than in the
past. Only six jurisdictions activated, i.e., turned on, EB between the
end of 1982 and the end of 1988 (Alaska, Idaho, Louisiana, Puerto Rico,
West Virginia, and Wyoming). The models can provide indications of
how much EB would be paid under present EB triggers and under the
(lower) triggers of the 1970s.
Total tax payments are determined in Block 3 as the product of total
covered wages, the taxable wage proportion and the effective tax rate
on taxable wages. Total covered wages are known from variables deter
mined in Block 1, i.e., covered employment of taxable employers and
the average weekly wage. The taxable wage proportion depends main
ly on the ratio of the taxable wage base (an exogenous variable in most
states) to average annual wages, i.e., 52 times average weekly wages.
The functional form of this relationship is nonlinear. As the tax baseto-average wage ratio increases, so does the taxable wage proportion,
but at a decreasing rate. The curvature in the relationship can be ap
proximated by a second degree (or higher order) polynomial.
The determination of the effective tax rate on taxable wages is modeled
in different ways in the individual states, a reflection of the major dif
ferences in their individual tax statutes. A fundamental distinction in
volves the type of experience rating present in the state. Nearly all states
use either a reserve ratio approach or a benefit ratio approach to set
tax rates for individual employers. Benefit ratio systems rely heavily
on the flow of benefit payments (over the past, say, three years) relative
to covered payroll in determining tax rates. Reserve ratio systems rely
mainly on the ratio of the employer's trust fund balance to covered
payroll to determine employer rates.
In reserve ratio states, the determination of the effective tax rate is
modeled as a two step process. Most reserve ratio states have a tax code
that provides for several different schedules of statutory rates. Experience
rating provisions determine which schedule is in effect in any given year.
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Higher tax schedules apply after a state has had bad experience (as in
dicated by a low trust fund balance). In reserve ratio states, the model
uses a measure of experience to activate the appropriate tax schedule.
Statutory rates from that schedule along with a measure of the overall
reserve ratio (reserves as a percent of covered wages) are primary deter
minants of the effective tax rate.
In benefit ratio states, the aggregate benefit ratio (benefits as a per
cent of covered payroll) for the appropriate recent period is the main
determinant of effective tax rates. Minimum statutory tax rates may
also be important to finance benefit payments that cannot be assigned
to individual employers (so called noncharges, ineffective charges and
charges against inactive employer accounts).
Block 4 determines interest payments as the product of an exogenously
determined interest rate and the average fund balance for the year. Block
5 contains the elements of the state's trust fund identity. The sum of
taxes plus interest minus benefits is added to last year's balance to ar
rive at this year's balance.
To anyone who has worked with UI models, there are few surprises
in UISIM as just described. The model described here is an annual
model, but there is nothing that precludes the construction of a quarterly
model. A quarterly model would have more equations and would have
to explicitly address issues of seasonally. The emphasis on TU as well
as IU as an important unemployment variable reflects my belief that
TU is the more basic of the two unemployment measures. A version
of UISIM could be built which used only IU, and many state practi
tioners might be inclined to do this.
A simulation model to analyze fund solvency has to determine benefits,
taxes and interest income separately, cumulate these flows and update
the fund balance periodically in order to track the trust fund over the
period of study. What is new with UISIM is the way it is implemented
using LOTUS. The model's equations are entered directly into a spread
sheet where the needed simulation calculations are performed
automatically. There is no need to code and compile an elaborate com
puter program containing the model's equations. In short, UISIM is
much more user-friendly than an earlier generation model like the
SBFSM.
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A Model of Massachusetts
During 1987 and 1988, the General Accounting Office conducted a
review of state unemployment insurance programs that included an
analysis of solvency questions. (See U.S. General Accounting Office
1988.) As one part of the solvency analysis, they requested that a simula
tion model be built to examine the effects of alternative macro scenarios
on fund adequacy. Since many states are acknowledged to have inade
quate balances, it was decided to study a state with a "large" balance
to see if the balance would prove adequate in the face of a serious reces
sion. Massachusetts was selected and became the first state where UISIM
was implemented. (See Vroman 1987.)
On December 31, 1986, Massachusetts had a fund balance of about
$1.0 billion, the sixth largest in the UI system. The state's reserve ratio
(reserves as a percent of covered wages) of 2.0 percent ranked 16th
highest among the 53 U.S. programs. At the end of 1987, reserves were
almost $1.1 billion and the reserve ratio was again 2.0 percent. Thus,
on both an absolute and a relative basis Massachusetts has had a large
trust fund in recent years.
The growth of high-tech employment and military procurement in
the 1980s have helped the Massachusetts economy to grow rapidly and
reduce its unemployment rate to less than 4 percent. Massachusetts has
an interesting history of cyclical experiences. It prospered in the late
1960s, but then had consistently high unemployment throughout the
1970s. Its unemployment rate (TUR) peaked at 11.2 percent in 1975,
2.7 percentage points above the national rate of 8.5 percent. The UI
program in the state experienced funding problems in these years.
Despite high tax rate levies, the fund balance was depleted, and the
state borrowed $265 million during 1975-1976. Since then the state's
unemployment rate has fallen, both absolutely and relative to the na
tional average. In 1986 the state's unemployment rate was 3.8 percent
whereas the national unemployment rate was 7.0 percent and in 1987
the corresponding state and national unemployment rates were 3.2 per
cent and 6.2 percent respectively. In summary, the state experienced
an above-average TUR from 1971 to 1977, an average TUR in 1978,
and a below-average TUR in all subsequent years.
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The model of UI in Massachusetts has 76 equations. Each equation
appears in appendix A, along with definitions of all the variables.
Behavioral equations were first estimated for the period 1967-1985 or
1967-1986, but later the estimation period was extended to 1967-1987.
Although the model was first implemented in simulations for the U.S.
General Accounting Office (1988) that covered the years 1987-1996,
it has been updated to examine the 1988-1997 period in the present
analysis. Because the procedures for modifying equations and updating
individual data series are straightforward in LOTUS, the updating of
UISIM in Massachusetts was completed in about two days. The ease
of updating is a convenient feature of LOTUS-based simulation models.
Of the exogenous labor market variables in Block 1, the labor force
is assumed to grow at a rate that is three-fourths of the national growth
rate for the 1987-1995 period as projected by BLS. (See Fullerton 1985.)
This assumption was based on a comparison of state and national labor
force growth rates for two periods; 1970-1975 and 1980-1985. Since
very high unemployment prevailed during 1975-1980, these years were
not used in the Massachusetts-U.S. comparison. The other main ex
ogenous variables (the growth in weekly wages, the interest rate, and
the TUR) can assume any values needed for a specific investigation.
Of particular interest would be a repetition of the state's high unemploy
ment of the 1970s.
Total state employment is known once the labor force growth rate
and the TUR have been set. Total employment, in turn, is the primary
determinant of taxable covered employment. The regression coefficient
for total state employment was almost exactly 1.0 in an equation ex
plaining taxable employment that covered the years 1967-1987 and in
cluded controls for the coverage expansion of 1978 and the rapid employ
ment growth of 1985-1987. After examining residuals from the regres
sion, however, it was decided to correct for first order serial correla
tion. This modification of the estimating equation reduced the large
positive residuals that had been present at the end of the data period.
For the model, the intercept in this equation has also been adjusted to
correct for serial correlation in the residuals.

New Model of Trust Fund Balances

75

Reimbursable employment has grown rapidly over the 1972-1987
period, with the largest increase occurring in 1978 when coverage was
expanded. The effects of Proposition 2 1/2 (a state tax initiative that
placed a cap on property tax rates) and cutbacks in public service employ
ment under CETA in 1981 and 1982 were also obvious as reimbursable
employment fell sharply in these two years. In the model, reimbursable
employment is assumed to increase by five for every one hundred in
crease in taxable employment above its 1987 level.
Insured unemployment (IU) is the most volatile of the endogenous
variables determined in Block 2. In Massachusetts, 94 percent of the
variation in IU between 1967 and 1987 was explained by a regression
equation that used as explanatory variables TU, TU lagged one year,
and a dummy variable which equaled 1 from 1981 to 1987. The respec
tive unemployment coefficients were .533 and -.207 on TU and TU
lagged, and both were highly significant. Lagged TU is apparently cap
turing the effects of exhaustions. The dummy variable for the 1981-1987
period was also found to have a significant negative coefficient sug
gesting a downward shift in IU in the 1980s. The size of the shift coef
ficient (-7,302) represented a 9.1 percent reduction in IU during the
1981-1987 period. In other regressions to explain the IU/TU ratio in
Massachusetts, the shift dummy's coefficient was of a similar size (sug
gesting roughly a 10 percentage point reduction) and highly significant.
Even in this state, which has enjoyed a high level of economic pros
perity in the 1980s, a reduced fraction of the unemployed have been
receiving UI benefits since 1981.
The gross replacement rate (the ratio of average weekly benefits to
average weekly wages) was essentially trendless in Massachusetts from
1967 to 1986 as its main statutory determinants did not change. The
maximum weekly benefit (as a percent of average weekly wages), the
statutory replacement rate, and the size of dependents' allowances were
all stable. In a multiple regression covering the 1967-1987 period,
however, both the unemployment rate and the growth rate in average
weekly wages were significant in explaining short-run variation in the
gross replacement rate. A dummy variable for just the 1985-1987 period
also was positive and significant. Higher unemployment raises the
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replacement rate as more senior workers enter the claimant pool dur
ing recessions. Greater wage inflation lowers the replacement rate as
benefits are based largely on last year's wages, but the replacement rate
is calculated on this year's wages. It is not clear what effect is being
proxied by the 1985-1987 dummy variable.
Average weekly benefits are determined as the product of the replace
ment rate and average weekly wages. Massachusetts raised its
dependents' allowance from $6 per dependent to $15 in 1987 and to
$25 in 1988, but continued to limit the total dependents' allowance to
half of the worker's average weekly benefit. In recognition of the in
creased payment per dependent, the average weekly benefit was raised
by $5 in 1987 and by $8 in 1988 and later years (amounts suggested
by a UI official in Massachusetts).
Besides IU and average weekly benefits, the other variables that deter
mine total payments of regular UI benefits are: (1) the ratio of IU among
taxable employers to total IU (including reimbursable employers); (2)
the ratio of weeks compensated to weeks claimed; and (3) a final benefit
adjustment ratio. After examining each of these variables it was decid
ed to treat all three as exogenous, and to set each one to its average
value for the 1983-1987 period.
The determination of extended benefits (EB) payments starts with the
EB triggering mechanism. If the state's insured unemployment rate (IUR)
averages 5 percent for any 13-week period, and the IUR is at least 20
percent above the average IUR for the same 13-week period in the
previous two years, this will activate the EB program. Examining
quarterly lURs for the 1979-1985 period, it was found that the average
seasonal factor in the IUR for the first calendar quarter was 1.257. This
implies that an annual IUR of 3.98 percent would be expected to pro
duce a first quarter IUR of 5 percent. Thus EB is triggered "on" when
the IUR reaches 3.98 percent. Weeks of EB (measured as annualized
weeks and expressed as a proportion of weeks of regular UI benefits)
are then determined from a regression on the average of the IUR for
the current year and the previous year. The number of months that EB
is "on" then increases as the IUR increases. It starts at three months,
and when the IUR reaches 5.6 percent, the program is "on" for all
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12 months. The weekly benefit in EB is set at 90.9 percent of the weekly
benefit in regular UI (the average ratio for the 1980-1982 period) After
total EB payments have been estimated, half are assumed to be the state's
share. Half of EB along with all regular UI payments account for the
total annual benefit outflow from the trust fund.
Tax collections from taxable employers depend on the product of three
variables: total covered wages, the taxable wage proportion, and the
effective tax rate on taxable wages. Since its inception, the Massachusetts
program has generally used the federal tax base as the state's tax base.
The only exception occurred between 1962 and 1971 when the state's
tax base of $3600 exceeded the federal tax base by $600. Assuming
that the state continues to follow the federal tax base in the future, the
time path of the taxable wage proportion will depend mainly on the rate
of wage inflation. In the model, the taxable wage proportion depends
on the ratio of the taxable wage base to annual wages (52 times average
weekly wages) and the TUR. The tax base-to-annual wages ratio enters
as a homogeneous second degree polynomial, i.e., a polynomial with
no intercept. This functional form ensures both that the relationship has
curvature and that the taxable wage proportion goes to zero when the
tax base-to-average wage ratio goes to zero. The regression explained
98 percent of the variation in the taxable wage proportion over the
1967-1987 period.
The Massachusetts statute provides for seven different tax schedules
to be used in setting employer taxes. Statutory rates range from 1.2 to
5.4 percent of taxable wages under the most favorable schedule and
from 3.0 to 7.2 percent under the highest schedule. The trust fund reserve
ratio as of September 30th (reserves on that date as a percent of total
covered wages for the preceding calendar year) determines which
schedule will apply to taxable private employers in the next calendar
year. In this calculation, Massachusetts allows the October tax payment
(on average 13.4 percent of annual tax revenues) to be credited to
employer reserves. A series of conditional (or if) statements are used
in the model along with the September 30th reserve ratio to select the
appropriate tax schedule for the next year.
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Once the appropriate schedule has been identified, statutory rates from
that schedule are used as a prime determinant of the average effective
tax rate. In Massachusetts, the simple average of each tax schedule's
minimum rate and maximum rate is used as a proxy variable to repre
sent statutory rates from that schedule. This average is a key variable
in a multiple regression to explain the average effective tax rate on tax
able employers. Two other explanatory variables in the tax rate equa
tion are a post-1978 dummy variable (to capture the effect of introduc
ing a revised set of tax rate schedules in 1978) and the start-of-year
trust fund reserve ratio (to capture movements along a given tax
schedule). All three variables were highly significant in a regression
that covered the 1967-1987 period, explaining over 98 percent of the
variation in the effective tax rate.
Massachusetts also levies a solvency tax to replenish its solvency fund
(a fund within the overall trust fund) each year. This fund is the source
of payments for noncharged benefits and ineffectively charged benefits
(benefit payments not charged to individual employers, benefit charges
against active employers whose account balances are less than -15 per
cent of their taxable wages, and charges against inactive employers whose
accounts have been exhausted. 1 The solvency fund received inflows from
two sources: the state trust fund's interest income and solvency tax
receipts. Prior to 1985, solvency taxes had been levied for several years
at a flat rate of 1 percent on all taxable employers. Since 1985, the rate
has been set to cover the excess of noncharges and ineffective charges
over interest income. The solvency tax is a flat rate assessment levied
at the start of the following calendar year. Rates of .05 percent and
.07 percent were applied in 1986 and 1987 respectively.
In the model, the proportion of benefits that are noncharged and in
effectively charged is an inverse function of the state's start-of-year
reserve ratio. The proportion ranges from .10, when the reserve ratio
exceeds 4.0 percent, to a maximum of .27, when the reserve ratio is
smaller than -.5 percent. After the solvency tax rate has been set, it
is added to the regression-determined tax rate to yield the total effec
tive tax rate on taxable employers. Total tax payments are then just the
product of total covered wages, the taxable wage proportion and the
total effective tax rate.
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Blocks 4 and 5, which respectively determine interest income and
the state trust fund balance, have no behavioral relations. Identities deter
mine interest income and the trust fund balance. An if statement allows
for interest income only if the average fund balance is positive. The
interest rate is an exogenous variable linked to the rate of wage infla
tion. These blocks serve to close the model, but are of very little analytic
interest. The economic variables, UI statutes and behavioral relations,
that drive the model are found in the first three blocks of equations.

Models in Other States
Models similar to the Massachusetts model have also been developed
in California, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Texas. All
have a basic structure with five blocks of equations to respectively
characterize each state's labor market, benefit payments, taxes, interest,
and the trust fund identity.
The two behavioral equations that differ most across the seven states
are the equations which determine taxable covered employment and the
effective tax rate. Taxable covered employment in all states depends
on total state employment (as measured in the monthly labor force
survey). In several states there are also controls for the coverage ex
tensions of 1972 and/or 1978. The equations differ in their use of employ
ment variables from key industries. Three examples of key industry
employment variables are as follows: construction employment in
Florida, mining and manufacturing employment in Texas, and mining,
manufacturing, and transportation employment in Michigan. Five of
the seven models use a key industry employment variable, and they
make highly significant contributions to explained variation in these
states.
The effective tax rate equations have the most widely varying specifica
tions across the states, a reflection of interstate differences in UI tax
statutes. Typically, in reserve ratio states, a statutory tax rate and a
measure of the state's overall reserve position are the principal
arguments. The reserve ratio may measure the trust fund relative to
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either taxable wages or total wages depending on how the state's tax
law is worded. In benefit ratio systems, the benefit ratio (benefits as
a percent of covered payrolls) is always highly significant and measured
over the time period stipulated by the state's law, e.g., in Texas the
three years ending September 30th of last year. In some states, the tax
rate equation also incorporates the provisions of a solvency tax design
ed to replenish the trust fund when it is drawn down to low levels.
Appendices B and C respectively provide full descriptions of the
UISIM models as developed for Texas and Michigan. All variables are
defined and all equations are shown in the same format as the descrip
tion of the Massachusetts model given in appendix A. Combined, the
three appendices provide examples of states with reserve ratio, benefit
ratio and a hybrid reserve ratio-benefit ratio experience rating system.
The seven states are all large, and combined they accounted for 38
percent of taxable covered employment in 1987 (30.9 million workers
out of a national total of 81.4 million). They represent a substantial
share of aggregate UI program experiences. Because the seven are widely
dispersed (two in each of the North East, the Midwest and the South
and one in the West) their histories reflect regional as well as overall
experiences with unemployment. Regional experiences are explored in
chapter 5.
NOTE
1. The solvency tax in Massachusetts is not designed to increase total reserves of the state's overall
UI trust ftmd.

4
A Simulation Analysis
of Fund Adequacy
This chapter uses UISIM as developed in seven states to examine ques
tions about UI trust fund adequacy. Chapter 2 discussed in some detail
three basic funding strategies that a state can follow. The state may prefund against future obligations by building a large trust fund balance,
or it may plan to defray future benefit liabilities through an automatic
pay-as-you-go strategy or a discretionary pay-as-you-go strategy. Under
the later two strategies, fund balances may be restrained to lower average
levels (vis-a-vis pre-funding), but taxes (and possibly benefits) respond
more rapidly when recession-induced benefit outlays increase.
To help focus the analysis we will rely heavily on one operational
indicator of funding inadequacy. The failure of a state to adequately
finance its UI program will be inferred if the state's net trust fund balance
is exhausted and the state requires "large" U.S. Treasury loans, i.e.,
total loans for an entire cyclical episode that exceed 1 percent of covered
payroll as of one year (such as 1975 for the 1970s or 1984 for the
1980-87 period). This definition of what constitutes a large loan is ad
mittedly arbitrary, but it permits a state to receive some loans without
automatically concluding that its funding strategy is a failure. Since payas-you go strategies anticipate some borrowing, it is the need for large
loans that signals a failure of the funding mechanism under this strategy.
Of the three funding strategies, the discretionary pay-as-you-go
strategy is the least amenable to analysis through simulation modeling.
This strategy contemplates legislative action to change tax statutes and/or
benefit statutes to avoid insolvency. The need for discretionary changes
is indicated by the (anticipated or actual) presence of trust fund debts,
but the legislative response can take many forms when debts develop.
The discretionary response arises within a legislative context that varies
across states, something that does not fit easily within a simulation model
ing framework.
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What the simulation models can readily examine are the consequences
for states of differing initial trust fund balances, the responsiveness of
taxes (and perhaps benefits) under current UI statutes and the long-run
implications for fund adequacy of current tax and benefit statutes. Thus
the analysis of the models is most useful for assessing the pre-funding
and automatic pay-as-you go strategies. These strategies can be examined
because they presume that the present statutes of the UI system in a
state remain unchanged. The statutes influence the way that UI taxes
and benefits respond to changes in unemployment, inflation and other
factors in the state's economic environment. What the simulation models
can show are the need for discretionary changes and the size and the
timing of needed changes if large scale borrowing is to be avoided. The
borrowing needs of the states will be highlighted in subsequent sec
tions of the chapter.

The States
The seven states selected for analysis are all large (among the top
ten in taxable covered employment and covered wages and salaries),
and combined they accounted for nearly 40 percent of covered U.S.
employment in 1987. Besides their large average size, however, the
states are diverse in a number of ways.
Table 4.1 presents summary information on several aspects of the
states' diversity. The seven states are widely dispersed geographical
ly, and they have had a variety of experiences with UI loans and debt
in the 1970s and 1980s. Only California avoided borrowing altogether,
while Michigan was the only large borrower in both decades. ! The other
five exhibit varying combinations of no loans, small loans and large
loans in the two decades. There is a clear pattern of coastal states re
quiring large loans in the 1970s while interior states were more apt to
be large borrowers in the 1980s. The geographic aspect of experiences
with debt will be examined in some detail in chapter 5.
The seven states have a variety of experience rating systems. Four
use reserve ratios and two use benefit ratios, while Michigan uses both

Table 4.1
Summary Information for the Seven States in the Simulation Analysis

Solvency
tax

Indexed
maximum
weekly
benefit

Indexed
taxable
wage
base

Reserve ratio

No

Yes

No

Small

Reserve ratio

Yes

Yes

Large

Large

Reserve ratiobenefit ratio

Yes

Yes
Yesb

Midwest

Small

Large

Reserve ratio

Yes

Yesb

No

Florida

South

Small

No

Benefit ratio

Yes

No

Texas

South

No

Large

Benefit ratio

Yes

No
Yesb

No

California

West

No

No

Reserve ratio

Yes

No

No

Geographic
region

UI loans
in the
1970s8

UI loans
in the
1980s8

Type of
experience
rating

Massachusetts

North East

Large

No

New Jersey

North East

Large

Michigan

Midwest

Ohio

State

No

SOURCES: National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation and Workers' Compensation (1988), tables 3,5, 12, and 18 and loan calculations
made by the author.
a. Large loans in the 1970s, i.e., loans exceeded 1 percent of 1975 payroll. Large loans in the 1980s, i.e., loans exceeded 1 percent of 1984 payroll.
b. Maximum weekly benefit frozen for two or more years between 1983 and 1988.
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reserve ratios and benefit ratios to set employer tax rates. 2 Six of the
seven states, all but Massachusetts, have some kind of solvency tax.
Thus as trust fund balances approach zero, most have some provision
for raising taxes that operates (at least partially) independently from
the regular tax rate-setting procedure followed under experience rating.
In four states the solvency tax is a separately identifiable tax, while in
California and New Jersey the solvency tax is an extension of the regular
experience rating tax schedules to a top (highest) schedule of statutory
tax rates. There is an obvious interest in knowing the effectiveness of
these extra taxes in preventing insolvency and/or large-scale borrow
ing. They represent an important element of an automatic pay-as-yougo financing strategy.
The seven states also have varied provisions regarding the indexa
tion of the maximum weekly benefit and the taxable wage base. Only
New Jersey indexes both, while Florida and California index neither.
These three states can be described as having a symmetric indexation
treatment of taxes and benefits (either indexing both or indexing neither)
while the other four provide for an indexed weekly benefit maximum
but not for an indexed tax base. 3
The seven states selected for analysis differ in other ways besides
those summarized in table 4.1. The lag between the tax computation
date and date when new employer tax rates are imposed is six months
in Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio and three months in Massachusetts
and Texas. Parts of tax computation arrangements followed in both
California and Florida use information through the end of the current
year to set the new tax rates that become effective on January 1 of the
next year, i.e., a zero lag. 4 Florida and Texas use three years of recent
experience for measuring individual employer benefit ratios, while the
benefit ratios in Michigan cover five-year periods.
Two potentially important automatic pay-as-you-go features are ab
sent from all seven states. None of the seven has a provision to
automatically raise the taxable wage base or a provision to automatically
freeze (or reduce) the maximum weekly benefit when the trust fund
balance falls to a low level. Thus, although the sample of states is diverse
in many ways, it does not exhaust the full range of potentially impor
tant UI financing provisions.
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The Analytic Approach

A simulation analysis can cover a wide range of investigations into
the effects of different exogenous variables, different behavioral rela
tions, and different UI statutory provisions. This chapter examines on
ly a limited number of topics. At the outset, each state's UI statutes
(as of 1988) are taken as given, and the simulated time path of the trust
fund balance over the 10 years from 1988 to 1997 is traced. Attention
is then focused on the performance of the current UI program in response
to changes in five variables: (1) the unemployment rate, (2) the infla
tion rate, (3) restrictions in the availability of UI benefits in the 1980s,
(4) the real interest rate, and (5) the initial trust fund balance (as of
December 31, 1987). Note that four of the five, all but changes in UI
benefit availability, are beyond the state's immediate control. Later,
the effects of solvency taxes on trust fond balances are examined. Reserve
ratio and benefit ratio experience rating systems are also briefly com
pared in the section on tax responsiveness.
Each simulation makes explicit assumptions about all five of the control
variables listed in the preceding paragraph. Note that the first four are
flow variables that must be specified for each year of a simulation. A
few added comments about the control variables should also be made.
Unemployment is probably the control variable of greatest interest
since it exerts a strong and direct influence on the volume of UI claims.
In each state, four time paths of the total unemployment rate (TUR)
were singled out for explicit attention: the state TUR in the 1970s (1970
to 1979), the state TUR in the 1980s to (1979 to 1988), the national
TUR in the 1970s; and the national TUR in the 1980s. Use of historic
TUR data limits what otherwise could be any number of conceivable
time paths of unemployment in the simulations. Two logical questions
for analysis which follow from the choice of TURs are: How would
the UI program fare if the state were to undergo a repetition of earlier
unemployment experiences? and How would the state fare if its
unemployment rate matched the national average? The choice of the
TUR as the fundamental unemployment variable permits one to
distinguish the effects of variation in overall unemployment from the
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effects of variation in the accessibility of benefits (e.g., the ratio of weeks
compensated to total weeks of unemployment) in determining benefit
payouts within a state.
It should also be noted that most time paths of the state TURs, like
the national TURs, peak in the middle years of the 10-year simulation
intervals, so that trust funds are usually growing at the end of the simula
tions (both from the response of experience rated taxes to earlier claims
activity and from declining claims activity). The analysis focuses on
borrowing over the entire 10-year interval as well as final trust fund
balances.
The control variable for inflation is the annual growth rate in average
weekly wages. As with unemployment, historic data on wage inflation
from the 1970s and 1980s are utilized. To further explore the effects
of inflation on fund balances, inflation rates that exceed historic ex
periences are also utilized. Attention on the real interest rate is especially
relevant in the 1980s, as real interest rates (the nominal interest rate
less the rate of wage inflation) have been unusually high. To explore
the effects of differing initial trust fund balances, we use actual balances
at the end of 1987 and alternatives that reflect actuarial guidelines (such
as the 1.5 reserve ratio multiple).
The simulations also explore the consequences for states of changes
in benefit availability in the 1980s. This is done by making two modifica
tions in the models. Decreased benefit availability in the regular UI pro
grams is approximated by a dummy variable shift effect in the insured
unemployment equation. The effects of the higher EB triggers are also
incorporated in the models. Both restrictions on benefit availability can
be reversed to make the benefit payout patterns more closely resemble
those of the 1970s.
A problem was observed in some initial simulations with the taxable
wage base and maximum weekly benefit in states where these variables
were not indexed. The minimum taxable wage base permitted in a state
is the base used for the Federal Unemployment Tax (PUT), presently
$7,000 per worker. This was the actual 1988 (and 1989) tax base in
three simulation states (Massachusetts, Florida, and California). If the
tax base is assumed to remain unchanged over the 10-year 1988-1997
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interval, taxable wages decline to only 15 to 20 percent of total wages
by the end of the simulation period. To counteract what may be view
ed as an unrealistically low taxable wage proportion, the PUT tax base
was raised to $9,000 in 1991 and to $11,000 in 1995. In the two states
where the maximum weekly benefit is not indexed, the following assump
tions were also made. California was assumed to raise its present $166
maximum to $205 in 1991 and to $250 in 1993. Florida's 1989 max
imum of $200 was raised to $250 in 1993. All of these assumptions
were somewhat arbitrary, but they seemed less unrealistic than assum
ing unchanged tax bases and weekly benefit maxima over the entire
1988-1997 interval.

The Baseline Simulations
The starting point for the analysis was a baseline simulation in each
state where the unemployment rate was stable at roughly the full employ
ment unemployment rate5 and wage inflation was stable at a moderate
rate. Two purposes were served by the baseline simulations. First, they
showed the level that the trust fund balance would attain in the in
termediate run under generally favorable economic conditions, given
the initial trust fund balance and the 1988 tax and benefit statutes
operative in the state. Second, they provide a background against which
the changes in benefits, interest, taxes and fund balances could be
measured when the important control variables departed from their
baseline levels. 6
The assumptions for the control variables in the baseline simulations
were as follows. (1) The unemployment rate was 5.5 percent of the
labor force. In three states where the 1987 unemployment rate was more
than a full percentage point above 5.5 percent (Michigan, Ohio, and
Texas), the rate in 1988 and 1989 was assumed to decline by about
1 percentage point per year until 5.5. percent was achieved. 7 (2) The
wage inflation rate was assumed to be 6 percent per year. This rate
is consistent with historic experiences in UI programs. 8 (3) The real
interest rate was assumed to be 1 percent per year (or a 7 percent nominal
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interest rate in the baseline). This real interest rate is less than the average
for the 1980s, but greater than the average for the 1970s. (4) Benefit
availability in the regular UI and EB programs was assumed to be the
same as in the 1980s, i.e., a downward shift from the 1970s in regular
UI and the applicability of the current (higher) EB triggers. (5) Initial
trust fund balances were those as of the end of 1987. 9
Table 4.2 displays summary information from the baseline simula
tions. So much information is generated by 10-year simulations of models
containing 70 to 90 equations that only a small portion of model output
is shown. The three flow variables (taxes, interest and benefits) are
summed for the entire 10 years, while fund balances and other reserve
indicators are shown for the start and end of the simulation period.
Observe that the average unemployment rate (TUR) is slightly above
5.5 percent in three states, a reflection of the assumption that unemploy
ment gradually declines to 5.5 percent in the initial years of the
simulations.
To provide indicators of trends on the benefit and tax sides of the
programs, the table shows starting year and ending year measures for
the ratio of the maximum weekly benefit amount to average weekly
wages and the taxable wage proportion. The former is stable in three
of five states where the maximum weekly benefit is indexed
(Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Michigan). It rises in Ohio, reflect
ing a recoupment between 1988 and 1993 of earlier losses associated
with a freeze in maximum benefits over the 1983-1987 period. It rises
in Texas, due to the operation of an indexation formula which causes
the maximum benefit to rise faster than average weekly wages. 10 The
ratios decline in the two states where the weekly maximum is not in
dexed, Florida and California, and where the models assume the max
imum reaches $250 by 1997. The taxable wage proportion is stable in
New Jersey, which has an indexed tax base, and in Massachusetts,
Florida, and California, the three states where the 1988 base is $7,000
(and assumed to rise to $11,000 by 1997). In the other three states,
(Michigan, Ohio, and Texas) the taxable wage proportion declines
because the starting (1988) tax base exceeds $7,000 but only grows to
$11,000 by the end of the simulation period. Thus, in two of the states

Table 4.2
Baseline Simulation Results
Massachusetts

New
Jersey

Michigan

Ohio

Florida

Texas

California

Total unemployment
rate (TUR) (%)

5.5

5.5

5.7

5.6

5.5

5.8

5.5

Wage inflation rate (%)

6.0

6.0

6.0

6.0

6.0

6.0

6.0

Maximum WBA/
AWW ratio

1988
1997

0.599
0.599

0.496
0.504

0.503
0.520

0.445
0.525

0.538
0.398

0.503
0.546

0.357
0.318

Taxable wage
proportion

1988
1997

0.345
0.323

0.447
0.432

0.370
0.256

0.364
0.298

0.398
0.372

0.369
0.300

0.317
0.292

1988-1997
1988-1997
1988-1997

8,316
564
8,918

11,730
2,023
11,305

10,141
1,361
8,657

10,042
1,549
8,016

5,308
1,704
5,109

10,832
922
9,262

26,033
4,081
25,396

on

0.064

0.147

0.118

0.134

0.243

0.136

>

4,017
8,735

55'
2.

Taxes
Interest
Benefits

Interest/total trust
fund receipts
End of year
trust fund

1987
1997

1,097
1,058

1,824
4,272

26
3,540

214
3,789

1,745
3,648

0.078
-514
1,979

Reserve ratio (% of
covered payroll)

1987
1997

1.96
0.99

2.65
3.16

0.04
2.55

0.29
2.53

2.38
2.12

-0.48
0.72

1.79
1.77

Reserve ratio
multiple

1987
1997

0.61
0.31

0.80
0.95

0.01
0.69

0.09
0.82

1.29
1.15

-0.42
0.63

0.76
0.75

SOURCE: Simulations with UISIM. Taxes, interest, benefits and trust fund balances measured in millions of dollars
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(Ohio and Texas), the UI programs become more unbalanced over the
1988-1997 period because maximum benefits grow considerably faster
than weekly wages while the taxable wage proportion declines.
When the 10-year flows of taxes, interest, and benefits are examin
ed, one noticeable feature of the simulations is the importance of in
terest income in overall trust fund receipts. In five states, interest ac
counts for more than 10 percent of total receipts and for more than 20
percent in Florida. The 10-year flows of benefits and taxes are roughly
equal in several states, so that trust fund accumulations are due mainly
to interest income. Having a large average trust fund balance yields
substantial interest income to several states.
Primary interest in table 4.2 centers on the behavior of the trust fund
balance over the 10 years. In all states but Massachusetts, nominal
reserves grow and the accumulations are especially large in Michigan,
Ohio, and Texas, the states with low initial balances. When the start
ing and ending balances are measured as a percent of covered payroll
(i.e., as reserve ratios), one observes that the reserve ratios remain
roughly constant in New Jersey, Florida, and California. The reserve
ratio declines by roughly half in Massachusetts, while ratios grow
substantially in the three states with low initial balances. Thus, of the
seven states, only Massachusetts experiences a measurable decline in
its reserve ratio in the baseline simulations.
Finally, the bottom rows of table 4.2 display starting and ending
reserve ratio multiples. No multiple is as large as 1.5, a recommended
actuarial standard, and only Florida's multiples exceed 1.0. By 1997,
however, six states have multiples of at least .6, and only Massachusetts
has a lower multiple (at .31).
To summarize, trust fund balances grow substantially in six of the
seven states in the baseline simulations. For the seven programs com
bined total net reserves increase from $8.4 billion to $27.0 billion over
10 years, or from 1.25 percent to 1.83 percent of covered payroll.
Despite the favorable economic environment of the baseline and substan
tial trust fund accumulations, no state achieves a 1.5 reserve ratio multiple
by the end of 1997, and only one (Florida) achieves a multiple that ex
ceeds 1.0.
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Alternative Unemployment Simulations

During most years in the 1970s and 1980s, the average unemploy
ment rate for the nation exceeded 5.5 percent, averaging 6.2 percent
from 1970 to 1979 and 7.3 percent from 1979 to 1988. For the seven
states under investigation, the statewide averages over the same time
periods also typically exceeded 5.5 percent. 11 To analyze the perfor
mance of the individual UI programs under differing unemployment
environments, a series of simulations were conducted which differed
from the baseline simulations only in the time paths of the unemploy
ment rate (TUR). State and national TURs from the 1970s and 1980s
(1979-1988) were used in these simulations. The need for UI loans and
the scale of borrowing were the outcome variables of central interest.
It should be emphasized that these (and later) simulations are not
offered as predictions of the volume of borrowing that would occur for
given time paths of unemployment. A state whose fund balance was
observed to decline could enact legislation to increase taxes and/or reduce
benefits to prevent insolvency or to reduce the scale of borrowing. What
the simulations are intended to show is the borrowing that would take
place given the state's initial trust fund balance and given the state's
1988 tax and benefit statutes. Discretionary policy actions lie outside
the scope of the simulations.
In chapter 1, it was observed that states that incurred interest-bearing
debts after March 1982 tended to repay such debts very quickly. Some
of the loans received were needed for seasonal and other short-run cash
flow needs when fund balances are low. The debtor states were often
observed to borrow and then repay part or all of the loan within the
same year. Since the simulation models were developed as annual
models, they do not capture these very short term borrowing needs.
Consequently, the volume of loans as simulated by UISIM in states
whose trust fund balances are low or negative will systematically
understate the actual extent of borrowing undertaken by states in such
situations. This understatement should be kept in mind in judging the
volume of loans required under the various unemployment scenarios.
We estimate the volume of "cash flow" loans to have been substantial
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in Michigan, Ohio, and Texas in the 1982-1987 period, roughly half
of all interest-bearing loans received in these years. 12 Thus, we will
infer that a state needs large scale loans if total simulated loans for the
1988-1997 period equal .5 percent of 1992 payroll. This will make the
loan estimates in the simulations roughly comparable with historic data
from the seven states covering the 1970s and 1980s (and noted in table
4.1).
Table 4.3 summarizes the alternative unemployment simulations. No
state requires UI loans in the baseline. The average TURs during
1988-1997 and 1997 fund balances from the baseline are shown so that
the reader can compare baseline values of these variables with their
values under the differing unemployment scenarios. Applying 1970s
state TURs, two states, Massachusetts and Michigan, need loans. Us
ing a .5 percent criteria for large loans (total loans relative to 1992
payroll), Massachusetts and Michigan both need large loans, as they
actually did in the 1970s. The third large borrower from the 1970s,
New Jersey (see table 4.1), needs no loans under this simulation scenario.
When the states are subjected to a repetition of state TURs from the
1980s, Michigan and Ohio are identified as major borrowers while Texas
is simulated to require only a small loan. Note that Michigan and Ohio
have especially high average unemployment rates, the highest average
TURs in table 4.3, and both states end the simulations with negative
net trust fund balances. Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Florida ac
tually end these simulations with higher net reserves than in the baseline
simulations, a reflection of the effects of declining TURs towards the
end of the simulation period. 13
The third set of unemployment simulations suggests that a repetition
of national TUR experiences from the 1970s in the individual states
would not pose serious financing problems. Texas is the only state that
requires loans, and its borrowing totals only .09 percent of 1992 payroll.
In all reserve ratio states, the 1997 reserve balances are measurably
lower than in the baseline. The differences range from about $250 million
in Massachusetts to $1 billion or more in New Jersey, Michigan, Ohio,
and California. The ending fund balance (vis-a-vis the baseline) is only
$41 million lower in Florida, and it is $142 million higher in Texas.

Table 4.3
Simulations with Alternative Unemployment Rates
Massachusetts

New
Jersey

Average TUR (%)
Loans - 1988-1997 ($)
Fund balance - 1997 ($)

5.5
0
1,058

5.5
0
4,272

Average TUR (%)
Loans - 1988-1997 ($)
Loans/1992 payroll (%)
Fund balance -1997 ($)

7.2
789
1.03
312

7.2
0
0.00
1,408

Florida
Ohio
Michigan
Baseline simulation
5.5
5.6
5.7
000
3,648
3,789
3,540

Average TUR (%)
Loans - 1988-1997 ($)
Loans/1992 payroll (%)
Fund balance - 1997 ($)

5.1
0
0.00
1,917

6.3
0
0.00
4,438

State unemployment rates of the 1970s
6.5
6.1
7.9
0
0
808
0.00
0.00
0.81
3,547
2,539
-359
State unemployment rates of the 1980s
6.4
8.8
10.8
0
3,953
4,316
0.00
3.72
4.32
3,933
-3,119
-2,210

Average TUR (%)
Loans - 1988-1997 ($)
Loans/ 1992 payroll ($)
Fund balance - 1997 ($)

6.2
0
0.00
811

6.2
0
0.00
3,063

Average TUR (%)
Loans - 1988-1997 ($)
Loans/ 1992 payroll (%)
Fund balance - 1997 ($)

7.3
479
0.63
751

7.3
0
0.00
2,469

Texas

California

5.8
0
1,979

5.5
0
8,735

4.8
0
0.00
2,108

7.9
0
0.00
6,435
Cfl

6.7
466
0.26
431

7.3
0
000
7,709

U.S. unemployment rates of the 1970s
6.2
6.2
6.2
000
0.00
0.00
0 00
3,609
2,390
2,466

6.2
171
0.09
2,121

6.2
0
0.00
7,524

U.S. unemployment rates of the 1980s
7.3
7.3
7.3
436
0
0
0.00
0.41
0.00
3,828
1,044
1,662

7.3
951
0.53
3,026

7.3
0
0.00
7,456

SOURCE: Simulations with UISIM. Loans and reserves measured in millions of dollars.
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Since the latter two states both use benefit ratio experience rating, we
note this contrast with reserve ratio states here and explore it further
in later sections of the chapter.
The bottom panel in table 4.3 shows results when each state ex
periences the national TURs from the 1980s. Since the 1980s average
TUR is higher than the average from the 1970s (7.3 percent versus 6.2
percent), these simulations show more of an effect on the need for loans
and final year trust fund balances. Three states (Massachusetts, Ohio,
and Texas) borrow a total of $1,866 million. Again observe that the
closing trust fund balances remain high in the benefit ratio states (Florida
and Texas), whereas they decline in the reserve ratio states (except for
California). Comparing the loan activity from these simulations with
the simulations using 1980s state TURs ($1,866 million versus $8,735
million), it seems clear that the concentrations of unusually high
unemployment in a few states (Michigan and Ohio) is what causes the
much larger volume of loans in the simulations that use 1980s state
TURs.
Based on the results shown in table 4.3, four conclusions about the
effects of higher unemployment are suggested. First, modest increases
of .5 percent to 1.5 percent in the average TUR (above the baseline)
do not lead to financing problems in all states. When the average TUR
increased to 7.3 percent (the U.S. TUR of the 1980s), three states needed
loans, and for each state the scale of borrowing was close to the threshold
used in the simulations to distinguish large from small loans (.5 per
cent of 1992 payroll). Across the seven states, however, the combined
loan total of $1,866 million represented only .18 percent of payroll.
Even after doubling this total to include borrowing for cash flow needs,
the resulting .36 percent of payroll is much smaller than the borrowing
that did take place in the 1970s and 1980s. Borrowing by these seven
states in the 1970s totaled .79 percent of 1975 payroll, and in the 1980s
it totaled 1.89 percent of 1984 payroll. Thus, under a repetition of na
tional TURs from the 1980s in each of the seven states, total simulated
borrowing (as a percent of payroll) was only about one-fifth of actual
borrowing by these states in the 1980s.
Second, major borrowing was observed in two states that experienc
ed unusually high average unemployment in the 1980s. The two states
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were found in the same region, the Midwest. Regional aspects of UI
financing will be examined more fully in chapter 5.
Third, initial trust fund balances have an important effect on the need
for UI loans. The three states that did not borrow in any of the simula
tions reported in table 4.3, (New Jersey, Florida, and California) were
the states with the highest reserve ratio multiples at the start of the simula
tions (.80, 1.29 and .76 respectively). Later in this chapter, the effects
of high initial fund balances are explored further.
Fourth, the results displayed in table 4.3 suggest that benefit ratio
experience rating may be more effective than reserve ratio experience
rating in maintaining trust fund balances in the face of high unemploy
ment. The ending trust fund balances in Florida and Texas were generally
as high in the high unemployment simulations as in the baseline simula
tions. We will return to this issue later in the present chapter.

Alternative Inflation Simulations
Variation in the rate of inflation, like unemployment, is an element
in the economic environment that is beyond a state's ability to control.
Experiences from the 1980s provide a clear illustration of the amount
of inflation variation that can occur within a short period. Annual wage
inflation averaged almost 10 percent at the start of the decade, dropped
to less than 5 percent in the 1983-1986 period, and then began to move
upward towards the end of the decade. 14
The consequences of differing inflation rates for UI financing are much
less dramatic than the effects of differing unemployment rates. High
inflation over several years may make a program more prone to insolven
cy, but high inflation per se will not cause insolvency. High inflation
can contribute to a financing problem if a state indexes its weekly benefit
maximum but does not similarly adjust its taxable wage base (through
indexation or periodic discretionary adjustments).
In this section we examine the consequences of nonsymmetric ad
justments of the maximum weekly benefit and the tax base in the face
of varying rates of inflation. New Jersey (which indexes both) is like
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Florida and California (which index neither) in providing symmetric
treatment, while the other four states have asymmetric treatment (in
dexing the maximum weekly benefit but not the tax base).
Table 4.4 summarizes the results from five simulations in each state,
the baseline and four others. In each simulation, the inflation rate varies
while unemployment and all other control variables repeat their baseline
values. Before examining the consequences for reserves it is useful to
briefly discuss the wage inflation averages themselves. Compared to
average state unemployment rates from the 1970s and 1980s, the average
state inflation rates exhibit much less variation. Across the seven states,
average inflation rates in the 1980s (1979 to 1988) ranged from 4.9
percent to 7.7 percent, whereas the average state TURs (table 4.3) ranged
from 5.1 percent to 10.8 percent. 15
Because the entire range of state wage inflation experiences from the
last two decades seemed rather limited, i.e., from 4.9 percent (Ohio
in the 1980s) to 7.7 percent (Massachusetts in the 1980s), simulations
were also conducted based on higher inflation rate averages (of 8.0 and
10.0 percent). These were used not necessarily as realistic alternatives
but to expand the range of inflation variation. They help to illustrate
how asymmetric treatment of maximum benefits and the tax base can
contribute to financing problems.
Since high inflation expands covered payroll, the more relevant solven
cy indicator in five of the seven states is not the absolute level of trust
fund reserves but rather the reserve ratio (reserves as a percent of
payroll). Both are shown in table 4.4 as of 1997, the final year of the
simulations. In states that index their maximum weekly benefit, potential
obligations to pay benefits rise proportionately as inflation increases.
Therefore, to maintain an initial degree of solvency it is important that
the reserve ratio not decline when inflation increases. In states which
do not index their maximum weekly benefit, potential obligations to
pay benefits may grow more slowly than the inflation rate. A judgment
about maintenance of solvency in such states involves a comparison of
the change (decline) in the reserve ratio with the change in a nominal
benefits indicator (such as the ratio of maximum weekly benefits to
average weekly wages) when higher inflation takes place. If the reserve

Table 4.4
Simulations with Alternative Inflation Rates
Massachusetts

New
Jersey

Wage inflation rate (%)
Maximum WBA/AWW - 1997
Fund balance - 1997 ($)
Reserve ratio - 1997 (%)

6.0
0.599
1,058
0.99

6.0
0.504
4,272
3.16

Michigan
Ohio
Florida
Baseline simulation
6.0
6.0
6.0
0.520
0.525
0.398
3,540
3,789
3,648
2.55
2.53
2.12

Wage inflation rate (%)
Maximum WBA/AWW - 1997
Fund balance -1997 ($)
Reserve ratio - 1997 (%)

6.3
0.594
1,088
0.99

6.6
0.491
4,528
3.17

State wage inflation rates of the 1970s
7.0
6.6
6.0
0.510
0.510
0.400
3,743
4,081
3,686
2.47
2.58
2.15

Wage inflation rate (%)
Maximum WBA/AWW - 1997
Fund balance - 1997 ($)
Reserve ratio - 1997 (%)

7.7
0.588
965
0.77

7.0
0.493
4,710
3.17

Wage inflation rate (%)
Maximum WBA/AWW - 1997
Fund balance - 1997 ($)
Reserve ratio - 1997 (%)

8.0
0.588
892
0.69

8.0
0.486
4,987
3.05

Wage inflation rate (%)
Maximum WBA/AWW - 1997
Fund balance - 1997 ($)
Reserve ratio - 1997 (%)

10.0
0.578
572
0.37

10.0
0.468
5,965
3.04

State wage inflation rates of the 1980s
5.0
4.9
6.4
0.545
0.541
0.384
3,208
3,475
3,648
2.56
2.57
2.04
8 percent wage inflation rate
8.0
8.0
8.0
0.506
0511
0.330
3,407
3,814
4,063
2.04
211
1.96
10 percent wage inflation rate
10.0
10.0
10.0
0.493
0.495
0.275
3,186
4,098
4,495
1.59
1.89
1.80

SOURCE: Simulations with UISIM. Reserves measured in millions of dollars.

Texas

California

6.0
0.546
1,979
0.72

6.0
0.318
8,735
1.77

7.5
0.537
2,108
0.67

5.6
0.329
9,074
1.90

6.0
0.540
1,828
0.67

6.7
0.297
8,529
1.61

8.0
0.551
1,945
0.58

8.0
0.264
8,735
1.46

10.0
0.555
1,913
0.48

10.0
0.220
7,768
1.08

>
i.

I

I

98

Simulation Analysis of Fund Adequacy

ratio declines more rapidly than the benefit indicator, this signals a
deterioration in the state's solvency position. For each simulation the
reserve ratio and the ratio of maximum weekly benefits to average weekly
wages (in 1997) appear in table 4.4.
It is clear in table 4.4 that higher inflation causes important losses
in reserve adequacy in several states, with Massachusetts providing the
most dramatic evidence. Its 1997 reserve ratio of .99 in the baseline
declines to .77 with a repetition of state wage inflation from the 1980s
(an average of 7.7 percent). Under 10 percent annual wage inflation,
the 1997 reserve ratio declines to .37 or 37.4 percent of its level in
the baseline. Michigan, Ohio, and Texas also exhibit large losses in
reserve adequacy by 1997 as the inflation rate increases above the 6.0
percent average of the baseline. Under 10.0 percent average annual in
flation, 1997 reserve ratios range from 62.4 percent to 74.7 percent
of their corresponding 1997 reserve ratios in the baseline, e.g., 62.4
percent in Michigan which has a 1997 reserve ratio of 1.59 percent
under 10 percent inflation versus 2.55 percent in the baseline.
New Jersey, which indexes both the maximum weekly benefit and
the taxable wage base, is the only one of the seven states whose reserve
ratio remains nearly constant in the face of increasing inflation. Its 1997
reserve ratio under 10 percent annual inflation (3.04 percent) is 96.2
percent of the 1997 reserve ratio in the baseline (3.16 percent). Note
that in Florida and California, higher inflation also causes 1997 reserve
ratios to decline (vis-a-vis the baseline). Generally the lower reserve
ratios in these two states coincide with lower ratios of maximum week
ly benefits to weekly wages, so that the declines per se do not signal
a loss of reserve adequacy. 16
None of the simulations with higher inflation rates resulted in insolven
cy for any state. The insolvency threat that high inflation poses is that
high inflation by itself causes a loss of reserve adequacy (when indexa
tion is not symmetrically applied to the tax and benefit sides of UI pro
grams) and makes the effects of high unemployment more serious
(because reserve ratios are depleted). Stagflation (the simultaneous
presence of high inflation and high unemployment) will lead to larger
solvency problems for such states than will a given level of high
unemployment operating in an environment of low inflation.
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Effects of Variation in Initial Trust Fund Balances
Raising a state's initial trust fund balance will reduce the risk of in
solvency and the scale of borrowing in the event of high unemploy
ment. Supporters of UI solvency standards base their arguments for
standards on such debt avoidance outcomes. If all states had entered
the 1980s with reserve ratio multiples of 1.5, the volume of state bor
rowing would clearly have been much smaller than the actual $24.0
billion that was borrowed between 1980 and 1987.
Any serious public policy discussion regarding the desirability of
solvency standards would benefit from a simulation analysis of technical
questions related to appropriate levels of reserve balances. What is the
average decrease in borrowing associated with each successive $1 billion
increase in initial reserves? Could most of the loan-avoidance advan
tages of higher reserves be realized if the initial reserve ratio multiple
were 1.0 rather than 1.5? These kinds of questions can be addressed
with UISIM.
Table 4.5 displays summary results from a series of simulations that
changed the initial trust fund balances (as of December 31, 1987) in
the seven states. As in previous sections, this table shows selected results
from the baseline simulation, and then results for a series of departures
from the baseline. For each simulation, attention is focused on the need
for loans and the final year's (1997) trust fund balance.
The first two departures from the baseline in table 4.5 simply change
the initial trust fund balance from its actual December 31, 1987 level
to the levels implied by reserve ratio multiples of 1.0 and 1.5. Starting
with a reserve multiple of 1.0 raises reserves in six states, all but Florida,
and the aggregate increase is $8.3 billion. By 1997, however, observe
that reserves in several states are not much above 1997 reserve balances
in the baseline. In the aggregate, total 1997 reserves are only $3.6 billion
above the baseline, while those in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and
California are essentially the same as in the baseline.
When the states are distinguished by the type of experience rating
they employ, it becomes clear that reserve ratio and benefit ratio systems
respond differently to increases in initial reserves. The benefit ratio
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systems in Florida and Texas tend to preserve any initial change in
reserves much more completely. In simulations where the states have
initial reserve ratio multiples (RRMs) of 1.0, Florida's initial (1987)
reserve is $396 million lower and its final (1997) reserve is $377 million
lower vis-a-vis the baseline. In Texas, the corresponding changes in
initial and final balances are increases of $1,737 million and $1,957
million respectively.
That benefit ratio systems should more effectively preserve any in
itial change in fund balances is not surprising. Because taxes are set
primarily on the basis of recent benefit payouts, which are the same
in the two simulations, an increase in initial balances does not create
any negative feedback on subsequent taxes. In reserve ratio states, a
negative feedback from an increase in initial balances reduces employer
taxes in later years. This back pressure operates with enough force in
Massachusetts, New Jersey and California that nearly all of the initial
increase in fund balances is dissipated over the subsequent 10 years,
i.e., by 1997.
A similar contrast between reserve ratio and benefit ratio states is
observed in simulations that set the initial RRM to 1.5 in each state.
Texas and Florida retain essentially all of the increase in initial balances,
while the 10-year reserve retention fractions in the four reserve ratio
states are as follow: .01 in Massachusetts; .58 in New Jersey; .48 in
Ohio; and .24 in California. 17 If these simulations were allowed to run
for a 20-year time period, the reserve retention fractions in reserve ratio
states would be even lower. Across the seven states, providing each
state an initial RRM of 1.5 increases total reserves by $16.8 billion in
1987, but closing reserves in 1997 increase by only $9.8 billion. In
the four reserve ratio states, the initial increase in reserves was $10.4
billion, but 1997 reserves increased by only $3.4 billion.
Increases in interest income also produce differential long-run effects
in reserve ratio versus benefit ratio states. Higher interest income in
itially raises the trust fund balance, but then leads to reductions in subse
quent employer taxes in reserve ratio states. In benefit ratio states, the
increased interest income has no effect on future tax rates, producing
larger long-run effects on fund balances.
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To test for the relative size of interest effects, a set of simulations
were run that differed from the baseline only in the level of the real
interest rate. Under a 3 percent real interest rate, as opposed to 1 per
cent in the baseline, final year (1997) trust fund balances were 14 per
cent and 16 percent higher than the baseline in Florida and Texas respec
tively. In the four reserve ratio states, the final trust fund balances were
also higher than in the baseline, but the percentage increments were
uniformly smaller (ranging from 3 percent to 12 percent). Thus varia
tions in both interest income and in initial trust fund balances have dif
ferential i.e., larger, long-run effects on trust fund balances in benefit
ratio states than in reserve ratio states.
Turning the focus back to initial trust fund balances, the bottom three
panels in table 4.5 show the amount of borrowing associated with dif
fering average unemployment rates. When each state starting with an
RRM of 1.0 is subjected to U.S. TURs from the 1980s, only one,
Massachusetts, needs any loans ($347 million), and its loans total .45
percent of 1992 payroll. This result can be compared with the result
in table 4.3 (the bottom panel), where three states needed loans total
ing $1,866 million. Higher initial reserves, an increase of $8.3 billion
over the baseline, caused the volume of loans to be $1.5 billion lower
when each state was subjected to national TURs from the 1980s.
Recall from table 4.3 that the largest loans were required by Michigan
and Ohio when they experienced a repetition of their own TURs from
the 1980s. The bottom two panels in table 4.5 show that loans are still
needed in these two states even when they have higher initial reserves
(but experience a repetition of 1980s state TURs). When the states start
with an initial RRM of 1.0 Michigan and Ohio each need more than
$2.0 billion. In contrast to table 4.3, however, Texas does not need
a loan when its initial RRM is 1.0. Also note that total borrowing, when
the initial RRM is 1.0, is only $4,994 million compared to $8,735 million
in table 4.3.
Finally, table 4.5 illustrates that a 1.5 reserve ratio multiple (RRM)
does not guarantee immunity from the risk of insolvency. In the bot
tom panel of the table, observe that even with initial RRMs of 1.5,
Michigan and Ohio still need loans, loans that exceed 1 percent of 1992

Simulation Analysis of Fund Adequacy

103

payroll. Admittedly, the average unemployment rates experienced by
the two states in the 1980s were unusually high, 10.8 percent and 8.8
percent respectively, but these results indicate that there is nothing
foolproof about the 1.5 RRM solvency guideline. On the other hand,
observe that total borrowing in this simulation ($3,059 million) is roughly
one third of what was needed in simulations that started with actual 1987
trust fund balances.
Based on the results summarized in table 4.5, three conclusions can
be drawn. First, a change in initial trust fund balances has much larger
long run effects on fund balances in benefit ratio states than in reserve
ratio states. This contrast is inherent in the tax rate-setting procedures
followed by the two types of experience rating systems. Even if a reserve
ratio state achieves a 1.5 RRM, subsequent reserve balances will tend
to be reduced through experience rating. 18 Second, higher initial balances
reduce both the risk of insolvency and the scale of borrowing in an en
vironment of high unemployment. Individual readers can differ on the
advisability of advocating higher balances. To achieve reserve multiples
of 1.0 in each of the 7 states, total reserves at the end of 1987 rose
by $8.3 billion, roughly double their actual 1987 total. This increase
caused total borrowing under a repetition of state TURs from the 1980s
to decrease by $3.9 billion. Third, achievement of a 1.5 RRM does
not always prevent insolvency and large scale borrowing. The unemploy
ment experiences of Michigan and Ohio in the 1980s were sufficiently
adverse that large scale borrowing was indicated even with the large
initial balances implied by the 1.5 reserve ratio multiple solvency
guideline.

Changes in Benefit Availability
Compared to the 1970s UI benefits are now less available to
unemployed workers. In regular UI programs, the ratio of insured
unemployment (regular UI claimants or IU) to total unemployment (as
measured in the monthly labor force survey or TU) has declined in most
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states. For each of the'seven states being studied in this chapter, there
was time series regression evidence of a decline in IU vis-a-vis TU after
1981. 19 A reduction in EB availability occurred during the 1981-1983
period following 1981 federal legislation, as new procedures for ac
tivating EB became effective. The revised EB triggering mechanism
has made extended benefits much less available to the long-term
unemployed than in earlier years.
Changes in UI benefit availability have implications for solvency that
can be examined with the simulation models. In each state the unemploy
ment scenarios examined in table 4.3 (the baseline and the four time
paths of state and national unemployment rates from the 1970s and 1980s)
were repeated in environments that approximated the greater UI benefit
availability of the 1970s. Specific changes in each state model were
to suppress the post-1981 dummy variable shift effect for regular UI
and to use the previous (lower) state EB trigger, i.e., a 4 percent in
sured unemployment rate rather than the present 5 percent rate. 20 The
simulations were then rerun over the 1988-1997 period.
Table 4.6 summarizes the simulation results. Because more benefits
are now paid out in the baseline simulations, observe in the top panel
that the ending (1997) trust fund balances are uniformly lower when
compared to the original baseline simulations. The difference is especially
large in Michigan ($2,093 million), but it also exceeds $700 million
in New Jersey and Ohio. Although ending balances are lower due to
the increased benefit availability, no state needs to borrow in these revised
baseline simulations.
Under each of the four alternative time paths of the TUR, however,
the increases in benefit outlays are large enough to cause a noticeable
increase in borrowing. When state TURs of the 1970s are used, four
states need loans and borrowing totals $6,530 million (compared to two
states needing $1,597 million in corresponding simulations of table 4.3).
The same qualitative finding holds in the other three unemployment
simulations. Focusing just on total borrowing across the seven states,
the other comparisons are as follows: using state TURs from the 1980s,
$12,965 million (in table 4.6) versus $8,735 million (in table 4.3);
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using U.S. TURs from the 1970s, $1,132 million versus $171 million;
and using U.S. TURs from the 1980s, $5,749 million versus $1,866
million.
On average the simulations in table 4.6 suggest that with the higher
benefit availability of the 1970s the amount of borrowing over the
1988-1997 period would be roughly double what it would be under pres
ent benefit availability. Thus the benefit restrictions of the 1980s have
important implications for the future solvency of UI programs. 21 Again
it should be emphasized that the simulations are not offered as predic
tions of future borrowing by the states, but rather as the amount of bor
rowing that would take place if there were no changes in present benefit
and tax statutes. The potential future need to borrow and/or to make
statutory changes has been reduced by the restrictions in the regular
UI and EB programs of the 1980s.
The Effects of Solvency Taxes
In six of the seven states under investigation, all but Massachusetts,
the UI tax statutes include provisions for solvency taxes to be activated
when the trust fund falls below a certain threshold level. 22 Of the possible
elements of an automatic pay-as-you-go funding strategy, solvency taxes
are the most prevalent. In 1988, 28 UI programs could automatically
activate a solvency tax, whereas only 3 provided for automatic tax base
changes, and only 8 provided for automatic benefit restrictions when
trust funds fell below predetermined thresholds.
Solvency tax provisions vary widely from one state to the next. The
terminology used to describe these taxes in individual states also can
be a source of confusion. What is termed a solvency tax in Massachusetts,
described in chapter 3, is in fact a tax to cover noncharges and ineffec
tive charges. This is not a solvency tax as the term is being used in
this chapter. In Michigan the tax statute identifies as a solvency tax a
levy on negative balance employers which is used to pay the interest
on new UI loans (a tax whose rate varies from 0 to 2 percent of taxable
payroll depending on the size of the outstanding loan balance).
Michigan's Accounting Building Component (ABC) of the UI tax is
a solvency tax, which is activated whenever trust fund reserves (as of
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the tax computation date) are smaller than 3.75 percent of total payroll.
The receipts for the ABC tax go into the state's trust fund, whereas
solvency tax receipts go into an interest account which is separate from
the trust fund. For the present discussion, we will consider as solvency
taxes only those taxes designed to increase the trust fund balance, hence
to avoid borrowing or lessen the size of loans. Other taxes such as in
terest taxes are no less real to the affected employers, but they do not
affect UI trust fund balances.
Four features can be identified that affect the performance of solven
cy taxes: (1) the threshold trust fund level that activates the tax; (2)
the range of statutory tax rates; (3) the proportion of employers affected;
and (4) the possibility of negative as well as positive solvency tax ad
justments. Across the six states, the trust fund thresholds range from
a high of 3.75 percent of total payroll in Michigan to a low of a zero
fund balance in New Jersey. The range of maximum statutory tax rate
increases varies from lows of .7 percent in New Jersey and .8 percent
in California to highs of 3.0 percent in Michigan and 3.4 percent in
Ohio. When the solvency tax is activated, it may raise all statutory tax
rates (thus affecting all employers) or it may increase the range of rates
by raising the maximum statutory rate. In the latter situation, only some
employers will actually experience higher rates (those at the previous
maximum tax rate). In four states (New Jersey, Ohio, Florida, and
California), all statutory rates are increased by the solvency tax while
in two (Michigan and Texas), the tax increases the maximum statutory
rate. Four states activate their solvency tax only to increase revenues
when the fund balance is low (New Jersey, Michigan, Ohio, and Califor
nia), while two (Florida and Texas), use the tax to both reduce and in
crease revenues. 23 In the latter two states, solvency taxes act to raise
the fund balance when it is low and to reduce the balance when it is high.
Recall that the UI tax provisions in Michigan use both benefit ratios
and reserve ratios to determine individual employer tax rates. The lagged
five-year average of the benefit ratio is the principal explanatory variable
in the employer tax rate equation. The lagged benefit ratio operates so
strongly that the maximum statutory tax rate (the rate influenced by
the ABC tax) did not enter the tax rate regression with a significantly
positive effect. 24 Over the past 20 years, Michigan's trust fund balance
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has always fallen below the current solvency tax trigger threshold (3.75
percent of total payroll for its ABC tax), so that all relevant recent ex
perience is with the solvency tax turned "on." This was also found
to hold for all years in the baseline simulation.
Because Michigan did not provide recent experiences of a period with
the solvency tax (the ABC tax) being turned "off," we constructed
estimates of the importance of these taxes within the overall tax rate
structure. The procedure involved three steps. After examining data
provided by the state on the distribution of taxable wages by benefit
ratios, we concluded that about 15 percent of taxable wages were from
employers whose benefit ratios exceeded 6 percent. Their taxable wages
were then multiplied by a representative ABC tax rate, i.e., 1.5 per
cent, the midpoint between 0 and 3 percent. The resulting estimate of
ABC tax revenues was then subtracted from total tax revenues. These
estimates typically accounted for 5 to 10 percent of total tax revenues
in Michigan.
In Texas, where the solvency tax (the deficit tax) also affects the max
imum statutory tax rate, the maximum tax rate has only a small impact
on the effective employer tax rate. 25 Thus, of the six states under in
vestigation that have solvency taxes, the models do not have econometric
estimates of their effect on revenues in one (Michigan), and it is prob
able that their estimated effects on revenues may be understated in one
(Texas). More confidence can be placed in the estimated effects of
solvency taxes in the four states where changes in solvency taxes affect
all employers, not just employers subject to the maximum statutory tax
rate, i.e., New Jersey, Ohio, Florida, and California.
To examine the quantitative importance of solvency taxes, simula
tions were conducted where solvency taxes were removed from each
state's 1988 tax rate structures. There were five simulations in each
state, which repeated the time paths of the unemployment rate as in
table 4.3 (the baseline rate of 5.5 percent and the four combinations
of state and national unemployment rates from the 1970s and the 1980s).
Table 4.7 summarizes the simulation results.
None of the six states needs loans in the new baseline simulations.
In New Jersey and California, states with large initial balances, removal

Table 4.7
Unemployment Simulations with Solvency Taxes Suppressed
New
Jersey
Loans - 1988-1997 ($)
Fund balance - 1997 ($)
Change from table 4.3

0
4,272
0

Loans - 1988-1997 ($)
Change from table 4.3
Fund balance -1997 ($)
Change from table 4.3

0
0
1,408
0

Loans - 1988-1997 ($)
Change from table 4.3
Fund balance - 1997 ($)
Change from table 4.3

0
0
4,438
0

Loans - 1988-1997 ($)
Change from table 4.3
Fund balance - 1997 ($)
Change from table 4.3

0
0
3,063
0

Loans - 1988-1997 ($)
Change from table 4.3
Fund balance - 1997 ($)
Change from table 4.3

0
0
2,469
0

Michigan

Ohio
Florida
Baseline simulation
000
2,814
3,085
3,986
-726
-704
338
State unemployment rates of the 1970s
1,477
0
0
669
0
0
-1,109
1,338
3,619
-750
-1,201
72
State unemployment rates of the 1980s
4,604
5,296
0
1,343
288
0
-2,835
-4,940
4,096
-625
-1,821
163
U.S. unemployment rates of the 1970s
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,498
1,097
3,779
-968
-1,293
170
U.S. unemployment rates of the 1980s
0
1,570
0
1,134
0
0
726
-854
3,808
-1,057
-1,898
-20

SOURCE: Simulations with UISIM. Loans and reserves measured in millions of dollars.

Texas

California

0
1,835
-144

0
8,735
0

0
0
2,052
-56

0
0
5,439
-996

849
383
-26
-457

0
0
7,816
97

335
164
1,781
-340

0
0
7,524
0

1,103
152
2,628
-398

0
0
7,454
-2

O.
fe
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of the solvency taxes has no effect because the trust fund balances re
main consistently above the thresholds that activate their solvency taxes.
The largest effects on the 1997 trust fund balances in the baseline are
found in Michigan and Ohio, states with low initial balances and a wide
range (3.0 and 3.4 percentage points respectively) of solvency tax rates. 26
Note also that removal of the solvency tax in Florida causes its 1997
trust fund balance to increase because tax rates are no longer held down
by the solvency tax. 27 In all four states where 1997 fund balances are
affected, the size of the effect is modest.
When the states are subjected to a repetition of state and national
unemployment rates from the 1970s and 1980s, the absence of solven
cy taxes increases the volume of borrowing and reduces the 1997 trust
fund balance (except for Florida). Note, however, that the effects are
generally small. In New Jersey, which has the lowest solvency tax trigger
threshold (a zero fund balance), there is no effect in any simulation.
The largest effects are found in Ohio when the state experiences a repeti
tion of state TURs from the 1980s and national TURs from the 1980s.
Removal of Ohio's solvency tax increases total borrowing by more than
$1 billion in both simulations and causes the 1997 trust fund balance
to be $1.8-$1.9 billion lower. The effects on loans and 1997 fund
balances are smaller in the other states, with Michigan consistently rank
ed second in the size of the solvency (ABC) tax effects.
Perhaps the most interesting finding to be noted in the table 4.7 simula
tions is that solvency taxes in these six states do not prevent insolven
cy. For departures of unemployment from baseline unemployment there
are 24 simulations in table 4.7. In seven of the twenty-four, the state
needs UI loans. In all seven instances, the state also needed loans when
the identical simulation was run with the solvency tax present, i.e., in
table 4.3. For these states, solvency taxes operate to modestly reduce
the scale of borrowing, but they did not prevent insolvency. 28 The simula
tion results suggest that solvency taxes are not of much quantitative
importance.
The table 4.7 simulations point to two main conclusions. First, the
solvency taxes presently operative in the six states have only modest
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effects on UI trust fund balances and the need for UI loans. Second,
the effects of solvency taxes were largest in Ohio. If solvency taxes
are to have larger effects than the effects found here, they need to be
structured with a more aggressive combination of higher trigger
thresholds, a wider range of statutory rates, and applicability to all
employers.

Tax Responsiveness
To maintain solvency and avoid large-scale borrowing, individual
states will place differing degrees of emphasis on pre-funding, automatic
pay-as-you-go, and discretionary pay-as-you-go financing strategies.
A key requirement of a successful automatic pay-as-you-go strategy is
that tax receipts (and perhaps benefit outlays) respond rapidly and strong
ly when recession-induced claims for UI benefits increase. A rapid and
strong tax response is even more important if a state enters a recession
with a small trust fund balance.
In the final simulation analysis of the present chapter, each of the
seven states was subjected to a modest but sustained increase in UI
claims, and the resulting response of UI taxes was noted. The analysis
was quite limited in scope, e.g., benefit responsiveness and tax base
responsiveness were not analyzed, and large scale changes in claims
were not analyzed. By examining all seven states, however, contrasts
between reserve ratio and benefit ratio experience rating systems could
be observed.
The analysis of tax responsiveness was conducted using the unemploy
ment rates from the baseline simulations as the point of departure. In
each state, the level of average unemployment rate was increased by
.5 percentage points from 1988 through 1997 (from 5.5 percent to 6.0
percent for most observations). 29 To remove the effects of differing in
itial trust fund reserves, the simulations were conducted with similar
initial balances across states. Initial reserves were set to equal a reserve
ratio multiple of 1.0 and also a multiple of .2. The latter reserve posi
tion is of more interest, since a rapid and strong tax response is especially
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important when reserves are low if insolvency is to be avoided. By con
trasting the tax responses under differing initial reserve positions, some
insight into the quantitative importance of solvency taxes may be gained.
Table 4.8 summarizes the simulation results showing changes in
benefits, changes in taxes, and tax responsiveness ratios (the ratio of
tax changes to benefit changes) in each state. Tax responses to a sus
tained increase in unemployment are shown after five years and after
ten years. Responses are displayed for both the high and the low initial
reserve positions.
At least four important findings are apparent in table 4.8. (1) The
short-run responses of taxes are smaller than the long-run responses. 30
(2) Short-run tax responses are larger in the two benefit ratio states
(Florida and Texas) than in the reserve ratio states. (3) Short-run and
long-run tax responses exhibit less variation in benefit ratio states. The
uneven response of taxes in reserve ratio states is to be expected, as
trust fund thresholds are crossed and then a different (higher) statutory
tax rate schedule is activated. (4) Perhaps most significant is the find
ing that tax responsiveness ratios, both 5-year and 10-year ratios, are
not consistently larger in simulations with low initial trust fund balances.
The responses are larger in some states where solvency taxes are
operative, e.g., Ohio and Texas, but even in those states the differences
(for low vis-a-vis high initial reserves) are of limited size.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the table 4.8 simulations.
First, taxes in benefit ratio states (with three-year averaging periods)
respond more quickly and consistently to changes in benefit outlays than
do taxes in reserve ratio states. Second, solvency taxes do not add much
to the responsiveness of taxes when benefit payments increase but in
itial trust fund balances are low. Automatic pay-as-you-go tax features
do not operate with much strength in these seven states.

Table 4.8
Simulations of Tax Responsiveness
Massachusetts
Change in benefits
Change in taxes
Ratio of tax change to
benefit change
Change in benefits
Change in taxes
Ratio of tax change to
benefit change
Change in benefits
Change in taxes
Ratio of tax change to
benefit change
Change in benefits
Change in taxes
Ratio of tax change to
benefit change

New
Jersey

282
155

357
240

0.550

0.672

635
557

798
616

0.877

0.772

282
187

357
95

0.663

0.266

635
540

798
227

0.850

0.284

Michigan
Ohio
Florida
5-year response, initial RRM of 1.0
464
353
299
49
50
226

Texas

California

557
406

687
34

0.756

0.729

0.049

10-year response, initial RRM of 1.0
823
1,105
723
389
900
669

1,355
1,332

1,553
1,260

1.094
0.352
0.925
5-year response, initial RRM of 0.2
464
353
299
41
139
226

0.983

0.811

557
440

687
335

0.116
0.300
0.756
10-year response, initial RRM of 0.2
823
1,105
723
276
598
669

0.790

0.488

1,355
1,357

1,553
942

1.001

0.607

0.142

0.335

0.106

0.541

0.925

SOURCE: Simulations with UISIM. Benefits and taxes measured in millions of dollars. RRM - Reserve Ratio Multiple. In each simulation the unemployment
rate was increased by 5 percentage points per year above the unemployment rate in the baseline simulation.
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Conclusions
The preceding simulation analyses have yielded several findings re
garding UI trust fund adequacy. Probably the most important conclu
sion of the chapter, however, is that the simulation models developed
for the seven states have proven useful for examining a number of issues
related to fund adequacy. UISIM is a useful and flexible analytic tool.
The detailed findings of the chapter can be grouped into three
categories: obvious, less obvious, and new findings. Obvious findings
include the following. Large initial trust fund balances help to prevent
insolvency and the need for large-scale borrowing. Modest increases
in state unemployment above full employment levels, i.e., unemploy
ment rates of 5.5. percent, do not cause important financing problems
for the states. Major borrowing and large-scale indebtedness were
observed in the states that had the largest increases in average unemploy
ment. Finally, symmetric treatment in the responses of taxes and benefits
to inflation helps to reduce the risk of insolvency.
Among the less obvious findings, the following two should be noted.
First, the threat to solvency of asymmetric treatment of maximum weekly
benefits and the tax base in the face of higher inflation is not direct
but indirect. High inflation by itself reduces reserve adequacy in states
that index just the maximum weekly benefit. This reduction in reserve
adequacy, i.e., the reserve ratio, makes the effect of higher unemploy
ment more serious than it otherwise would be. Second, the two major
experience rating systems operate differently over 10-year periods.
Reserve ratio systems do not preserve changes in fund balances as com
pletely in the long run as do benefit ratio systems.
Four new findings are the following. (1) The 1.5 reserve ratio multi
ple is not an infallible solvency guideline. Michigan and Ohio both re
quired large-scale loans under a repetition of unemployment experiences
from the 1980s, even in simulations where they started with 1.5
multiples. (2) Restrictions on benefit availability in the 1980s have major
implications for the future solvency of UI programs. The restrictions
roughly halved the volume of borrowing when compared to simulations
with the higher benefit availability of the 1970s. (3) Solvency taxes had
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only modest effects on the volume of borrowing. These taxes did not
prevent insolvency, and they exerted only a small effect on the response
of taxes to increases in benefit outlays. (4) The short-run response of
taxes to increases in benefit outlays was larger in benefit ratio states
than in reserve ratio states, and the response was also less varied in
benefit ratio states.
Large reserves and responsive tax systems both help to prevent in
solvency in UI programs. In the simulations of this chapter, enough
instances of insolvency and large-scale borrowing were found to assure
the continued importance of solvency questions in future years.

NOTES
1. Nationwide, 32 of 53 programs secured UI loans sometime between 1980 and 1987, and 15
programs needed large loans, i.e., loans exceeding 1 percent of 1984 covered payroll.
2. Across the 52 jurisdictions that experience rated employer taxes in 1988, 32 used reserve ratios,
13 used benefit ratios, 2 (Michigan and Pennsylvania) used both reserve ratios and benefit ratios,
and 5 used other experience rating systems.
3. In 1988, 17 programs indexed both the weekly benefit maximum and the taxable wage base,
16 states indexed neither and 19 states indexed the weekly benefit maximum but not the tax base.
Only Alaska indexed the taxable wage base but not the weekly benefit maximum.
4. In California, the year end trust fund balance determines which tax schedule is operative on
January 1 of the next year. Florida uses the current calendar year as one of the three years in
the benefit ratio computation to set the next year's tax rates. These two states also have other
tax setting provisions which entail longer time lags.
5. Economists differ in their opinion of what constitutes full employment, with many thinking
it lies in the range from 5.5 percent to 6.0 percent. The simulation analysis assumes the full employ
ment unemployment rate to be 5.5 percent.
6. Some readers may think only the results showing departures from baseline levels are mean
ingful, but not the baseline levels themselves.
7. This was done to prevent a sharp drop in claims in the first year of the simulations, i.e., an
excessively large effect of lagged unemployment in the insured unemployment equations.
8. Average weekly wages increased at a compound annual growth rate of 6.2 percent between
1967 and 1987.
9. Texas completed its UI debt repayments in 1988, while Michigan continued to make repayments
after 1988. The baseline simulations assumed that Texas completed its repayments of old debt
in early 1989 and that Michigan completed its debt repayments in 1991.
10. The Texas formula raises the maximum by $7 for each $10 increase in average weekly wages
in manufacturing.
11. Only two of the fourteen state decade averages fell below 5.5 percent: Texas in the 1970s
(4.8 percent) and Massachusetts in the 1980s (5.1 percent).
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12. We examined data for each of the three states in the following way. The difference between
annual receipts (taxes plus interest) and benefits (regular benefits plus the state share of EB) was
compared to gross interest bearing loans and net loans (gross loans less repayments). In years
when receipts were less than benefits (and the net trust fund balance was negative), net loans
were about half of gross loans.
13. The three states' 1988 unemployment rates, which are used for 1997 in these simulations,
were as follows: Massachusetts 3.3 percentl; New Jersey 3.8 percent; and Florida 5.0 percent.
14. Average weekly wages grew by 9.5 percent and 9.0 percent in 1980 and 1981, by 4.0 percent
to 4.4 percent between 1983 and 1986, and by 4.4 and 5.0 percent respectively in 1987 and 1988.
15. The national averages of annual wage inflation in the 1970s (1970-1979) and 1980s (1979-1988)
as measured by average weekly wages in covered employment were respectively 6.5 percent and
6.0 percent.
16. The simulations do suggest that California experiences some loss of reserve adequacy under
increased wage inflation. The 1997 reserve ratio in the simulation with 10.0 percent inflation
is 61.0 percent of its baseline level (1.08 percent versus 1.77 percent), whereas the maximum
benefit.weekly wage ratio is 69.1 percent of its baseline level (.220 versus .318). Experiments
with additional average inflation rates, e.g., 9 percent and 12 percent, showed that the two ratios
did not decline at the same rate as the inflation rate increased. Because the reserve ratio did decline
more rapidly, there was evidence of a modest loss of reserve adequacy, but smaller than in the
states with asymmetric treatment of indexation.
17. These retention fractions for simulations with initial reserve ratio multiples (RRMs) of 1.5
were calculated by comparing changes in ending balances as of 1997 with changes in initial balances
as of 1987. For example, in Massachusetts the actual 1987 balance of $1097 million became $2700
million under an RRM of 1.5, or an initial increment of $1,603 million. The final year increment
of only $10 million ($1,068 million less $1,058 million) was only .01 of the starting year increment.
18. This statement holds under the present (1988) tax schedules operative in the four reserve ratio
experience rating states (Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, and California). If new (higher)
schedules were imposed, they could be structured so that RRMs of 1.5 could be sustained in the
long run.
19. As noted previously, the evidence came from time series regressions where IU was regressed
on TU, TU lagged one year, and a dummy variable that equaled 1 for 1981 and later years. The
dummy variable coefficient was negative in each of the 7 states. The downward shifts in IU im
plied by the dummy variable coefficients ranged from 8 percent in California to 51 percent in Florida.
20. The insured unemployment rate (IUR) is the ratio of insured unemployment to UI covered
employment and expressed as a percentage. Because the IUR measures used in the models did
not include EB recipients in the pre 1980s years, the simulations understate somewhat the actual
reduction in EB availability caused by the 1981 changes in the EB triggers.
21. Reductions in benefit availability also have implications for the performance of UI as a
macroeconomic automatic stabilizer and as a microeconomic income maintenance program Restrict
ing benefit availability, which enhances future solvency prospects, at the same time impairs the
program's income maintenance performance at both the macro level and the micro level.
22. The solvency taxes are as follows: (1) New Jersey's 10 percent addition to the tax rates of
tax schedule E when the trust fund balance turns negative; (2) Michigan's ABC (account building
component) tax; (3) Ohio's MSL (minimum safe level) tax; (4) the deficit tax and the tax credit
applicable in Texas; (5) the fund balance adjustment factor, part of the variable adjustment fac
tor, in Florida; and (6) California's 15 percent addition to the tax rates of tax schedule F when
the fund balance falls below .8 percent of total payroll.
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23. Texas activates its deficit tax when the fund balance falls below 1 percent of taxable payroll.
A tax reduction (credit) is activated when the fund balance exceeds 2 percent of taxable payroll.
Florida applies its fund balance adjustment factor symmetrically to upward and downward depar
tures of the trust fund balance from 5 percent of taxable payroll.
24. The only other tax variable found to enter the tax rate equation with a significant effect (when
the benefit ratio was present) was the minimum statutory tax rate (the noncharged benefits tax
or NEC tax). Appendix C shows the tax rate regression equation. The benefit ratio and the reserve
ratio were too highly correlated to both enter the tax rate equation at the same time, and of the
two, the benefit ratio was always the more powerful explanatory variable.
25. The coefficient for the maximum statutory tax rate was 043 in the Texas effective tax rate
equation, whereas the lagged benefit ratio had a coefficient of 1.474 The equation appears in
appendix B.
26. The effects are largest in Michigan and Ohio when measured relative to total payroll, as well
as the absolute effects shown in table 4 7.
27. Recall that solvency taxes can operate to reduce as well as increase tax revenues in Florida
and Texas.
28. When Michigan experienced a repetition of U.S. TURs from the 1980s, there was a 4-year
period when the net trust fund balance fell below $100 million. In the corresponding simulation
that included the solvency (ABC) tax, the fund balance averaged about $250 million higher dur
ing these four years.
29. In Michigan, Ohio, and Texas, where unemployment rates exceeded 5.5 percent in the first
one or two years of the simulations, the unemployment rates where also raised by .5 percentage
points in these initial years
30. Recall that in reserve ratio states there is the strong tendency for high initial reserves to be
dissipated in the long run. (Recall table 4.5.) The findings in table 4.8 do not contradict this,
because tax changes are measured as departures from a baseline where reserve-induced tax reductions
take place.

Regional Unemployment
and Insolvency
Chapter 1 examined national data on UI loans, debt, and repayment
activities in the 1970s and 1980s. Disaggregation of the national data
by geographic area reveals a number of clearcut patterns. In both
decades, borrowing and indebtedness have been closely linked to regional
unemployment developments. This chapter examines regional aspects
of UI financing problems. It starts with a review of regional borrowing
patterns.

UI Loans by Census Division
Table 5.1 displays summary data on UI loans for three time periods:
1972 to 1979, 1980 to 1983, and 1984 to 1987. The UI programs have
been grouped into the nine census divisions, with Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands assigned to the Mid-Atlantic division. 1 The table shows
the dollar amounts and percentage distribution of loans, number of pro
grams needing loans, and loans as a percent of payrolls for the nine
divisions and the entire United States.
Although 26 of the 27 census divisions—time period cells in the table
show positive loan amounts (all but the Pacific division in 1980-1983),
the dollar amounts in each of the three periods are heavily concentrated
in a few divisions. States in the North East accounted for 59.8 percent
of borrowing in the 1970s and ten of eleven jurisdictions (all but New
Hampshire) required loans sometime between 1972 and 1979. Be
tween 1980 and 1983, loan activity was concentrated in the Midwest,
65.2 percent of all loans and borrowing by nine of twelve programs.
The Midwest also accounted for the largest share of loans in the
1984-1987 period (44.4 percent), but states in the South also accounted
119
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for over one-third (35.3 percent) of the total. The increased borrowing
in the South during 1984-1987 took place primarily in Louisiana and
Texas, as petroleum extraction and production declined.
When loans are measured as a percent of payrolls, the borrowing in
each division can be compared to the national average. In all three
periods, loans as a percent of payrolls were consistently low (less than
three-tenths of the national average) in the South Atlantic, Mountain
and Pacific divisions, but above average in the East North Central divi
sion. In each of the three periods, one division had loans (as a percent
of payrolls) that were about three times the national average: the New
England division in 1972-1979, the East North Central division in
1980-1983, and the West South Central division in 1984-1987.
The changes in the positions of the New England and West South
Central divisions between 1972-1979 and 1984-1987 are especially
dramatic. Across the nine divisions, loans as a percent of payrolls dur
ing 1972-1979 were highest in New England (2.89 percent) and lowest
in the West South Central (1.06 percent). In 1984-1987, however, their
rankings were exactly reversed; they were highest in the West South
Central (1.86 percent) and lowest in New England (.01 percent). Con
sidering all three periods covered by table 5.1, it is clear that the
geographic concentration of UI loan activities was not stable in the 1970s
and 1980s.

Regional Economic Performance
The geographic patterns of UI loan activity in the 1970s and 1980s
have been strongly influenced by changes in the fortunes of the various
regional economies. This section reviews regional labor market per
formance since World War II with attention directed to the four major
regions as defined by the Census Bureau: the North East, Midwest,
South and West. 2
When one examines regional labor market data in the period since
World War II, four "facts" become apparent. (1) Business cycle in
dicators in the regional economies reflect the overall U.S. business
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cycle. (2) Economic performance in the regions can depart substantial
ly from national economic performance, and the departures can last for
several consecutive years. (3) The relative economic fortunes of in
dividual regions can undergo large changes in short periods of time.
(4) Employment growth in the South and West has been consistently
higher than employment growth in the North East and Midwest.
The long-run employment growth disparities by region can be il
lustrated as follows. Between 1948 and 1987, the share of private, nonfarm employment located in the North East fell from 33.1 percent to
22.9 percent while in the Midwest it declined from 31.6 percent to 24.7
percent. The rates of decline of these regions' shares, however, were
not uniform, as shown by data from the 1980s. Between 1979 and 1987,
the employment share for the North East was stable at roughly 23.0
percent, while the share for the Midwest declined from 27.3 percent
to 24.7 percent, more than twice as fast as during the previous 30 years.
To characterize regional labor market performance, two types of in
dicators will be examined: unemployment and employment growth. Two
measures of unemployment are the total unemployment rate (TUR) from
the monthly labor force survey (the CPS) and the insured unemploy
ment rate (IUR) from UI program data. The employment variable is
private, nonfarm employment from the U.S. Labor Department's
establishment survey. Note that attention is focused on real variables
and not on labor market prices, i.e., wage rates. Each of the three labor
market indicators is measured at both the regional and national level,
allowing one to judge the similarity of their movements as well as the
size and persistence of regional deviations from national developments.
To illustrate the association between regional unemployment and na
tional unemployment, table 5.2 presents annual data on TURs for the
1967-1987 period. The table displays both absolute and relative
unemployment rates for the four regions. The national business cycle
is apparent in the four regional unemployment rates, each of which has
peaks in 1975 and again in 1982-83. Over the 1967-1987 period, the
averages for three of the four regions are close to the national average,
while the West displays a somewhat higher average (7.2 percent ver
sus 6.4 percent for the U.S.).

Table 5.2
National and Regional Unemployment Rates, 1967 to 1987

Year
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

United
States
3 8
36
35
49
59
56
49
56
85
77
7 1
6 1
58
7 1
76
97
96
75
72
70
6.2

Total unemployment rates for
all persons 16 and older
North
East
Midwest
South
3.3
3.5
3.9
3.2
3.0
3.7
3.2
3.6
2.9
4.6
4.5
4.6
6.2
4.9
5.5
6.3
4.8
5.0
4.1
4.4
5.5
4.8
6.1
5.1
7.9
9.5
7.7
9.4
6.8
6.6
8.4
6.4
6.0
6.9
5.6
5.3
6.6
5.4
5.5
7.1
6.4
8.2
7.4
7.0
8.6
9.0
8.9
11.1
10.8
8.7
9.3
8.4
6.8
7.2
8.0
6.2
7.2
7.3
5.6
7.6
4.5
6.7
6.8

Relative unemployment rates
(regional rate/U.S. rate)
West
5.5
4.9
4.9
6.9
8.1
7.1
6.5
6.8
9.2
8.7
7.8
6.6
6.0
6.9
7.4
9.9
9.5
7.6
7.3
7.1
6.3

North
East
0.92
0.89
0.91
0.94
.05
.13
.12
.09
.12
.22
.18
.13
1.14
1.00
0.97
0.93
0.91
0.91
0.86
0.80
0.73

Midwest
0.87
0.83
0.83
0.92
0.93
0.89
0.90
0.86
0.93
0.86
0.85
0.87
0.95
1.15
.13
.14
.13
.12
.11
.04
.08

South
1.03
1.03
1.03
0.94
0.83
0.86
0.84
0.91
0.91
0.88
0.90
0.92
0.93
0.90
0.92
0.92
0.97
0.%
1.00
1.09
1.10

West
.45
.36
..40
.41
.37
.27
.33
.21
.08
.13
.10
.08
.03
0.97
0.97
.02
0.99
.01
1 .01
1 .01
1 .02

1967-87 average

64

6.4

6.4

6.0

7.2

1.00

0.97

0.95

1 .15

1967-87 range

62

6.3

8.2

5.7

5.0

0.50

0.33

0.28

0.48

SOURCE: All unemployment rates are from the CPS. Regional detail is published in the Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment.
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When the regional relative unemployment rates are examined,
however, a number of systematic patterns become apparent that pro
vide clear evidence of the varied experiences of the regional economies.
Over the 21 years, each region has experienced the highest of the four
regional unemployment rates in at least two years, and three regions
(all but the West) have experienced the lowest of the four regional
unemployment rates in at least five years. The West has had the highest
average relative unemployment rate over these 21 years, and the South
has had the lowest average.
More important than the averages of the relative unemployment rates
are their variability over time and their strong patterns of serial cor
relation. For each region, the range of variation in its relative unemploy
ment rate exceeded .25 between 1967 and 1987, and for two (the North
East and the West) the range exceed .45. The strong serial correlation
in the relative unemployment rates is striking. The highest relative
unemployment rates were found the in the West from 1967 to 1974,
the North East from 1975 to 1979, the Midwest from 1980 to 1985,
and the South from 1986 to 1987. Strong serial correlation in the lowest
relative unemployment rates is also obvious in table 5.2. Since the late
1960s, the unemployment rates in the regions have not moved in lock
step with the national unemployment rate, and regional deviations have
typically persisted for multiyear periods.
Table 5.2 also provides evidence of rapid short-run changes in regional
relative unemployment rates. Examples of rapid increases in relative
unemployment are provided by the North East between 1970 and 1972,
the Midwest between 1978 and 1980, and the South between 1984 and
1986. Rapid declines in relative unemployment occurred in the North
East between 1979 and 1980 and in the West between 1973 and 1975.
To characterize regional labor market performance in a more
systematic manner, each of the three regional labor market indicators
(the TUR, the IUR, and the private, nonfarm employment share) was
regressed on its respective national counterpart. The goodness of fit,
i.e., R2, of the regressions provides evidence of the coincidence of
regional with national economic developments. The errors from the
regressions show the size and direction of regional deviations from the
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national economy. Because regional TURs are only available since 1967,
the TUR regressions cover just the 1967-1987 period. Both sets of
unemployment regressions were fitted as homogeneous equations, i.e.,
without constant terms. The slope coefficients from the equations show
the proportional relationship between regional unemployment and the
national unemployment rate. The employment shares equations were
fitted with a linear time trend to test for the smoothness of change in
regional employment shares over the 1948—1987 period.
Table 5.3 shows the regressions and summary statistics. All 12 of
the R2s exceed .50 and nine exceed .80. Unemployment in each of the
four regions is positively associated with national unemployment. The
constants of proportionality range from .824 (the IUR regression in the
South) to 1.191 (the IUR regression in the North East). Both sets of
unemployment regressions suggest that unemployment in the West is
less closely associated with national unemployment than is unemploy
ment in the other three regions. When regional unemployment coeffi
cients are compared across the four TUR equations, they mirror the
patterns previously noted in table 5.2, i.e., TURs were highest in the
West and lowest in the South over the 1967-1987 period.
When the IUR and TUR regressions for each region are compared,
they reveal systematic differences in UI benefit availability by region.
Coefficients in the IUR regressions are larger than for the TUR regres
sions in both the North East and West, but smaller in both the Midwest
and the South. In the North East and the West, UI benefits are relative
ly more accessible than they are in the Midwest and the South. 3
Strong trends in the employment shares of all four regions are ap
parent in the employment share regressions. The employment share
trended downward most rapidly in the North East and upward most rapid
ly in the South between 1948 and 1987. Note that all four employment
share regressions have R2s that exceed .90. Large scale trend wise
changes in employment shares occurred in all four regions during these
40 years.
The regional unemployment rate and employment share regressions
provide a basis for judging the degree of regional variation around na
tional economic performance. In the unemployment equations, unusually
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strong regional performance is suggested in years when the regression
overpredicts the regional unemployment rate. Strong regional employ
ment performance is suggested in years when a region's employment
share is underpredicted.
Table 5.4 uses fitted values from the regression equations of table
5.3 to judge regional labor market performance. In each region, weak
performance is inferred when an index ratio exceeds 1.00 and vice versa.
The indices for the fitted unemployment series (the TUR and the IUR)
are ratios of actual to predicted unemployment rates. For employment,
the indices are ratios of predicted shares to actual employment shares.
Each region has three ratios from 1967 to 1987, but only two from 1948
to 1966. Note that the performance indices based on the IUR and TUR
regressions show more variability than the indices based on the employ
ment regressions. To highlight years of unusually good and unusually
weak performance low and high ratios that depart substantially from
1.00 are identified with + 's and *'s respectively. The identifiers are
applied to IUR and TUR indices which deviate by at least . 10 from
1.00 and employment share indices which deviate by at least .03 from
1.00.
Over the 40 years covered by table 5.4, each region has experienced
major changes in relative labor market performance. The indices for
the North East show weak performance from 1972 to 1979, but then
strong performance from 1982 to 1987. In this region and the others,
there is strong serial correlation in the performance indices, i.e., good
years are bunched together as are bad years. There is also a clear tenden
cy for the employment-based index to lag somewhat behind the
unemployment indices. Strong economic performance in the Midwest
is indicated in many years between 1948 and 1980, particularly in nonrecession years. Durable manufacturing employment, which is extremely
volatile over the business cycle, has traditionally been concentrated in
this region. Note how the midwestern performance indices change in
the recession years 1954, 1958, 1961,1970-71 and 1975. In the 1980s,
consistently weak performance is observed in the Midwest.
The IUR series for the South suggests that economic performance
in this region was weak from 1952 to 1960, but then strong from the
mid-1960s through 1981. A weakening of the southern labor markets
in the mid-1980s is also apparent. 4 In the West, strong performance

Table 5.4
Indices of Regional Labor Market Performance, 1948-1987
Year

North East
IUR

1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

1.02
1.02
1.00
1.07
1.03
0.98
0.94
1.04
0.99
1.00
0.97
1.07
0.98
0.94
0.99
1.06
1.05
1 01
1.04
0.96
0.99
1.02
0.95
1.04

TUR
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0.92
0.89 +
0.92
0.94
1.05

Midwest
Emp.
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.01
1.01
1.01
1.00
1.01
1.00
1.00
0.99
1.00
0.99
0.98
0.98
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.98
0.99

IUR
0.75 +
0.82 +
0.83 +
0.82 +
0.84+
0.79+
1.02
0.86+
1.00
0.93
1.11*
0.89+
0.95
1.03
0.93
0.86+
0.82 +
0.75 +
0.74+
0.85 +
0.86+
0.82 +
1.01
1.00

TUR
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0.86+
0.82+
0.82+
0.91
0.92

South
Emp.
1.02
1.02
1.01
1.00
1.00
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
1.00
.02
.01
.01
.02
.02
.01
.01
0.99
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.99

IUR
0.91
0.97
.04
.08
.11*
.23*
.21*
.20*
.14*
.14*
.04
.14*
.11*
.09
1.07
1.00
0.96
0.92
0.90 +
0.93
0.92
0.90+
0 84 +
0.79 +

TUR
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1.09
1.09
1.09
1.00
0.88+

o'

West
Emp.
0.97+
0.97+
0.98
0.98
0.98
.00
.00
.00
.00
.01
.00
.01
.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.00

IUR
1.40*
1.15*
1.16*
0.96
0.97
1.07
0.78 +
0.84+
0.79+
0.88 +
0.80+
0.82 +
0.94
0.92
0.98
1.04
1.17*
1.39*
1.39*
1 34*
1.29*
1.32*
1.26*
1.18*

TUR
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1.33*
1.25*
1.28*
1.29*
1.26*

Emp.
0.99
1.00
1.02
.02
.01
.02
.01
.01
.00
.00
0.97 +
0.97 +
0.97 +
0.96 +
0.96 +
0.97 +
0.98
1.00
1.01
1.02
1.02
1.02
1.03*
1.04*

C

1

"o*
2.

1
1
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1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

1.18*
1.22*
.16*
.05
.12*
.14*
.15*
.10*
0.91
0.91
0.84+
0.87+
0.93
0.88 +
0.80+
0.78 +

1.13*
1.13*
1.09
1.12*
1.23*
1.19*
1.14*
1.14*
1.00
0.98
0.93
0.91
0.91
0.86+
0.80+
0.73 +

1.00
1.02
1.03*
1.03*
1.04*
1.04*
1.05*
1.05*
1.03*
1.02
1.00
0.99
0.98
0.97 +
0.96 +
0.95 +

0.95
0.87 +
0.97
.06
.01
.00
.03
.15*
.45*
.34*
.32*
.20*
.15*
.17*
.13*
1.18*

0.88 +
0.89 +
0.85 +
0.92
0.85 +
0.84+
0.86 +
0.94
1.14*
1.12*
1.13*
.11*
.11*
.10*
.03
.07

0.99
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.97+
0.97+
0.97 +
0.98
1.00
1.02
1.03*
1.04*
1.03*
1.03*
1.03*
1.02

0.72 +
0.72 +
0.79 +
0.99
0.90+
0.89 +
0.87 +
0.88 +
0.87 +
0.89+
0.97
0.99
0.94
0.95
1.06
1.03

0.91
0.89+
0.97
0.96
0.94
0.96
0.98
0.99
0.96
0.98
0.98
1.03
1.02
1.06
1.16*
1.17*

0.99
0.98
0.98
0.99
0.99
1.00
1.00
1 00
099
0.98
0.98
0.99
0.99
1.00
1.01
1.02

1.16*
1.21*
1.10*
0.90 +
1.00
0.99
0.97
0.88 +
0.84 +
0.94
0.96
1.02
1.04
1.07
1.07
1.07

1.16*
1.21*
1.11*
0.99
1.04
1.01
0.99
0.95
0.89 +
0.89 +
0.93
091
0.93
0.93
0.93
093

.04*
.03*
.03*
.01
.01
.00
0.99
0.97 +
0.97 +
0.98
0.99
0.99
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.01

JO
a
era

Unearimoplonalyment

SOURCE: All indices based on regression equations from table 5.3. The IUR and TUR indices are ratios of actual unemployment rates to fitted rates
from the regressions. The employment indices are ratios of fitted employment shares to actual shares. For all indices high ratios indicate years of poor
regional labor market performance. Years with especially weak performance have *'s, and years with especially strong performance have +'s. NA=not
available.
5.
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is observed from 1954 to 1961, but then weak performance prevailed
from 1964 to 1974.
The labor market performance indices of table 5.4 are closely linked
to the regional pattern of UI loans previously examined in table 5.1.
Weak performance in the North East in the 1970s, in the Midwest
throughout the 1980s, and in the South in the mid-1980s coincides with
the timing of large-scale borrowing by states in each of these regions.
Weak performance in years prior to the mid-1970s was observed both
in the South (from 1952 to 1960) and in the West (from 1964 to 1974).
For these regions, however, the period of weak economic performance
was not accompanied by large scale UI borrowing activity. Borrowing
did not take place in the earlier periods for two reasons: trust fund
reserves were more adequate and the average unemployment rates were
lower (particularly in the West between 1964 and 1974). Regional
reserve ratios at the start of the periods of weak labor market perfor
mance illustrate the long-term change in reserve adequacy over the
1948-1987 period. The four relevant reserve ratios (reserves as a per
cent of covered payrolls) were as follows: the South in 1952—7.0 per
cent;, the West in 1964—3.0 percent; the North East in 1972—2.4 per
cent; and the Midwest in 1980—.7 percent. Since reserve ratios are
not likely to return to their levels of the 1950s, it seems likely that weak
regional performance in the future will pinpoint the geographic areas
where the need for UI loans will be the greatest. 5
Another point is worth emphasizing in reference to the regional labor
market performance. If a region experiences weak performance, UI
claims rise due to higher unemployment. Weak performance, however,
also affects revenues because employment growth is reduced. In table
5.4 especially weak employment growth is indicated between 1974 and
1980 in the North East, between 1982 and 1986 in the Midwest, and
between 1970 and 1974 in the West. Financing problems are exacer
bated by slow employment growth, which occurs in periods of weak
economic performance.
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Covariation Among State Unemployment Rates

The patterns of UI loan activities summarized earlier strongly sug
gest that individual states within larger geographic areas share similar
unemployment experiences. This issue can be directly examined in a
regression analysis of state unemployment rates.
As noted above, unemployment rates by geographic area are available
from the CPS starting in 1967. In that year, annual unemployment rates
were first published for the four census regions, the nine census divi
sions and the ten largest states. Later, the number of states expanded
to 27 (in 1970) and then to 29 (in 1973), and finally to all states in 1976.
Thus for the 1967-1987 period there are 810 state-year observations
on annual state unemployment rates (TURs). These were the depen
dent variables in the regression analysis.
Three regression equations were tested to explain variation in state
TURs. The regressions differed in the choice of the larger geographic
areas used to explain individual state TURs, i.e., national, regional or
divisional TURs. To the extent that state TURs are most similar to the
TURs of adjacent states, then a clear ranking of the goodness-of-fit of
the three regressions should be observed. The fit should be worst using
the national TUR, intermediate using the regional TUR, and best us
ing the divisional TUR. To reduce spurious correlation in the regres
sions, each state's unemployment was removed from the unemployment
measure for the larger geographic area which included the state. For
example, the three explanatory variables for the New York TUR obser
vations were respectively TURs for the U.S. less New York, the North
East region less New York, and the Mid-Atlantic division less New York.
Table 5.5 displays the regression results. All three regressions have
positive slope coefficients indicating that state TURs increase when the
TURs for the larger geographic areas increase. Observe that the R2 is
highest (=.559) when the explanatory variable is the TUR for the other
states in the same census division, more than 20 percentage points higher
than when the regional or national TUR is used. Note, however, that
a large share of the variation in state TURs remains unexplained even
in the best fitting equation. The TURs of states within census divisions
are closely related, but do not move in perfect lock step.
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Table 5.5
Simple Regressions Explaining State TURs
1967 to 1987
Constant

0.382
(1.2)

U.S. TUR

0.913
(20.3)

Regional TUR

1.173
(4.3)

0.806
(21.1)

Divisional TUR
Summary measures
Number of observations

0.703
(3.6)

0.906
(32.0)

810

810

810

R2

0.337

0.354

0.559

Standard error

1.855

1.831

1.514

SOURCE: All regressions use state TURs as the dependent variable. Independent variables are
unemployment rates for the indicated geographic area after removal of the state's unemployment
from the area's unemployment. All unemployment data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
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To further illustrate the similarity of unemployment rates in adjacent
states, table 5.6 presents TURs for individual states in the North East
region between 1970 and 1988. Data are available for five states for
all years and for the four smaller New England states since 1976. Also
shown are the national TUR and the TUR for the North East region.
Relative unemployment rates (state rates divided by the national rate)
appear in the bottom half of the table.
At least four observations should be made regarding the unemploy
ment patterns in table 5.6. (1) Relative unemployment rates in the 1970s
peaked earlier in New England states than in Mid-Atlantic states. For
states with annual data extending back to 1970, relative unemployment
rates of 1.20 and above are observed for the following consecutive se
quences of years: 1971-1973 in Connecticut, 1973-1976 in
Massachusetts, 1976-1979 in New York, and 1975-1977 in New Jersey.
(2) Low unemployment is pervasive throughout New England in the
1980s, especially in the later years of the decade. With only two ex
ceptions (Maine in 1984 and 1986), relative unemployment rates of .75
or less are observed in all six states since 1984, and even earlier in New
Hampshire (1978), Vermont (1981), and Connecticut (1982).
(3) Relative unemployment rates in some states deviate from relative
rates in adjacent states for several consecutive years. Since 1976, New
Hampshire generally has had the lowest rate while Maine has had either
the highest or second highest rate among the six New England states.
Since 1980, Pennsylvania has had the highest unemployment rate among
the Mid-Atlantic states.
(4) The patterns of unusually high and unusually low state unemploy
ment rates are closely linked to UI borrowing. Note the high unemploy
ment in Connecticut starting in 1971 (while borrowing commenced in
1972). Low unemployment in New Hampshire helps explain why that
state (alone among the nine states of the North East) did not need loans
in the 1970s. The high unemployment in Pennsylvania in the 1980s helps
explain why it was the only northeastern state to be a major borrower
in the present decade.
Three implications of the preceding state and regional analysis may
warrant some additional comments. The first relates to the geographic
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Relative unemployment rates

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

().94
.12
.14
.37
.29
.32
.23
]1.14
11.00
().95
().79
().84
(
().72
().64
().54
().54
().52
().60

1.16
1.42
1.54
1.29
1.09
1.07
1.23
0.99
0.87
0.88
0.83
0.82
0.71
0.63
0.61
0.68
0.54
0.53
0.55

1.16
1.18
1.02
1.24
1.10
0.95
0.89
0.94
0.81
0.75
0.76
0.71
0.69

0.86 a
1.00I3
1.07 a
0.86 a
1.12 a
1.09|3
0.83
0.83
0.62
0.53
0.66
0.66
0.76
0.56
0.57
0.54
0.40
0.40
0.44

1.13
0.99
0.97
0.88
0.90
0.75
0.71
0.72
0.69
0.67
0.67
0.58
0.51

1.05
1.21
1.08
1.14
1.01
1.00
1.05
0.86
0.71
0.68
0.57
0.61
0.56

0.92
1.12
1.20
1.10
1.14
1.12
1.34
1.28
1.26
1.22
1.06
1.00
0.89
0.90
0.96
0.90
0.90
0.79
0.76

0.94
0.97
1.04
1.14
1.13
1.20
1.35
1.32
1.18
1.19
1.01
0.96
0.93
0.81
0.83
0.79
0.71
0.65
0.69

0.92
0.92
0.96
0.98
0.91
0.98
1.03
1.08
1.13
1.19
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.23
1.21
1.11
0.97
0.92
0.93

0.94
1.05
1.11
1.12
1.09
1.12
1.22
1.18
1.13
1.14
1.00
0.97
0.93
0.91
0.91
0.86
0.80
0.73
0.73

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

SOURCE: All unemployment rate data based on the Current Population Survey and published in U.S. Department of Labor, Geographic Profile of
Employment and Unemployment, various issues.
a. Average for four states for which individual state data are not available prior to 1976.
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mobility of the labor force. Movement of workers between tight and
loose labor markets is an important adjustment mechanism. Geographic
mobility provides labor market rewards and helps to reduce unemploy
ment rate differentials between geographic areas. The results of the table
5.5 regressions imply that unemployment differentials are smaller for
adjacent states than for states that are farther apart. This suggests that,
on average, the extra earnings and other economic rewards to migra
tion will be larger for longer-distance moves. Also, since geographic
mobility improves national labor market performance, national policies
to promote mobility are to be encouraged. 6
The second implication, directly related to UI financing, is that financ
ing problems are apt to be experienced by adjacent states because high
unemployment in one state is likely to be accompanied by high unemploy
ment in surrounding states. The data examined in tables 5.1 and 5.6
support this strongly. Five of six New England states needed loans in
the 1970s and borrowing equaled 2.89 percent of 1975 payrolls. In the
1980s, New England states borrowed only very small amounts (.14 per
cent of payrolls during 1980-1983 and .01 percent of payrolls during
1984-1987).
The third implication, also linked to UI financing, is that weak
economic performance affects UI tax receipts as well as benefit outlays.
Table 5.4 showed that weak unemployment performance in a region
is associated with weak employment performance. Thus, when UI claims
rise due to increased unemployment there is an associated tendency for
employment growth to decline. This double-edged impact on UI trust
funds is examined in the next section.

Financing Experiences in New Jersey
At the end of the 1980s, New Jersey was experiencing a prolonged
economic expansion which began at the start of the decade. Unemploy
ment in 1987 was only 4.0 percent of the labor force, 2.2 percentage
points below the national average, and unemployment declined further
to 3.8 percent in 1988. During the previous decade, however, the state's
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unemployment rate exceeded the national average in every year be
tween 1972 and 1980. In 1975, when the national unemployment rate
was 8.5 percent, New Jersey's was 10.2 percent, and the rate rose to
10.4 percent in the following year while national unemployment declined
to 7.7 percent. (Recall the state and national rates in table 5.6.)
Thus during both the 1970s and 1980s, New Jersey had average
unemployment rates that departed substantially from national unemploy
ment rates. Between 1970 and 1979, the state's TUR averaged 7.2 per
cent, 1 percentage point above the national average. Between 1979 and
1988, however, the state's average TUR of 6.3 percent was 1 percent
age point below the national average. The state was a major borrower
in the 1970s (loans of $735 million during 1975-1978 equaled 3.27 per
cent of 1975 payrolls), but only a small-scale borrower in the 1980s
(a 1983 loan of $78.5 million equaled .2 percent of 1981 payrolls).
When state unemployment departs from national unemployment, there
are three separate effects on the UI trust fund balance. 7 Higher unemploy
ment causes benefit outlays to increase and reduces the fund balance.
Higher unemployment reduces covered employment and tax receipts
and causes the fund balance to decline. Experience rating then operates
to offset the former two effects and restore the fund balance to its
previous level.
Simulations with the New Jersey model provide a way of estimating
the size of the first two effects. These can be characterized respective
ly as the benefit effect and taxable wage effect of state unemployment
deviations. In two simulations of the 1988-1997 period using respec
tively U.S. TURs from the 1970s and New Jersey TURs from the 1970s,
the simulation based on the (higher) New Jersey TURs had $2.120 billion
of higher benefit payments and $7 billion of lower taxable wages. Com
pared to the simulation using U.S. TURs, benefit payments were 16.8
percent higher and taxable wages were 1.6 percent lower. Of the two
effects, the benefit effect accounted for 91.3 percent, and the taxable
wage effect accounted for 8.7 percent of their combined adverse im
pact on the New Jersey trust fund.
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When state versus national TURs from the 1980s (1979 to 1988) were
used, similar qualitative results were obtained. In the simulation using
(lower) New Jersey TURs, benefit payments were $2.003 billion (or
14.35 percent) lower, while taxable wages were $8 billion (or 1.85 per
cent) higher when compared to the simulation using the national TUR.
Of the combined favorable effect on the trust fund, 88.6 percent was
from lower benefits and 11.6 percent from higher taxable wages. Averag
ing the two sets of state versus national comparisons, about 90 percent
of the combined effect on New Jersey trust fund flows was from changes
in benefit payments, and about 10 percent was from changes in taxable
wages. When the state TUR deviates from the national TUR, the effect
on tax revenues is measurable but small compared to the effect on benefit
outlays.
The simulation results can also be used to assess New Jersey's bor
rowing experiences of the 1970s. The "extra" state unemployment of
the 1970s, i.e., the state TUR which averaged 7.2 percent less the U.S.
TUR which averaged 6.2 percent, had an adverse impact on the trust
fund of $2.322 billion in simulations covering the 1988-1997 period. 8
The $2.322 billion represents 2.35 percent of covered payroll for the
middle year (1993) of the 10-year simulation. This scale of combined
adverse benefit effect and taxable wage effect (their sum measured
relative to covered payroll) is about three-quarters of the actual scale
of state borrowing in the 1970s, i.e., 2.35 percent versus borrowing
which equaled 3.27 percent of 1975 covered payroll. If New Jersey
had experienced average unemployment during the 1970s, it certainly
would have borrowed much less than $735 million, perhaps one-fourth
of this amount. 9
The effects of above-average unemployment on benefit payments and
taxable wages have also been estimated in the other six states for which
trust fund simulation models were developed (and previously used in
chapter 4). The share of the combined effect accounted for by the tax
able wage effect in New Jersey fell in the middle of the range for the
seven states. In Ohio and Florida, only 6 percent of the combined ef
fect of high unemployment was due to reductions in taxable wages, while
94 percent was due to increased benefits. The (reduced) taxable wage
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effects in the other states were as follows: Michigan—8 percent,
Massachusetts and Texas—13 percent, and California—25 percent. Only
in California did the taxable wage effect account for more than onesixth of the combined effect. 10 In California, the higher taxable wage
effect was attributable both to a smaller response of benefit outlays and
a larger response of taxable wages to given increases in the average
TUR. 11
The models from the other states were also used to compare the scale
of state borrowing in the 1970s and 1980s with the combined benefit
effect and taxable wage effect of unusually high state unemployment.
All simulations covered the 1988-1997 period, and the combined (benefit
and taxable wage) effect over the 10 years was measured relative to
total payrolls as of 1993, a mid-year of the simulations. In Massachusetts,
the high average unemployment of the 1970s had a 10-year combined
effect equal to 1.87 percent (of 1993 payrolls) compared to state bor
rowing in the 1970s which equaled 1.62 percent of 1975 payrolls. The
simulated adverse effects of high unemployment in Michigan in the 1970s
and 1980s were 3.73 percent and 7.57 percent (of 1993 payrolls) respec
tively. The scale of state borrowing in the 1970s was 2.29 percent of
1975 payrolls, and in the 1980s it was 6.67 percent of 1984 payrolls.
For Ohio in the 1980s, the 10-year combined adverse benefit effect and
taxable wage effect on the trust fund was 3.76 percent (of 1993 payrolls)
compared to state borrowing which equaled 6.06 percent of 1984
payrolls.
This section has identified five instances where a state was a largescale borrower: Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey in the 1970s
and Michigan and Ohio in the 1980s. In each of the five states, average
TUR over 10 years exceeded the average U.S. TUR by at least 1.0
percentage point. Ten-year simulations then estimated the combined
adverse effects of high unemployment on benefit payments and taxable
wages in the states. In all five instances, the simulated effects of high
state TURs represented at least 60 percent of the state's actual borrow
ing, and in three instances the size of the adverse effects exceeded the
scale of state borrowing (Massachusetts and Michigan in the 1970s and
Michigan in the 1980s). 12 Since individual states have little or no
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control over their own unemployment, the scale of their borrowing was
at least partly due to adverse economic factors beyond their control.

NOTES
1. Throughout this chapter, geographic areas are identified using standard U.S. Bureau of the
Census classifications, which divide the states into nine divisions. Table 5.1 adds Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands to the Mid-Atlantic division. New England has six states: Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The Mid-Atlantic states
are New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania (plus Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands for the
analysis of loans). See table C-l of U.S. Department of Labor (1988a) for a complete listing
of states by census division. The divisions of the other simulation model states are as follows:
East North Central (Ohio and Michigan), South Atlantic (Florida), West South Central (Texas),
and Pacific (California).
2. The North East is defined as the states of the New England and Mid-Atlantic divisions. The
Midwest consists of the states in the East North Central and West North Central divisions. The
South combines the South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central divisions. The
West region combines the states of the Mountain and Pacific divisions.
3. The same general pattern of regional coefficients was obtained in IUR regressions fitted to
the 1967-1987 period. For the four regions, the slope coefficients were respectively 1.193, .988,
.747 and 1.188. Thus a high-to-low ranking of UI benefit availability across the four regions
would be as follows: North East, West, Midwest and South.
4. We know from data by census division that the weakening was pronounced in the West South
Central division.
5. At the end of 1987, for example, the aggregate reserve ratio for the U.S. was 1.38 percent.
For three earlier prerecession years aggregate reserve ratios were as follows: 1948—7.91 per
cent; 1959—3.57 percent; and 1969—3.46 percent.
6. Recent evidence from the UI Reemployment Demonstration Project in New Jersey, however,
suggests that few claimants (less than 1 percent) avail themselves of relocation assistance (payments
for out-of-area job interviews and payments for moving expenses)!. See part 2, section VI of
Corson et al. (1989).
7. There is also an effect on interest income to the trust fund, which will be omitted from the
present discussion.
8. This amount is the sum of $2.120 billion in additional benefit outlays and $.202 billion in reduced
tax receipts due to lower taxable wages.
9. Since we are using a simulation over the 1988-1997 period to interpret events of the 1970s,
the simulation results should be viewed as suggestive. A more precise quantitative estimate would
have to hold constant other effects from the 1970s.
10. In each of the seven states, the share of the combined effect of high unemployment on the
trust fund balance due to reduced taxable wages was estimated taking an average across four simula
tions. In each, deviations from the baseline simulation were noted. The four simulations used
state and national TURs from the 1970s (1970-1979) and the 1980s (1979-1988). The average
taxable wage effect shares in the seven states were as follows: Florida—.0552; Ohio—.0559;
Michigan—.0800; New Jersey—.1084; Texas—.1255; Massachusetts—.1304, and
California—.2486.
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11. The smaller benefit response in California is due in part to its low weekly benefit amount.
The larger taxable wage response is a partial reflection of a large covered employment response.
12. Recall the qualification noted in footnote 9. These comparisons are meant to be suggestive.
The simulations did not try to hold constant other factors from the 1970s and 1980s besides state
TURs, which could have affected borrowing in the individual states.

Federal Policies
to Encourage Solvency
In the mid- and late-1980s, state UI programs accumulated substan
tial reserve balances. At the end of 1989, aggregate net balances across
all 53 programs totaled $36.9 billion or 1.90 percent of covered payrolls.
The 1988 aggregate reserve ratio of 1.90 percent was considerably larger
than the reserve ratio that existed at the start of the decade (.91 percent
on January 1, 1980) but much smaller than the ratio at the start of the
1970s (3.46 percent). Despite this recent accumulation of reserves, many
states remain exposed to the threat of insolvency. If the past is pro
logue, the next recession will be more severe in some geographic areas
than others, and programs in the hardest hit regions will account for
a major share of future UI loans.
Since large-scale borrowing remains a realistic possibility, it may be
worthwhile to speculate on how the UI programs would respond to a
future recession and how the response might be affected by federal policy
initiatives regarding trust fund solvency. The discussion will emphasize
how federal policy can affect trust fund balances, tax responsiveness,
the terms and conditions for UI loans, and/or the possible supplemen
tation of state fund balances in recognition of unusual needs.
The framework for the discussion is based on the earlier analysis of
state funding strategies (chapter 2), but expanded to also consider possible
interstate financial arrangements. The discussion will focus on how alter
native federal policy stances can influence the states' choices of fund
ing strategies. Recall that three funding strategies were identified in
chapter 2: pre-funding, automatic pay-as-you-go, and discretionary
pay-as-you-go.
Under the present federal policy stance regarding UI financing, the
responsibility for financing benefit payments and making the associated
decisions about appropriate trust fund balances is located at the state
143
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level. States are responsible for funding their own programs, using any
combination of funding strategies. Alternatively, federal policy could
be directed to actively encourage the states to do one of the following:
(1) achieve a trust fund solvency standard; (2) include more flexible
financing provisions in their laws; or (3) participate in a cost sharing/cost
reimbursement arrangement whereby reserves from prosperous states
are made available to those with "excess" costs (however defined).
The current federal policy stance towards state fending strategies might
be characterized as one of laissezfaire. States have exclusive respon
sibility for funding their own programs, with access to interest-bearing
loans from the U.S. Treasury if they become insolvent. If a state bor
rows, it must repay the loan. Individual states are free to choose the
relative degree of reliance to place on the three funding strategies.
Given events of 1980-1984 (the recessions, followed by state bor
rowing activities and UI legislative responses in the debtor states), the
response by the states to a recession under the current federal policy
regime can be suggested. A serious recession in 1990 or 1991 would
cause several states to need UI loans. Likely candidates for borrowing
would be states whose reserve ratio multiples were less than .5, e.g.,
Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Texas, to name seven with extensive borrowing histories from earlier
in the 1980s. 1 The regional pattern of the recession would also influence
which states would become large-scale borrowers. Major borrowers,
in turn, would want to reduce and eliminate interest-bearing loans quick
ly. (Recall the repayment patterns identified previously in tables 1.4
and 1.5.) To eliminate their indebtedness, these states would be expected
to enact solvency legislation (while still in the recession) that included
both benefit reductions and tax increases.
The preceding stylized series of events has one very perverse out
come. States with serious unemployment problems find themselves under
financial pressures to reduce benefits at a time when worker needs for
benefits are unusually high. These pressures are strongest in states where
initial trust fund reserve ratios are the lowest and where unemployment
rates are the highest. Since fund balances at the end of the 1980s are
more adequate than at start of the decade, the scale of state borrowing
would likely be smaller than during the early 1980s.
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For UI programs to be effective in meeting their micro (family level)
and macro (automatic stabilizing) income maintenance objectives, benefit
reductions should not occur in the midst of a recession. The alternative
federal policy stances to be discussed below could modify this undesirable
outcome.
Even if the federal government were not to modify its present laissezfaire policy stance, it might take actions that would affect the risk of
insolvency in the states. To the extent that macroeconomic monetary
and fiscal policies continue to achieve and maintain full employment,
this will prevent the major increases in benefit payments that are the
proximate cause for state solvency problems. Also, federal legislation
to raise the taxable wage base for the Federal Unemployment Tax would
cause many states to raise their own tax bases. The resulting increase
in revenues would enhance trust fund balances in states that currently
maintain the minimum permissible state taxable wage base, i.e., $7,000
per covered worker. Both federal actions would affect trust fund balances
without trying to actively influence state choices of funding strategies.
Other federal actions could affect state choices.

Pre-Funding
Active federal pursuit of a UI trust fund solvency standard could raise
fund balances and reduce the anticipated scale of future borrowing.
Federal policy could be implemented via a regulatory approach or an
approach that emphasized financial incentives. The regulatory approach
could specify a solvency standard, e.g., a reserve ratio (or high cost)
multiple of 1.5 or 1.0, which was a conformity requirement. 2
Alternatively, there could be a suggested federal solvency standard
(not a conformity requirement) coupled with a federal policy that pro
vided financial rewards and financial penalties dependent upon achieve
ment of the standard. The financial reward could take the form of a
federal interest rate supplementation for large reserve balances, e.g.,
the U.S. Treasury could add, say, 1 percentage point to the interest
rate paid on state trust fund balances. An example might be as follows:
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a suggested reserve ratio multiple of 1.0 with interest rate supplemen
tation for balances in the range of reserve multiples of from .5 to 1.0.
This would encourage the states to achieve a reserve ratio multiple of
1.0, but only cause extra interest costs for the U.S. Treasury on a frac
tion of the implied level of reserves and no extra interest costs on reserves
that exceed the suggested standard. A rough calculation for 1988 sug
gests that the maximum cost of this specific policy would be $2.0 billion
or . 11 percent of covered payrolls. 3 The financial penalty for not achiev
ing the standard could be assessed on the interest rate charged to states
needing UI loans. The combined effects of extra interest for larger
balances plus lower interest charges on loans could be a powerful
stimulant for state trust fund accumulations.
Many other variants of the preceding financial incentives could be
proposed. Since we know that even with a reserve ratio multiple of 1.5
UI loans are a distinct possibility (recall chapter 4), there still would
be some borrowing in recessions. With higher initial balances, however,
the volume of required loans would be reduced. There would be rewards
to states for prudent fiscal behavior both before recessions and during
recessions. With less need for loans in recessions, the tendency to reduce
benefits in recessions would also be lessened.

Flexible Financing
Federal policy could encourage states to adopt financing arrangements
which increased the cyclical responsiveness of UI taxes and, perhaps,
of UI benefits as well. Achievement of flexible financing arrangements
would enhance a state's reliance on the automatic pay-as-you-go fund
ing strategy. There is definite state interest in flexible financing, as well
as recent examples of legislation designed to achieve increased flex
ibility. 4 Flexible financing provisions were central to the laws enacted
in Illinois in 1987 and in Pennsylvania in 1988. In these two states the
new laws increased both revenue flexibility and benefit flexibility. 5 Penn
sylvania's new law increased flexibility through variable surtaxes on
employers, variable employee taxes, and variability in the weekly benefit
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amount. Automatic tax increases and benefit reductions occur when the
state's trust fund balance falls below predetermined thresholds. 6 Pro
ponents of flexible financing arrangements argue that they allow a state
to operate with a lower average trust fund balance over the business
cycle when compared to states that pre-fund against future contingen
cies. One possible advantage of the lower balance is that it helps pre
vent benefit liberalizations (induced by higher trust fund balances).
Three arguments against flexible funding arrangements were noted
previously in chapter 2. (1) They may not operate on a large enough
scale to prevent insolvency in serious recessions. (2) Because employer
profits drop sharply in recessions, they impose tax increases at a time
when profits are already low. States such as Texas and Louisiana were
not willing to let their automatic tax increases go into effect in 1983
and 1984 because they implied such large changes in employer taxes. 7
(3) To the extent that flexible financing extends to UI benefits, it means
that benefits (for at least some recipients) are reduced during recessions.
Thus, increased burdens on both employers and UI recipients are im
posed at an inappropriate point in the business cycle, i.e., when
unemployment is high.
For the seven states examined in chapter 4, evidence from the simula
tions suggested that automatic solvency taxes did not operate on a suf
ficient scale to prevent large-scale borrowing in serious recessions. If
this conclusion holds generally for states with solvency taxes and other
automatic pay-as-you- go provisions, there would seem to be a paradox.
Flexible financing arrangements with small effects on taxes and benefits
might be allowed to be fully operative in a recession, but they would
not prevent insolvency. On the other hand, provisions with larger-scale
effects might not be allowed to operate, e.g., the experiences of Texas
and Louisiana in 1982-1984. The net effect of reliance on flexible financ
ing could be twofold: (1) keeping pre-recession fund balances smaller
than they otherwise would be, and (2) not preventing insolvency in
serious recessions. In effect, flexible financing would be like an um
brella that protected against light rain showers but not against
thunderstorms.
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Proponents of flexible financing arrangements would undoubtedly
downplay the practical importance of the preceding considerations. At
present, states can modify their laws to achieve increased flexibility
without the need for federal policy actions. If federal policy wanted
to actively encourage flexible funding arrangements this could be ac
complished by mandating new conformity requirements. In effect,
federal laws could be structured to force changes in existing tax and
benefit statutes in the states. Regarding state tax statutes, there could
be requirements mandating: (1) short delays between changes in trust
fund balances and changes in employer taxes; (2) wide minimum ranges
of experience rated tax rates; and (3) (in benefit ratio states) short ex
perience periods for measuring employer benefit ratios, i.e., less than
the three years presently used in most benefit ratio states. Since the poten
tial financial penalties are large for states that do not satisfy conformity
requirements (the loss of the ability to reduce state tax rates below 5.4
percent through experience rating), federal policy could strongly en
courage increased state reliance on flexible financing. It is not obvious
that such a federal policy would be prudent or who might advocate such
a federal policy stance.

Cost Reinsurance and Cost Equalization
Unlike the present situation where each state is responsible for financ
ing its own benefits, cost reinsurance and cost equalization promote
the sharing of UI costs across states. 8 Proponents argue that certain states
should be eligible for financial assistance because of unusually bad
economic circumstances, circumstances unexpected and beyond their
control.
Cost reinsurance in UI is modeled after cost reinsurance in other areas
of private insurance. A group of insurers (states) pays into a common
fund and those with unusually bad experiences receive payments from
the common fund to cover part or all of the excess costs due to un
foreseeable events. Cost reinsurance in UI typically uses past benefit
cost experiences to gauge expected experiences, and identifies as eligi
ble reimbursable costs those substantially above expected costs. Each
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state's own past experience is used to determine its eligibility for rein
surance payments from the common pool to the state trust fund.
Under cost equalization, states that experience costs (or unemploy
ment rates) in excess of an absolute threshold would have some (or all)
of their excess costs covered by payments from the U.S. Treasury or
from a cost equalization fund. A major justification for cost equaliza
tion is to relieve states from excessive cost burdens that have arisen
from economic factors beyond state control.
Cost reinsurance and cost equalization expand the scope of respon
sibility for covering individual states' UI costs. Those states with unusual
ly strong economic performance assume part of the responsibility for
benefit payments made in states experiencing unusually weak perfor
mance. Two premises of these proposals are that individual states and
regions can experience economic fortunes which depart substantially
from the national experience and that such departures can persist for
several consecutive years. The analysis of chapter 5 showed that substan
tial and persistent state and regional departures have taken place in the
U.S. since World War II and that downward deviations adversely af
fect UI tax revenues as well as benefit payments. Since the states and
regions have not been the principal cause for the deviations, a case can
be advanced for having the states with stronger performance help the
weaker ones. A major question for these arrangements is how much
cross-subsidization there should be.
Under the present system of UI financing, each state generates the
tax revenues that pay for program benefits. The presence of U.S.
Treasury loans does not change the full responsibility of each state for
financing its own benefits. Loans merely change the timing of when
state taxes are paid. Under cost reinsurance and cost equalization, ex
clusive state responsibility for UI financing no longer holds. However,
the operation of either type of cost sharing plan does not necessarily
imply that some states will always be net recipients while others will
always be net donors. The chapter 5 analysis of state and regional labor
market performance since World War n documented large-scale changes
in the relative economic fortunes of the major census regions. Over
a period of several decades, the extent of the net interregional subsidies
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would undoubtedly be much smaller than for shorter, say, 10-year,
periods. 9
Specific proposals for cost reinsurance and cost equalization were
made at various times in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, but they have
not been actively pursued in the decade of the 1980s. 10 Many impor
tant details need to be considered. Crosslin (1980), for example,
discusses four important considerations: (1) individual state eligibility
criteria; (2) the definition of "normal" benefit costs needed to identify
excessive costs; (3) the amount of a state's grant, i.e., the parameters
of the excess cost reimbursement schedule; and (4) the source of fun
ding. Although many specific questions would need to be addressed
by a particular cost reinsurance or cost equalization plan, the main prin
ciple is simple, i.e., shared (interstate) responsibility for funding ex
cess costs incurred by the states experiencing the worst economic
conditions.
One important advantage of cost sharing and cost reinsurance ar
rangements is that the UI system needs smaller aggregate reserves than
when each state is exclusively responsible for its own costs. Resources
can flow across state lines to UI programs in regions of excessive UI
costs. To function successfully, a system of cost sharing must have a
sufficient amount of initial reserves so that there exists an ample stock
of reserves to be shared. This condition is more fully satisfied in the
late 1980s than it was at the start of the decade.
Federal policy can directly promote cost reinsurance or cost equaliza
tion through legislation. No plans have been proposed since the late
1970s. Considering the higher levels of reserves achieved by states in
the late 1980s and the likelihood of continuing nature changes in regional
economic fortunes, now may be a good time to renew active considera
tion of cost reinsurance and cost equalization plans.
In the late 1980s, some favorable conditions exist that may enhance
the prospects of federal legislation to institute cost reinsurance or cost
equalization. As a result of the recessions of the mid-1970s and early
1980s, nearly three-quarters of the UI programs (38 of 53) have bor
rowed at least once from the U.S. Treasury. These experiences may
make a pooling arrangement more attractive to states than in the past.
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Also, two federal trust funds, the Federal Unemployment Account (FUA)
and the Extended Unemployment Compensation Account (EUCA), are
slated to grow substantially by the early 1990s. With a history of bor
rowing and the existence of substantial state-financed federal accounts,
a majority of states might be willing to contemplate using these accounts
for state trust fund loans in a future recession. Demonstrated federal
leadership would be needed to accomplish the required statutory changes.
The chapter has briefly examined how federal policy could influence
state funding strategies. A continuation of the current federal policy
stance is probably the most likely one to be followed in the near term.
To guard against further recession-induced benefit reductions, however,
a case can be made that federal policy should promote both state
adherence to a solvency standard and a form of cost sharing or cost
reinsurance among the states.
NOTES
1. The reserve ratio multiples were computed for these states as of the end of 1988.
2. To be allowed to use experience rating to reduce employer state UI tax rates below 5.4 percent
of taxable payrolls, the solvency standard would have to be satisfied. For states that did not satisfy
the requirement when the standard became effective, a timetable for achieving the solvency stan
dard could also be specified.
3. The calculation was done as follows: covered wages of $1,798 billion, the high cost ratio (benefits
as a percent of payroll) for the U.S. of 2.24 percent and extra interest of $2.0 billion.
4. Prior to its financing problems of the 1980s, UI officials from Texas had frequently argued
in favor of flexible financing provisions of their tax statute.
5. The Illinois provisions were described earlier in chapter 2.
6. The trigger mechanism in Pennsylvania uses the ratio of the trust fund balances on July 1st
to benefit payments over the preceding three years.
7. See the details for both states in chapter 2 of Vroman (1986).
8. See Backer (1980) and Crosslin (1980) for discussions of cost reinsurance and cost equalization.
9. The absence of long-term net interregional subsidies would be more likely if unemployment
rates (especially TURs) rather than benefit cost rates (benefits as a percent of payrolls) were used
to direct the net financial flows among the states. Use of benefit cost rates in a cost equalization
plan would be more likely to work to the disadvantage of low-cost states.
10. Backer (1980, p. 350) discusses aspects of the Loyson reinsurance plan that strongly influenced
an ICESA catastrophic reinsurance proposal of 1963. He also discusses a Broadhead-Javits plan
of the late 1970s.

Appendix A
The Massachusetts Model
All variables used in the model of Massachusetts are defined in this appendix. Also
shown are the behavioral equations and definitional relations that link the model's
variables.
BLOCK 1
LABOR MARKET
Growth rate in the
labor force, percent

Exogenous variable

Growth rate in average
weekly wages, percent

Exogenous variable

INTRAT

Interest rate on trust
fund balances, percent

Exogenous variable

TUR

Total unemployment rate,
percent

Exogenous variable

CLF

Labor force

- (1 + GRCLF/lOO^CLF.j

TU

Total unemployment

- CLF*TUR/100

ECPS

Total employment

- CLF - TU

ETX

Employment of taxable
covered employers

= -669 259 + 991*ECPS -f 94 812*078
(1 7)
(6 7)
(2 3)
+ 44 798*085 + 812*RHO
(1 3)
(5 6)
R2 - 986 S E - 32 19
D W - 1 20
Sample period 1968 to 1987
078 = 1 from 1978 to 1987, - 0 otherwise
085 - 1 from 1985 to 1987, = 0 otherwise
Model intercept = -629.259 to adjust
for average residuals in 1986 and 1987

EREI

Employment of reimburs
able covered employers

- 458 + 05*(ETX - 2477)
EREI in 1987 = 458
ETX in 1987 - 2477

Employment covered by
the UI program

= ETX + EREI

Average weekly wages in
covered employment

- (1 + GRAWW/100)*AWW.!

Insured unemployment

= 30 355 + 5327*TU - 2073*TU-!
(8 2)
(15 2)
(6 1)
- 7.302*081
(2 7)
R2 _ 947 S E = 5 72 D W - 1 51
Sample period 1967 to 1987
081 - 1 from 1981 to 1987, - 0 otherwise

BLOCK 2
BENEFITS
IU
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Insured unemployment
rate

=100*IU/ECOV

IUTXIU

Ratio of IU of taxable
employers to total IU

Exogenous variable,
- 964, average for 1983-1987

WBWCL

Ratio of weeks paid to
weeks claimed

Exogenous variable,
= 897, average for 1983-1987

REPLRT

Replacement rate, ratio
of weekly benefits to
average weekly wages

+

-

3841 + 00301*TUR - 00359*GRAWW
(36 7)
(3.2)
(2 6)
0163*085
(2 8)

R2 = .410 S E - 0083 D W = 96
Sample period 1967 to 1987
D85 = 1 from 1985 to 1987, - 0 otherwise
WBAPRE

Weekly benefit amount,
pre 1987

- REPLRT*AWW

WBA

Weekly benefit amount,
1987 and later years

= WBAPRE +ADJ
ADJ = $5 in 1987, =$8 in 1988 and
later years

BENADJ

Benefit adjustment,
adjusts product of bene
fit variables to agree
with aggregate benefit
payments in regular UI

Exogenous variable,
- 969, average for 1983-1987

BENREG

Aggregate benefit pay
ments for the regular
UI program

- IU*IUTXIU*WBWCL*WBA*BENADJ*( 052)

Trigger to turn on the
EB program

- 1 if IUR £ 3 98%, otherwise - 0

MOEB03

EB program triggered
on for 3 months

- 3 if 4.69% > IUR 2: 3 98%,
otherwise - 0

MOEB05

EB program triggered
on for 5 months

- 5 if 4.99% > IUR £ 4 7%,
otherwise - 0

MOEB08

EB program triggered
on for 8 months

- 8 if 5 29% > IUR a 5.0%,
otherwise - 0

MOEB10

EB program triggered
on for 10 months

- 10 if 5.59% > IUR £ 5.3%,
otherwise - 0

EB program triggered
on for 12 months

- 12 if IUR 2:5 6%, otherwise - 0

Months EB program is
triggered on for the
year

- MOEB03 + MOEB05 + MOEB08 + MOEB10
+ MOEB12

Ratio of annualized weeks
compensated in EB to
weeks compensated in the
regular UI program

- .08115 +.0213*IURAV
(2 3) (3 0)

MOEB

Weekly benefit amount
for EB beneficiaries

R2 - .441 S E - 028 D.W. - 2 29
IURAV - (IUR + IUR.^/2
Sample period - 1971-78, 1980-82
-

909*WBA
909 - Av. (WBAEB/WBA) for 1980-1982
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EB benefit adjustment,
adjusts product of EB
variables to agree
with total EB payments
Total EB payments

Exogenous variable,

-.8857, average for 1980-1982

- (EBON - 1)*IU*IUTXIU*WBWCL*(MOEB/12)*
APWKEB*WBAEB*EBADJ*(.052)

EBS

State share of EB costs

- EBTOT/2

BEN

Total benefit payments
from the trust fund

- BENREG + EBS

TXBASE

Taxable wage base

Exogenous variable

TBAW

Ratio of the taxable
wage base to average
weekly wages

- TXBASE/(52*AWW)

Taxable wage proportion

-(1 487*TBAW - 870*TBAW2 )*(1 -.00940*TUR)
(41 5)
(14.3)
(5.6)

BLOCK 3
TAXES

R2 - .980 S E. - .00793 D.W
Sample period 1967 to 1987

RES930

TXSCHE

-

97

Net trust fund reserves
at the end of last year

Predetermined variable

Net trust fund reserves
on Sept 30 of last year

- .75*RESNL +

Reserve ratio at the end
the last calendar year

- RESNL/WSTOL
WSTOL - total wages and salaries of
taxable employers, last year

Net trust fund
from last year
determine this
applicable tax

- RES930 + .134*TAX.!
TAX - total tax payments

reserves
used to
year's
schedule

25*RESNL. 1

Wages and salaries of
taxable employers used
to determine this year's
applicable tax schedule

- .911*WST0.2
WSTOL - total wages and salaries of
taxable employers, two year lag

Reserve ratio used to
determine this year's
applicable tax schedule

- RESTX/WSTS

Tax schedule A in effect

Predetermined variable, tax rate =33%,
in effect if RRTS > 2 3%

Tax schedule B in effect

Predetermined variable, tax rate =36%,
in effect if 2 3% > RRTS 2; 2%

Tax schedule C in effect

Predetermined variable, tax rate =39%,
in effect if 2% > RRTS > 1 7%

Tax schedule D in effect

Predetermined variable, tax rate =42%,
in effect if 1 7% > RRTS > 1 4%

Tax schedule E in effect

Predetermined variable, tax rate =45%,
in effect if 1 4% > RRTS > 1 1%

Tax schedule F in effect

Predetermined variable, tax rate =48%,
in effect if 1 1% > RRTS > 8%
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TXSCHG

Tax schedule G in effect

Predetermined variable, tax rate =51%,
in effect if 8% > RRTS

Statutory tax rate in
effect for the current
year

Predetermined variable, average rate as
shown for schedules A (3 3%) through
G (5.1%)

Effective tax rate on
taxable wages determined
from the tax rate
schedule

- 1 2460 + 6391*TRSTAT - 8612*078
(5.3)
(11 6)
(14 8)
- 1511*(100*RRLAG)
(4 0)
R2 = 981 S E - 103 D W - 1 92
D78 - 1 from 1978 to 1987, =0 otherwise
Sample period 1967 to 1987

NCHP1

Noncharged benefits pro
portion no 1

= 1 if RRLAG >4%,
otherwise - 0

NCHP2

Noncharged benefits pro
portion no 2

- 1 + 02*(4 - RRLAG%) if 4% > RRLAG >2%,
otherwise = 0

NCHP3

Noncharged benefits pro
portion no 3

= 14 +.04*(2 - RRLAG%) if 2% > RRLAG >1%
otherwise = 0

NCHP4

Noncharged benefits pro
portion no 4

= 18-1- 06*(1 -RRLAG%) if 1%> RRLAG >- 5%
otherwise = 0

NCHP5

Noncharged benefits pro
portion no 5

= 27 if - 5% > RRLAG
otherwise = 0

NCHPRO

Noncharged benefits proproportion, proportion of
BEN that is noncharged

- NCHP1 + NCHP2 + NCHP3 + NCHP4 + NCHP5

NONCHG

Noncharged benefits

= NCHPRO*BEN

SOLVAS

Solvency assessment

=. (NONCHG - INT)-!
INT = interest income for the year

TRSOLV

Tax rate for the
Solvency tax

= 100*SOLVAS/WSTO
Rounded to the nearest 01
WSTO = Total wages and salaries of
taxable covered employers

Total effective tax rate
on taxable covered em
ployers

= ETRSCH + TRSOLV

Total wages and salaries
of taxable covered
employers

ETX*AWW*( 052)

Total tax payments

- WSTO*TWP*(ETR/100)

Interest rate on trust
fund balances

Exogenous variable

Net trust fund reserves
at the end of last year

Predetermined variable

BLOCK 4
INTEREST
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Initial estimate of
trust fund balance,
end of current year

RESNL + TAX - BEN

Average trust fund
balance for the year

(RESNL + RESNHT)/2

Average positive fund
balance for the year

RESNAV if RESNAV > 0, otherwise - 0

Interest income for the
year

INTRT*RESNPB

BLOCK 5
FUND BALANCE
RESNL

Net trust fund reserves
at the end of last year

Predetermined variable

TAX

Total tax payments

Endogenous variable, determined in
Block 3

INT

Interest income for the
year

Endogenous variable, determined in
Block 4

BEN

Total benefit payments
from the trust fund

Endogenous variable, determined in
Block 2

RESNET

Net trust fund reserves
at the end of the
current year

= RESNL + TAX + INT - BEN

Appendix B
The Texas Model
All variables used in the model of Texas are defined in this appendix. Also shown
are the behavioral equations and definitional relations that link the model's variables.
BLOCK 1
LABOR MARKET
Growth rate in the
labor force, percent

Exogenous variable

Growth rate in average
weekly wages, percent

Exogenous variable

Interest rate on trust
fund balances, percent

Exogenous variable

TUR

Total unemployment rate,
percent of labor force

Exogenous variable

CLF

Labor force

- (1 + GRCLF/100)*CLF. 1

TU

Total unemployment

= CLF*TUR/100

ECPS

Total employment

- CLF - TU

PEMM

Proportion of employ
ment in mining and
manufactur ing

- .2397 - 00498*TUR - .
(3 4)
(3 3)
(15 2)
+ 8175*RHO
(6.1)

GRCLF

R2 - 858 S E - 00596 D U. - 1 22
Sample period 1968 to 1987
Employment in mining
and manufacturing

- ECPS * PEMM

Employment of taxable
covered employers

- -1234.350 + 6111*ECPS + 1 3833*EMM
(12 3)
(32.0)
(10 6)
+ 277.511*072 + 71.571*078
(1 5)
(9 0)
D W - 2 05
R2 - .999 S.E. - 37 31
Sample period 1967 to 1987
D72 - 1 from 1972 to 1987, - 0 otherwise
D78 - 1 from 1978 to 1987, - 0 otherwise

AWWMFG

Employment of reimburs
able covered employers

- EREI-! + 28.7
Ave. increase in EREI from 1979 to 1987
- 28.7. EREI in 1987 - 976.

Employment covered by
the UI program

- ETAX + EREI

Average weekly wages in
covered employment

- (1 + GRAWW/100)*AWW.!

Average weekly wages in
manufacturing

- 5.7377 +1 0187*AWW
(1 6) (87.1)
R2 - .999 S.E. - 2.745 D.W. - 1.793
Sample period 1976 to 1987
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BLOCK 2
BENEFITS
Insured unemployment

= - 14 232 + 302*TU - 052*111-!
(1.5)
(8.4)
(2.2)
-10 780*081
(1 2)
R - .949 S E = 9 72 D W - 2.14
Sample period 1967 to 1987
D81 - 1 from 1981 to 1987, - 0 otherwise

Insured unemployment
rate

- 100*IU/ECOV

IUTXIU

Ratio of IU of taxable
employers to total IU

Exogenous variable,
- 970, average for 1983-1987

WPDWCL

Ratio of weeks paid to
weeks claimed

=.6269 +
(19 3)

03400*TUR
(5 9)

R - 628 S E = 0424 D W. =
Sample period 1967 to 1987

78

Change in Mfg. average
weekly wage, lagged
Carryover of DAWWMFGL
from last year

- TOTINCR-! - FULLTEN-j
(See below)

Total increment in AWWMFG
used to determine the
increase in the maximum
weekly benefit

= DAWWMFGL + CAROVER

FULLTEN

Full ten dollar incre
ments in AWWMFG

= TOTINCR rounded down to the
nearest ten dollars

MAXWBA

Maximum weekly benefit
amount

- MAXWBA-j -K 7*FULLTEN)
(MAXWBA frozen in 1988 and 1989)

MBAWW

Ratio of maximum weekly
benefit to average
weekly wage

- MWBA/AWW

REPLRT

Replacement rate, ratio
of weekly benefits to
average weekly wages

= - 1006 + 1 5565*MBAW - 1 3752*MBAW2
(2 4)
(3 5)
(1 D
+ 00908*TUR - 00267*GRAWW
(3 1)
(4 6)
R2 - 975 S E - 00739 D W
Sample period 1967 to 1987

- 2 41

Weekly benefit amount

- REPLRT*AWW

BENADJ

Benefit adjustment,
adjusts product of bene
fit variables to agree
with aggregate benefit
payments in regular UI

Exogenous variable,
= 969, average for 1984-1987

BENREG

Aggregate benefit pay
ments for the regular
UI program

- IU*IUTXIU*WPDWCL*WBA*BENADJ*( 052)

EBON

Trigger to turn on the
EB program

= 1 if IUR > 3 98%, otherwise - 0

MOEB03

EB program triggered
on for 3 months

- 3 if 4 7% > IUR > 4 0%,
0
otherwise
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MOEB05

EB program triggered
on for 5 months

~ 5 if 5 0% > IUR > 4.7%,
otherwise - 0

MOEB08

EB program triggered
on for 8 months

- 8 if 5 3% > IUR 2: 5 0%,
otherwise - 0

MOEB10

EB program triggered
on for 10 months

- 10 if 5.62% > IUR > 5 3%,
otherwise - 0

MOEB12

EB program triggered
on for 12 months

= 12 if IUR >5.62 %, otherwise - 0

MOEB

Months EB program is
triggered on for the
year

- MOEB03 + MOEB05 + MOEB08 + MOEB10
+ MOEB12

PYEBON

Proportion of the
year EB is "ON"

= MOEB/12

EBENPROP

Extended benefits as
a proportion of regular
benefits

- .2584*PYEBON
(27 5)
R2 - 977 S E - .0155
Sample period 1972, 1975-78, 1980-81

EBTOT

Total EB payments

EBS

State share of EB costs

- EBTOT/2

BEN

Total benefit payments
from the trust fund

- BENREG + EBS

- (EBON - 1)*BENREG*EBENPROP

1LOCK 3
TAXES
TXBASE

Taxable wage base

Exogenous variable

TBAW

Ratio of the taxable
wage base to average
weekly wages

- TXBASE/(52*AWW)

Taxable wage proportion

-(1 536*TBAW - 861*TBAW2 )*(1 - 00902*TUR
(54.2)
(18.7)
(4 0)
- 00726*TUR_ 1
(3 6)
R2 - 996 S E - 00372 D W - 1 39
Sample period 1967 to 1987
Fitted by nonlinear least squares

BENTAX

Total wages and salaries
of taxable covered
employers

- ETAX*AWW*( 052)

Taxable wages and salar
ies of taxable covered
employers

- WSTO*TWP

Benefits of taxable
employers to be financed
by employer taxes
Proportion of BENTAX
effectively charged to
taxable employers

75*BEN. 1 )

25*BEN.2 )

Exogenous variable
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EFFCHG

Effective charges

PEFFCHG*BENTAX

INEFFCHG

Ineffective charges

BENTAX - EFFCHG

EFFCHG3

Effective charges for
the three years used in
benefit ratio calculations

BENTAX + BENTAX-! +BENTAX_2

WSTX630

Taxable wages and salar
ies for the year ending
June 30th of last year

( 5*WSTX. 1 ) + ( 5*WSTX_ 2 )

WSTX930

Taxable wages and salar
ies for the year ending
Sept 30th of last year

WSTX3

Taxable wages and salar
ies for the three years
used in benefit ratio
calculations

- WSTX930 -i- WSTX930-! + WSTX930.2

BRNRATIO

Benefit ratio used in
employer tax calculations

- 100*EFFCHG3/WSTX3

RPLNRATO

Replenishment ratio

- (EFFCHG + (.5*INEFFCHG)) /EFFCHG

TRBASRAW

Basic tax rate, raw
calculation

- BENRATIO*RPLNRATO

TRBASIC

Basic tax rate, con
strained

- Minimum(TRBASRAW, 6%)

TRREPLEN

Tax rate for the
replenishment tax

- 100*(.5*INEFFCHG)/WSTX630, rounded
to the nearest 01

RES930

Net trust fund reserves
on Sept 30 of last year

- (.75*RESNET.j) + ( 25*RESNET.2 )

RRWTX930

Reserve ratio on Sept 30
of last year, percent of
taxable wages

- 100*RES930/WSTX630

DEFTAXON

Deficit tax on?

- 1 (yes) if RRWTX930 <- 1.0,
otherwise - 0

CREDITON

Tax credit on?

- 1 (yes) if RRWTX930 >- 2 0,
otherwise - 0

FLOOR

Trust fund floor for
deficit tax

- Maximum(400, 01*WSTX630)

CEILING

Trust fund ceiling for
receiving a tax credit

- .02*WSTX630

BASCONTR

Basic contributions for
calculating the deficit
tax rate

- ( 75*(TRBASIC. l + TRREPLEN.!)*WSTX. 1 ))
+ ( 25*(TRBASIC.2 + TRREPLEN.2 )*WSTX_ 2 ))

DEFICIT

Deficit used in the
numerator of the deficit
tax rate calculation

FLOOR - RES930

DEFRATIO

Deficit ratio

DEFICIT/BASCONTR

TRDEFRAW

Deficit ratio tax rate,
unconstrained

DEFRATIO^RBASIC.,

TRDEFICT

Deficit ratio tax rate

Minimum(TRDEFRAW,2.0), rounded to
the nearest 01

+ ( 25*WSTX. 2 )
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CREDIT

Tax credit to employers
when the fund balance
exceeds 2 percent of
taxable payroll

= RES930 - CEILING

TRCREDIT

Credit tax rate sub
tracted from employer
rate when reserves ex
ceed the ceiling

- 100*CREDIT/WSTX

TRINTON

Interest tax In effect

- 0 (off) if RES930 >=0, otherwise - 1

TRINT

Tax rate for the
interest tax

-

TRSMAX

Maximum statutory tax
rate

= 6 0 + (2 0*DEFTAXON) + TRREPLN
+ TRINT - TRCREDIT

TRSMIN

Minimum statutory tax
rate

- TRREPLN + TRINT

TREFF

Effective tax rate on
taxable wages, percent

= -.916 + 1.473*BENRATIO + 365*RPLNRATO
(4 5)
(16 5)
(3 0)
+ 931*TRSMIN + 043*TRSMAX
(3.5)
(2 2)

2 if TRINTON - 1, otherwise - 0

R2 = 982 S E - 081 D W - 1 92
Sample period - 1963 to 1987
Total tax receipts

= (TREFF/100)*WSTX

INTRT

Interest rate on trust
fund balances

Exogenous variable

RESNL

Net trust fund reserves
at the end of last year

Predeterrained variable

RESNHT

Initial estimate of
trust fund balance,
end of current year

- RESNL + TAX - BEN

RESNAV

Average trust fund
balance for the year

- (RESNL + RESNHT)/2

RESNPB

Average positive fund
balance for the year

= RESNAV if RESNAV > 0, otherwise - 0

INT

Interest income for the
year

- INTRAT*RESNPB

Net trust fund reserves
at the end of last year

Predetermined variable

TAX

Total tax payments

INT

Interest income for the
year

Endogenous variable, determined in
Block 3
Endogenous variable, determined in
Block 4

Total benefit payments
from the trust fund

Endogenous variable, determined in
Block 2

Net trust fund reserves
at the end of the
current year

= RESNL + TAX + INT - BEN

TAX
BLOCK 4
INTEREST

BLOCK 5
FUND BALANCE

BEN

Appendix C
The Michigan Model
All variables used in the model of Michigan are defined in this appendix. Also shown
are the behavioral equations and definitional relations that link the model's variables.
BLOCK 1
LABOR MARKET
Growth rate In the
labor force, percent

Exogenous variable

Growth rate in average
weekly wages, percent

Exogenous variable

Interest rate on trust
fund balances, percent

Exogenous variable

TUR

Total unemployment rate,
percent of labor force

Exogenous variable

CLF

Labor force

= (l+GRCLF/100) *CLF_!

TU

Total unemployment

- CLF*TUR/100

ECPS

Total employment

= CLF - TU

T67

Time trend starting
in 1967

1967 - 1, 1968 -2, etc

T79

Time trend starting
in 1979

1979 - 1, 1980 = 2, etc ,
- 0 before 1979

Real net exports as a
percent of GNP

Exogenous variable

Employment in mining,
manufacturing, and
transportation

= 1439 600 -34 464*TUR +9 018*RNXS
(73 4)
(14.1)
(1 9)
+13 380*T67 -27 481*T79
(1 7)
(3 5)
R2 - 970 S E = 17 547 D W. = 2 07
Sample period 1967 to 1987

ETAX

- -718 962 + 687*ECPS + 599*EMMT
(8 6)
(39 2)
(15.8)
+ 87 946*085
(6 9)

Employment of taxable
covered employers

R2 - 993 S E =16.288
D W - 2.39
Sample period 1967 to 1987
D85 - 1 from 1985 to 1987, - 0 otherwise
= 131 234 + 040*ETAX -1-290 104*075
(2 3)
(1 8)
(27 3)
+ 110 231*078
(11 7)

Employment of reimburs
able covered employers

R2 - 993 S E - 13 003 D W =1 68
Sample period 1972 to 1987
075 - 1 from 1975 to 1987, - 0 otherwise
078 - 1 from 1978 to 1987, - 0 otherwise
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Employment covered by
the UI program

= ETAX + EREI

Average weekly wages of
taxable employers

= (1 + GRAWW/100)*AWW. 1

Ratio of insured to
total unemployment

-

BLOCK 2
BENEFITS
IUTU

4203 + 0207*TUR - 0182*TUR. X
(12 8) (4.2)
(3 4)
- 1508*081
(5.0)

R2 - 797 S E - 0446 D W. = 2 24
Sample period 1967 to 1987
D81 = 1 from 1981 to 1987, - 0 otherwise
Intercept adjustment = + 0502 from 1987
IU

Insured unemployment

- IUTU*TU

IUR

Ins unemployment rate

= 100*IU/ECOV

IUTXIU

Ratio of IU of taxable
employers to total IU

Exogenous variable,
- 955, average for 1983-1987

WBWCL

Ratio of weeks paid to
weeks claimed

Exogenous variable,
= 879, average for 1983-1987

Maximum weekly benefit,
raw calculation

( 980* 580*(AWW_j + AWW.2 )/2) - 5
980 adjusts AWW to private AWW
580 is the MAXWBA percentage

MAXWBA

Maximum weekly benefit

Round(MAXWBAC) , to nearest dollar

MBAWW

Maximum weekly benefit
as a proportion of
average weekly wages

MAXWBA/AWW

REPRATE

Replacement rate, ratio
of weekly benefits to
average weekly wages

- .1701 + .4157*MBAWW + 00344*TUR
(8 2)
(6.2)
(2.5)
- 00370*TUR-!
(2.6)
R2 = 804 S.E - .0120 D.W. = 1.33
Sample period 1967 to 1987
Intercept adjustment = -.02618 after 1986

WBA

Weekly benefit amount

= REPRATE*AWW

BENADJ

Benefit adjustment,
adjusts product of ben
efit variables to agree
with aggregate benefit
payments in regular UI

Exogenous variable,
- 978, average for 1983-1986

BENREG

Aggregate benefit pay
ments for regular UI

- IU*IUTXIU*WBWCL*WBA*BENADJ*(.052)

EBON

Trigger to turn on the
EB program

- 1 if IUR £ 4 0%, otherwise - 0

MOEB03

EB program triggered
on for 3 months

- 3 if 5 1% > IUR > 4.0%,
otherwise - 0

MOEB05

EB program triggered
on for 5 months

- 5 if 5 3% > IUR > 5 1%,
otherwise
0

167
MOEB08

EB program triggered
on for 8 months

- 8 if 5 4% > IUR £ 5.3%.
otherwise - 0

MOEB10

EB program triggered
on for 10 months

- 10 if 5 55% > IUR 2: 5 4%,
otherwise - 0

MOEB12

EB program triggered
on for 12 months

- 12 if IUR > 5.55%, otherwise - 0

MOEB

Months EB program is
triggered on for the
year

- MOEB03 -t- MOEB05 + MOEB08 + MOEB10
f MOEB12

APWKEB

Ratio of annualized weeks
compensated in EB to
weeks compensated in the
regular UI program

-

WBAEB

Weekly benefit amount
for EB beneficiaries

EBADJ

EB benefit adjustment
adjusts product of EB
variables to agree
with total EB payments

Exogenous variable,
- 961, average for 1980-1982

EBTOT

Total EB payments

= (EBON - 1)*IU*IUTXIU*WBUCL*(MOEB/12)*
APWKEB*WBAEB*EBADJ*( 052)

EBS

State share of EB costs

- EBTOT/2

BEN

Total benefit payments
from the trust fund

- BENREG + EBS

311*EBON
311 - average proportion for the
1975-77 and 1980-82 periods

BLOCK 3
TAXES
TXBASE

Taxable wage base

Exogenous variable

TBAU

Ratio of the taxable
wage base to average
weekly wages

- TXBASE/(52*AWW)

Taxable wage proportion

= - 0657 + 8158*TBAW + 4224*(EMMT/ECPS)
(10 2)
(2.8) (24 1)
+ 00249*TUR - 00138*TUR. 1
(2 8)
(3 8)
R2 - 992 S E = 00390 D W
Sample period 1967 to 1987

Taxable wages and
salaries of taxable
covered employers
WSTX331L

Taxable wages and
salaries for year
ending March 31 of
last year

WSTO

Total wages and salaries
of taxable covered
employers

- ETAX*AWW*TWP*( 052)/1000
(in $ billions)
25*WSTX. 1 )

75*WSTX_ 2 )

= ETAX*AWW*( 052)/1000
(in $ billions)

= 1 71
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WST0331L

Total wages and salaries
of taxable employers for
the year ending March 31
of last year

WST0630L

Total wages and salaries
of taxable employers for
the year ending June 30
of last year

- (WSTO.j + WST0. 2 )/2

RESN630L

Net trust fund reserves
on June 30 of last year

- (RESNET-! + RESNET. 2 )/2
RESNET defined below

RR630L

Reserve ratio on June
30 of last year

- 100*RESN630L/(WST0630L*1000)

WSTXCBC

Taxable wages and sal
aries for the chargable
benefits component (CBC)
of employer taxes

BENCBC

Benefits for the charge
able benefits component
(CBC) of employer taxes

= ( 5*BEN_!) + BEN_ 2 + BEN_ 3
+ BEN-5 + ( 5*BEN_ 6 )

BRCBC

Benefit ratio for the
chargeable benefits tax

- 100*BENCBC/(WSTXCBC*1000), rounded to
the next highest 1%

TRABC

Account building tax
rate, maximum

- 3%

TRNBCRAW

Noncharged benefits tax
rate, raw calculation

- 100*(( 0375*WST0331L*1000) - RESN630L)
/(WSTX331L*1000)

TRNBCC

Constrained NEC tax
rate

- Min(TRNBCRAW,l%) if TRNBCRAW >= 0,
otherwise - 0

TRNBC

Noncharged benefits tax
rate

- TRNBCC, rounded to the next highest

-i- ( 75*WST0. 2 )

+ WSTX- 2 + WSTX.j + WSTX. 4
WSTX_ 5 + ( 5*WSTX. B )

TRSOLV

Solvency tax rate

= 2% if RESN630L < 0, otherwise = 0

TRSMIN

Minimum statutory tax
rate

= TRNBC

TRSMAX

Maximum statutory tax
rate

- 6% + TRABC + TRNBC

Effective tax rate on
taxable wages, percent

-

6845 + .8336*TRSMIN + 6415*BRCBC
(6 3)
(5.0)
(12 8)

R2 - 970 S.E. - 217 D W
Sample period 1963 to 1987
TAX

Total tax payments

= WSTO*TWP*(TREFF/100)

Interest rate on trust
fund balances

Exogenous variable

Net trust fund reserves
at the end of last year

Predetermined variable

BLOCK 4
INTEREST

- 1 45

1%
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Initial estimate of
trust fund balance,
end of current year

= RESNL -I- TAX - BEN

Average trust fund
balance for the year

- (RESNL + RESNHT)/2

Average positive fund
balance for the year

- RESNAV if RESNAV > 0, otherwise - 0

Interest income for the
year

- INTRT*RESNPB

RESNL

Net trust fund reserves
at the end of last year

Predetermined variable

TAX

Total tax payments

Endogenous variable, determined in
Block 3

INT

Interest income for the
year

Endogenous variable, determined in
Block 4

BEN

Total benefit payments
from the trust fund

Endogenous variable, determined in
Block 2

RESNET

Net trust fund reserves
at the end of the
current year

- RESNL + TAX + INT - BEN

INT

BLOCK 5
FUND BALANCE
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